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Abstract 
Digital platforms generally placed under the ‘sharing economy’ and various other labels match different groups of 
users and providers and enable the increase in scale and speed for traditional transactions such as selling, renting, 
lending, labour trade, and provision of services. In many cases, these platform-mediated activities involve peer-to-
peer or peer-to-business transactions that occur in a regulatory vacuum. Since 2014, the phenomenal growth of a few 
large commercial ‘sharing’ platforms, the increasing number of economic sectors affected, and the conflicting interests 
among the stakeholders involved have made the ‘sharing economy’ a domain of conflictual rhetoric and public 
controversies, legal disputes, and even violent protests. The various expressions used to refer to ‘sharing’ platforms, 
by now appropriated by practitioners and stakeholders, are ‘floating signifiers’ for all sorts of different activities, in 
what can be called the rhetorical politics of platformisation. Terms and concepts are used in such confused and 
confusing ways that it is at times difficult to ascertain whether advocates, opponents, regulators, and policy makers 
are discussing the same phenomenon. There is a closed self-reproducing loop between conceptual ambiguity, 
rhetorical controversies, and lack of sound measurement and empirical evidence. This loop, in turn, limits the space 
for a rational debate of alternative policy options and contributes to the fragmented regulatory approaches which 
currently address the ‘sharing economy’. This theoretically-inspired and empirically-informed critical essay (i) unpacks 
the ‘sharing economy’ rhetoric, (ii) clears the field of semantic and conceptual ambiguity by providing a heuristically-
useful and empirically-grounded typology, (iii) maps the controversies against available empirical evidence on the 
functioning and on the impacts of ‘sharing’ platforms, (iv) reviews the debate and the literature which focuses on 
regulatory and policy issues, and (v) discusses all these aspects in terms of their policy implications, and of future 
European research on this topic. It does so in a unique way, because of the extensive evidence base used and the 
inter-disciplinary approach it takes in which theoretical and empirical economics, sociology, anthropology, regulatory 
and legal studies, and rhetorical analysis converge. The evidence comprises: a) 120 media items (newspapers and 
magazine articles; blogs especially by ‘sharing economy’ advocacy groups and organisations; industry briefs etc.); b) 
in-depth analysis of a purposive sample of 70 platforms (website, blog, public relations and self-reports, etc.); c) 140 
sources, consisting of scientific items (115) and broadly defined reports (25), selected using a formalised protocol and 
systematically reviewed; c) about 60 reports released by interested parties (industrial associations, platforms own 
reports and public relation materials); d) 70 indirectly relevant scientific contributions and policy reports. 
Title: The Passions and the Interests:  Unpacking the ‘Sharing Economy’ 
1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................... . . 3 
Foreword  ............................................................................................ . . 4 
 
Executive Summary ....................................................................................... . 6 
 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................... . 12 
1.1  Context: disputed values and uncertain facts ............................................ 12 
1.2  Policy Relevance ................................................................................... 14 
1.3  Objectives, approach, and sources .......................................................... 16 
 
2 Conceptualisation, sizing, and future prospects .................................... . 20 
2.1 Conceptual clarification and typology ....................................................... 20 
2.2 Dimensional relevance ........................................................................... 25 
2.3 Trends, drivers, and development paths ................................................... 27 
 
3 Main findings: rhetoric, motives, functioning, and impacts ................... . 30 
3.1 Rhetorical and more tangible ‘battles’ ...................................................... 30 
3.1.1  Neo-liberal co-optation and impacts as lobbying .............................. 31 
3.1.2  Do the ‘sharing economy’ benefits trickle down? .............................. 33 
3.1.3  Tangible ‘battles’ ......................................................................... 33 
3.2 Motivation to participate and social capital ............................................... 35 
3.3 Platforms functioning: matching and ratings ............................................. 36 
3.4 Impacts: ex-ante hypotheses and empirical evidence ................................ 39 
3.4.1  The ex-ante big picture................................................................. 39 
3.4.2  Environmental impacts ................................................................. 41 
3.4.3  Socio-economic impacts ............................................................... 41 
 
4 On regulatory matters ............................................................................. 46 
4.1 Debating regulations ............................................................................. 46 
4.2 Consumer protection open issues ............................................................ 48 
4.2.1  Negative externalities and issues of liability and insurance ................ 48 
4.2.2  Information asymmetries and related issues ................................... 49 
4.2.3  Licensing and certification ............................................................. 50 
4.2.4  Data and privacy ......................................................................... 50 
4.3 Potential issues for competition law ......................................................... 50 
 
5 Discussion and conclusions ..................................................................... 52 
5.1 Discourses and concepts ........................................................................ 52 
5.2 Facts ................................................................................................... 55 
5.3 Regulation ............................................................................................ 57 
5.4 Future research .................................................................................... 60 
 
6 Technical Annex .................................................................................... . 63 
6.1 Method and sources............................................................................... 63 
6.1.1  Design ........................................................................................ 63 
6.1.2  Process and sources ..................................................................... 64 
6.1.3  Limitations .................................................................................. 65 
6.2 Supplementary material on definitions and classifications ........................... 66 
6.2.1  Selective review of definitions ....................................................... 66 
6.2.2  Broad objects-based categorisations .............................................. 69 
6.2.3  Sector-based categorisations ......................................................... 72 
6.3 Synthetic and analytical accounts of sources............................................. 74 
6.3.1  Summary overview of scoping review findings ................................. 74 
6.3.2  Analytical tabulation of scoping review findings................................ 77 
6.3.3  Selective review of ‘sharing’ platforms ............................................ 116 
2 
 
Notes  ............................................................................................ . 126 
 
References  ............................................................................................ . 135 
 
List of Figures  ............................................................................................ . 156 
List of Tables  ............................................................................................ . 156 
List of Evidence Boxes ................................................................................. . 156 
 
 
  
3 
Acknowledgements 
This essay which focuses on the ‘sharing economy’ as a whole and discusses both 
rhetorical and empirical aspects, and a second one which deals more specifically with 
digital labour markets 1, present the results of an exploratory research project conducted 
by Unit J.03 (Information Society) at JRC between June 2015 and February 2016. 
Special thanks go to Ioannis Maghiros (Head of Unit J.03), who envisaged the scientific 
and policy relevance of this topic, and decided to launch this exploratory project. Other 
colleagues at J.03 also provided input: Gianluca Misuraca made many valuable 
suggestions and Bertin Martens’ questions and comments helped finally to corroborate 
the key tenets of the analysis of the ‘sharing economy’ presented in these two essays.  
The preliminary versions of both essays were presented in Brussels on 24 February 2016 
at an internal workshop, which was organised by Ann Branch and Maria Nyberg of DG 
Employment. The authors would like to acknowledge their support and policy insights 
which have improved the content of these essays. The workshop was attended by 
representatives of various Directorate Generals, whose comments and suggestions have 
also provided valuable input. 
The authors, however, are solely responsible for the limitations of the evidence base 
upon which these essays rest, for any conceptual and/or logical flaw in the framing of 
the topic, for biases in the interpretation of the results, and for any possible ‘value-
relevance’ (Wertfreiheit)2 that might be attributed to the discussion of the main findings. 
Two disclaimers and corresponding apologies to the community of researchers are in 
order here. First, for both essays and particularly for this one, there is a sizeable time 
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1  “The future of work in the ‘Sharing Economy’: Market Efficiency and Equitable Opportunities or 
Unfair Precarisation?” (Codagnone et al., 2016). 
2  The reference here is, obviously, to Max Weber’s distinction between ‘value-freedom’ 
(Wertbeziehung) and ‘value-relevance’ with respect to the three phases of research: what we 
research, how we do it, and how results are interpreted (Weber, 1904). 
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Foreword  
This essay is one of two that deal with the ‘sharing economy’.  While this essay deals 
with the ‘sharing economy’ in general, the second provides a more vertical analysis of 
digital labour markets (see footnote 1).  Both are based on primary (analysis of 
platforms) and secondary (scientific literature, think tanks and policy reports, and media 
accounts) sources. They take an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis, combining 
economics, sociology, anthropology, legal studies, and rhetorical analysis.  
The reader will embark on what may at first sight seem a tortuous journey into different 
literatures, codes, terminologies, and narratives. Discussion of ‘hard’ findings from 
experimental and quasi-experimental studies will alternate with analysis of ‘softer’ issues 
such as rhetorical discourses and media ‘hyped’ accounts. There is a rationale, however, 
inspired by the enduring legacy of the work of Albert O. Hirschman (1970, 1977, 1991)3 
and his view that ideas and rhetoric can become endogenous engines of social change, 
reforms, and policies.  
In the preface of his book The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991), Hirschman observed that 
opposing groups in liberal democracies sometimes get walled off from each other’s 
opinions and views. He argued that rhetorical discourses can explode into conflict simply 
as a result of the ‘imperative of the argument’. He explained that he found a detached 
analysis of surface rhetoric, placed historically and analytically in context, more useful 
than a head-on attack on one of the opposing factions. He also claimed that 
deconstructing rhetoric by using empirical evidence could help restore dialogue and 
communication between conflicting factions. He also showed how rhetorical discourses 
do not emerge from nowhere but are historically inspired and recurring. He compared, 
for instance, the neoconservative attacks on welfare states, such as Charles Murray’s 
Losing Ground (1984), to the reactions hundreds year earlier against the “Poor Laws”.  
He noted how ‘Any idea that has been out of view for a long time has a good chance of 
being mistaken for an original insight’ (1991, pp. 29-30). A case in point is the discourse 
about gigs workers performing tasks on digital labour markets for ‘pin money’. Here, an 
old idea first articulated in the 1950s and 1960s about the then-emerging temporary 
work agencies in the US has clearly resurfaced (Berg, 2016). More generally, the 
‘sharing economy’ is today a rhetorical field that needs unpacking. 
The ‘sharing economy’ (also given, among many others, the label ‘collaborative 
economy’), is potentially the ideal place for reconciling the ‘passions’ and the ‘interests’. 
In the last few years, however, it has become the domain of conflicting discourses, legal 
disputes, and at times violent strikes (i.e. traditional taxi drivers in Paris or Milan). It 
may seem churlish to deconstruct these discourses with empirical evidence and to 
challenge claims made by both naive disinterested and shrewd self-interested parties 
about ‘le magnifiche sorti e progressive’ (the magnificent and progressive fate4) of the 
‘sharing economy’. Alternatively, deflating the gloomy predictions of the harshest 
detractors of ‘sharing’ platforms may be considered apologetic. Yet, this is exactly what 
this essay aims to do. It will try to disentangle the rhetoric with available empirical 
evidence in order to enable a more rational debate at least in the discussion of policies, if 
not in the public arena. Analysis of the rhetoric, mapping of stakeholder positioning and 
interests, and robust empirical evidence are triangulated to inform policy making with a 
series of options. Currently, commercial ‘sharing’ platforms operate in an institutional 
vacuum and stand to some extent ‘above the law’. This makes it easy for ‘detractors’ to 
argue that they are simply thriving on ‘regulatory arbitrage’, rather than producing 
innovation. Decisions made by local governments and courts may create a very 
                                           
3  As evident also in the title of the other essay on the ‘sharing economy’ in general pitting the 
passions against the interests.  
4  This is a famous quote from a 1836 poem by Giacomo Leopardi’s (La Ginestra o Fiore del 
Deserto), where the Italian poet ironically challenged in the positivist context of the day the 
blind faith in an unlimited and extraordinary progress for all human race. 
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fragmented landscape in Europe. Regulatory and policy guidance is therefore urgently 
needed. 
The ‘sharing economy’ is a paradigmatic case of a policy-relevant issue where facts are 
uncertain, values disputed, and the stakes increasingly high. As such, it represents a test 
bed for the exercise of science to broker policy options honestly and transparently. It is a 
strategic case study in which the JRC could play a valuable role as a ‘boundary 
organisation’ between science and policy (Guimarães Pereira & Saltelli, 2014). This essay 
represents a first step in this direction. There are however some obstacles in data 
accessibility that must be overcome, as discussed briefly in the final part of this foreword.  
On 10 February 2016, Airbnb, Uber and 45 other commercial ‘sharing’ platforms sent an 
open letter to the Netherlands Presidency of the Council of the European Union5. An 
extract is reported below: 
In its Digital Single Market Strategy, the European Commission announced the 
development of a European agenda for the collaborative economy […] We welcome 
the Strategy as an important step in realising the benefits which our platforms can 
deliver for European consumers. We also support the Commission’s efforts to seek 
and remove obstacles in the broader European internal market for goods and services. 
In view of the upcoming European Competitiveness Council, we urge Member States 
to support these objectives and continue to seek to ensure that local and national laws 
do not unnecessarily limit the development of the collaborative economy to the 
detriment of Europeans. [...] We therefore call on the Council to acknowledge in its 
Conclusions, the positive contribution of the collaborative economy in terms of 
sustainable economic growth for Europe. 
The work carried out as part of the exploratory project on the ‘sharing economy’ shows 
that evidence is emerging on both the positive and negative effects of platforms. 
However, it also unequivocally documents that the currently available evidence on costs 
and benefits is absolutely partial and not yet conclusive. There are a few exceptions 
where data on labour platforms has been made available to researchers: i.e from 
Upwork, formerly Elance-oDesk, and Freelancers. However, most of the available 
quantitative evidence based on platforms’ own data has been produced by the platforms 
themselves (Airbnb, 2015b)6, or has been commissioned to former members of the 
Obama administration (Autor et al., 2003; Hall & Krueger, 2015; Sperling, 2015) and of 
the German Monopolies Commission (Uber, 2015f, 2015g), or co-authored (but not yet 
published in peer-reviewed journals) by academics and ‘embedded researchers’ (i.e. 
researchers who are employed by platforms and have been given access to internal 
data). The datasets and methods used to produce these reports, thus, are not publicly 
accessible for third-party scrutiny. It is more than likely that the net welfare effects of 
the ‘sharing economy’ are positive for the economy, and the society as a whole, 
including consumers, employers, and possibly workers. However, it needs to be 
demonstrated by further empirical research in general and especially in Europe. This 
research should undergo the scrutiny of peer-review. Though evidence can certainly be 
gathered through qualitative interviews and case studies, surveys, and web scraping of 
data, the important data that would show economic effects are those gathered by the 
platforms, which so far have been made available only to a few selected researchers. It 
is, thus, important that European researchers also have access to platform-generated 
data. It would provide evidence on costs and benefits for different categories of 
stakeholders, from which aggregate net welfare effects could be estimated. The 
European Commission should take steps to make this possible. 
  
                                           
5  Available at: https://www.airbnbaction.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/NLCouncilLetterCollabEcon-Final-100216-4.pdf (retrieved 11-02-
2016). 
6  After this entry in the blog summarising the overall results, one can then access the city 
specific reports (Airbnb, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b; 
Uber, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015f, 2015g). 
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Executive Summary 
Digital platforms generally placed under the ‘sharing economy’ and various other labels 
match different groups of users and providers and increase the scale and speed of 
traditional transactions such as selling, renting, lending, labour trade, and provision of 
services. In many cases, these platform-mediated activities involve peer-to-peer or 
peer-to-business transactions that occur in a regulatory vacuum. Since 2014, the 
phenomenal growth of a few large commercial ‘sharing’ platforms, the increasing 
number of economic sectors affected, and conflicting interests among the stakeholders 
involved have made the ‘sharing economy’ a domain of conflictual rhetoric and public 
controversies, legal disputes, and even violent protests. The various expressions used to 
refer to ‘sharing’ platforms, now appropriated by practitioners and stakeholders, are 
‘floating signifiers’ for all sorts of different activities, in what can be called the ‘rhetorical 
politics of platformisation’. Terms and concepts are used in such confused and confusing 
ways that it is at times difficult to ascertain whether advocates, opponents, regulators, 
and policy makers are discussing the same phenomenon. There is a closed self-
reproducing loop between conceptual ambiguity, rhetorical controversies, and lack of 
sound measurements and empirical evidence. This loop, in turn, limits the space for a 
rational debate about alternative policy options and contributes to the fragmented 
regulatory approaches which currently address the ‘sharing economy’. 
This theoretically-inspired and empirically-informed critical essay  
(i) unpacks the ‘sharing economy’ rhetoric,  
(ii) clears the field of semantic and conceptual ambiguity by providing a heuristically-
useful and empirically-grounded typology,  
(iii) maps the controversies against available empirical evidence on the functioning 
and the impacts of ‘sharing’ platforms,  
(iv) reviews the debate and the literature which focuses on regulatory and policy 
issues, and  
(v) discusses all these aspects in terms of their policy implications and of future 
European research on this topic.  
It does so in a unique way, because of the extensive evidence base used and the inter-
disciplinary approach it takes in which theoretical and empirical economics, sociology, 
anthropology, regulatory and legal studies, and rhetorical analysis converge. The 
evidence comprises: a) 120 media items (newspapers and magazine articles; blogs 
especially by ‘sharing economy’ advocacy groups and organisations; industry briefs, 
etc.); b) in-depth analysis of a purposive sample of 70 platforms (website, blog, public 
relations and self-reports, etc.); c) 140 sources, which consist of scientific items (115) 
and broadly defined reports (25), selected using a formalised protocol and systematically 
reviewed; c) about 60 reports released by interested parties (industrial associations, 
platforms own reports and public relation materials); d) 70 indirectly relevant scientific 
contributions and policy reports. 
Discourses 
The ‘sharing’ discourse and movement emerged as a form of social utopianism out of the 
broader narrative on the wisdom of the crowds and the creativity of the commons. After 
the development of ‘sharing’ platforms has taken a more ‘commercial turn’, 
disenchantment has fuelled growing criticism. Other more tangible interests and 
concerns have subsequently exacerbated the conflictual climate that currently surrounds 
the ‘sharing economy’. This essay identifies five controversial themes that it 
deconstructs and maps against available empirical evidence: 
1) The claimed neo-liberal co-optation of the ‘sharing’ movement by a few economically 
self-interested and powerful platforms through public relations and lobbying 
strategies; 
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2) The argument that platforms allegedly help revive communities by strengthening 
social capital and increasing generalised trust; 
3) The distributional effects and how they do or do not benefit less advantaged social 
groups; 
4) The promises of greener consumption (positive environmental effects) and wide net 
socio-economic welfare gain, much publicised in platforms’ public relations 
campaigns; 
5) The polarisation of the debate on regulation: laissez-faire and self-regulation versus 
top-down application of the same regulatory requirements faced by the incumbent 
industries. 
In the midst of limited empirical evidence, polarised and contrasting normative and 
prescriptive narratives are widespread and mostly unchallenged. This essay has grouped 
and categorised these narratives into social utopianism, business and economics-driven 
optimism, and social pessimism. These narratives give rise to the following four possible 
development paths:  
 Great transformation. This community-led, optimistic path (green, social, and fair 
economic prosperity) requires no major regulatory intervention. The re-embedding of 
the economy happens entirely through changes in behaviour and culture.  
 Regulated sustainability. Governments push for re-embedding through regulatory 
and traditional intervention to steer society toward sustainability and resolve the 
disempowerment and unfair effects of the ‘sharing economy’. 
 Growth-oriented globalisation. There is no societal and cultural re-embedding, 
with minimal government intervention, leading to increasing inequality, social 
polarisation, and a negative impact on sustainability. ‘Sharing’ platforms lead to 
human capital specialisation and ‘virtual labour migrations’. 
 Barbarisation. Traditional firms and work are dis-intermediated, decentralised, and 
parcelled, to be re-intermediated through algorithms. Robots substitute work, 
workers perform routinised, repetitive micro-tasks. Dis-embedding and dis-
empowerment without government intervention lead to unemployment and 
inequality.  
Conceptualisation 
Rhetorical discourses, public controversies, and more tangible ‘battles’, as it occurs in 
any kind of polarisation process, fail to consider that ‘sharing’ platforms cover a wide 
range of different activities. Policy makers, however, need conceptual clarity and should 
be aware that the diversity of this domain rules out any ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
regulation. Platforms should be categorised and distinguished according to their 
commercial orientation, dimensional relevance, and interaction modality; all of which 
shape their importance for regulatory concerns. One key contribution of this essay is the 
purposive elaboration of a conceptually-sound typology inspired by the current 
regulatory implications of different types of platforms. Two dimensions (asset mix: from 
capital to just labour; interaction modality: P2P vs. P2B) are used to identify the 
following four types:  
1) peer-to-peer assets-intensive provision of goods and services; 
2) peer-to-peer manual labour-intensive unskilled provision of personal and home 
services;  
3) peer-to-business cognitive labour-intensive unskilled provision of services to 
businesses;  
4) peer-to-business cognitive labour-intensive skilled provision of services to 
businesses.  
The range of new P2P activities in (1) raises regulatory concerns regarding consumer 
protection. In this type, other controversies have also emerged (zoning, taxes and local 
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rules for short term rental in the case of Airbnb). On the other hand, (2), (3), and (4) 
have implications for employment and social protection that are not relevant for (1) and 
are discussed at length elsewhere (Codagnone et al., 2016). Ride services (Uber), which 
fall under (3), are serious concern because they entail both consumer protection and 
labour protection issues. Ride services in this respect are very different from ride sharing 
(i.e., BlaBlaCar) and car sharing (e.g. RelayRides). The former are labour intensive and 
currently at the centre of labour disputes, whereas car sharing entails little or no work, 
and ride sharing only a limited amount of work. In P2P car and ride sharing, reservations 
are made in advance, the two peers eventually meet, and driving is mostly for personal 
use, with less frequent but longer utilisation. In ride services, on the other hand, 
scheduling is on demand with a short lead-time, the driving is for commercial use, and 
utilisation is very frequent (with more risks involved). When one peer is just giving a ride 
to the other in his/her car or renting a car rather than carrying paying passengers, 
liability policy is much more straightforward. The fact that provider and consumer meet 
increases trust; and the less frequent use reduces risks to safety. From a regulatory 
perspective, these are important factors. Last but not least, Uber is possibly the only 
‘sharing’ platform that could become an object of concern for competition law. 
Thus, the focus of more urgent policy and regulatory actions and supporting research 
has been clearly delimited. Other sub-sets of the ‘sharing economy’ have been removed 
but are possibly of interest in other policy domains.  For instance, Not-For-Profit (NFP)  
platforms in general and collaborative production platforms could be the object of 
supporting policy measures, which would aim to encourage social and industrial 
innovation. 
Facts 
In general, only limited empirical evidence is available on most of the topics raised in 
this essay. Lack of evidence is much more acute in Europe than it is in the US. For 
instance, of the 140 sources formally reviewed, only about 20 focussed on European 
empirical realities. On the other hand, while the evidence does not yet warrant 
conclusive judgements, it has nonetheless helped to deconstruct the key discourses and 
controversies and shed some light on the issues. 
Lack of a consensual definition has hindered the development of reliable statistical 
measurements of both the monetary value of, and of the level of participation in, the 
‘sharing economy’. PWC estimates, that on a global basis the ‘sharing economy’ is worth 
$15 billion and could reach $335 billion by 2025. Other estimates presented in the report 
by the EU Parliament (2016) expect that it will be worth €572 billion in the EU28 by that 
date. Various surveys about participation in the ‘sharing economy’, despite some 
variations due to the definition, agree that the phenomenon is statistically detectable 
and relevant. The fact that the 70 platforms reviewed cover both factor (capital, labour) 
and product markets (goods and services), i.e. the entire economy (and potentially 
society as a whole) is another indication of the dimensional relevance of the ‘sharing 
economy’. A number of trends and drivers explain the emergence of the ‘sharing 
economy’ and suggest that it has great potential for future growth. These trends include 
technological developments, demographic change and urbanisation, shifts in socio-
cultural attitudes to consumption and work, and also the need to economise on resource 
usage and to achieve a more environmentally sustainable growth trajectory. 
The empirical evidence found and analysed, despite evident limitations, enabled us to 
shed light especially on the issue of motivations and social capital, and on the 
functioning of ‘sharing’ platforms. On the other hand, the empirical evidence on the 
expected environmental and socio-economic effects of ‘sharing’ platforms is very limited, 
fragmented, and inconclusive. 
With respect to motivations and social capital, three broad preliminary conclusions 
emerge. First, motivations range from altruism to utilitarian goals. Second, the ‘sharing 
economy’ creates some form of genuine social capital but it is also based on reciprocal 
(negative and positive) exchanges. Third, altruistic and ideological motivations and social 
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capital building clearly seem to characterise more the early not-for-profit initiatives. So, 
the ‘sharing economy’ overall does indeed seem to be a mixture of both ‘passions’ and 
‘interests’. 
The platforms delimited by the proposed typology are by definition two-sided markets 
where cross-side network effects may emerge provided more consumers (employers) 
attract more suppliers and vice versa. The empirical evidence available shows that these 
platforms still struggle with market frictions and inefficiency, which limit their growth. In 
addition, they almost all allow ‘multi-homing’ (no lock-in for peers in one single 
platform). Frictions and multi-homing do not seem to give these platforms the capacity 
to scale up to market dominance. Though evidence is not available on how efficient the 
matching process is, for Uber, ‘multi-homing’ is in practice impossible and the platform 
clearly imposes constraints on drivers. The possibility of market power is not entirely out 
of reach for Uber. On the other hand, the empirical evidence also shows unequivocally 
that the reputational rating systems harnessed by these platforms are not entirely 
reliable, can be manipulated, and suffer from lack of input and/or from input based on 
reciprocity (reluctance by users to provide negative ratings). 
The potential benefits, costs and welfare implications of P2P platforms can be identified 
theoretically and ex-ante. They add service delivery capacity, which should decrease 
prices and increase supply and consumer choice, thereby enhancing consumer welfare.  
On the supply side, they put pressure on prices and sales of traditional businesses, 
reducing their revenues and potentially the number of jobs they offer. On the other 
hand, they create new gainful employment for additional market entrants and 
employment opportunities for independent contractors.  On this issue, however, it has 
been shown that there are also costs in terms of job security and quality (Codagnone et 
al., 2016).  
The net welfare balance from these positive and negative effects is an empirical question 
that cannot be answered by theory. Unfortunately, no robust and comprehensive ex-post 
empirical evidence on the aggregate welfare costs and benefits of these platforms was 
found.  Available empirical evidence is very partial, un-systematic and inconclusive. Out 
of 140 reviewed sources, only 12 provide empirical evidence on impacts, but none 
consider both costs and benefits. Of these, 6 focus on Airbnb, 3 on Uber, 1 on Get 
Around, and 2 on consumer welfare impacts of P2P renting in general. Only one of these 
empirical contributions focuses on Europe, whereas all the others analyse data related to 
the US. There is contrasting evidence on Airbnb impacts on the hotel industry and on 
tourism in general; apparently Uber reduce driving-under-the-influence accidents and its 
competitive pressures lead to service quality improvement by traditional taxi companies. 
However, it also decreases the latter’s revenues and the value of medallions (i.e. taxi 
licenses). Theoretical modelling studies, which calibrate limited empirical data, seem to 
suggest that P2P rental increases consumer welfare (but does not necessarily reduce 
either ownership or usage), particularly for social groups with below median incomes.  
Aside from the contributions summarised above, the rest of the evidence is simply 
anecdotal and often presented by stakeholders involved in the current controversies.  
For example, Uber and Airbnb have released dozens of reports but their reliability could 
not be independently validated because the methodologies are not transparently 
illustrated and data are not made accessible to researchers. Equally inconclusive is the 
evidence on the promised positive environmental impacts of the ‘sharing economy’. First 
order effects can reasonably be expected to be positive: staying in existing 
accommodation would reduce the construction of new hotels and/or work spaces, while 
sharing tools or goods would reduce the production of new goods, both of which should 
reduce ecological and carbon footprints.  However, a measure of net impact at aggregate 
socio-economic level should also consider the second order effects. What happens with 
the money providers extra-earned with the ‘sharing economy’ or users saved? As seen, 
Airbnb has published ‘evidence’ that their hosts spend more than tourists staying in 
hotels to show its impacts on city economies. This is self-defeating with respect to the 
claim that Airbnb produces environmental benefits. 
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Regulation 
On the one hand, proponents of self-regulation argue that formal regulation is costly and 
serves to protect vested interests. On the other hand, the proponents of extending the 
reach of formal regulation to P2P platforms argue that this would correct market failures 
that private parties on their own cannot overcome. However, more moderate approaches 
are also evolving. Consensus is growing around the idea that the ‘sharing economy’ 
cannot be left entirely unchecked, nor can it be regulated by means of traditional 
command and control approaches.  
Aside from this more general debate, there are still several unresolved issues that are 
briefly summarised below (except for labour issues that are addressed in Codagnone et 
al., 2016):  
1) Taxation. Substantive law for tax sharing activities exists, but enforcement may 
present challenges because: a) some platforms opportunistically pick the most 
favourable regulatory regime; b) micro-providers raise unique compliance concerns. 
Airbnb is currently engaged with legislators in drafting or adjusting existing 
legislation. In addition, its website requires hosts to be aware of and comply with 
local laws and their landlord’s rental policies, both of which may prohibit short-term 
rentals (Miller, 2015; Zrenner, 2015). Furthermore, Airbnb has also started to collect 
taxes in some US cities and in Amsterdam; 
2) Negative externalities, liability and insurance. Negative externalities for ride service 
platforms derive from unsafe and uninsured or under-insured driver/car. Short-term 
accommodation rentals produce negative externalities for neighbourhoods (increased 
traffic, parking places occupied, noise, tenants disturbing neighbours, etc.) and by 
removing properties from long-term rental markets. Liability and insurance, however, 
are not only matters of negative externality and may concern also the two sides of a 
‘sharing’ transaction. The issue is again to determine who is liable if something goes 
wrong and to guarantee that ‘sharing’ activities are insured. It is reasonable to 
expect that some intervention may be needed to define liability, ensure safety, and 
close the insurance gap. Under specific circumstances, the negative externalities of 
short-term rentals should also be addressed; 
3) Information asymmetries and cognitive biases. Various information asymmetries, 
exacerbated by the typical cognitive biases documented in the behavioural economic 
literature, cast doubt on the extent to which self-regulation can fully protect 
consumers. This entails various more specific issues such as the reliability of 
reputational ratings, safety standards, frauds, dispute resolution and redress. The 
chances are that consumers will make poor decisions when faced with an 
overwhelming range of choices, poor regulation and unclear avenues for recourse in 
the case of a dispute. They may also fail to fully appreciate risks and safety 
requirements. In these circumstances, regulation and/or nudges could help increase 
protection for consumers; 
4) Licensing and certification schemes. While licensing and certification schemes tend to 
be ineffective and may unduly favour incumbents, serious incidents with both Uber 
and Airbnb have caused critics to demand that they be imposed on large commercial 
platforms. Platforms have tried to boost confidence with ID checks and vetting 
processes. There are doubts, however, as to how transparent and rigorous these 
inspections are; 
5) Data and privacy. There are concerns about the amount of data that ‘sharing’ 
platforms are collecting from consumers, given the sensitive nature of some of these 
data and how they are being used; 
6) The potential implications of competition law. From the evidence reviewed on the 
characteristics and functioning of the largest platforms it seems that market 
dominance is out of reach for most of them due to heterogeneity and matching 
frictions. It is not so unlikely, however, for Uber. On the other hand, improvements 
in the matching algorithms, together with pricing strategies and use of personal data 
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without any regulatory checks, may change the situation and make market 
dominance more likely also for a few other platforms. 
The regulatory debate and policy response to the challenges posed by some sharing 
economy platforms is very fragmented in the EU.  Taxi and hotel sector regulation is 
mostly a competence of city councils and cities respond in various ways.  Labour market 
and social security regulation is mostly a state competence, and is handled differently by 
the Member States.  At a higher level, the EU may want to consider consumer protection 
and other liability issues.  However, the literature reviewed in this paper does not give 
any indication of whether the EU should respond to these regulatory challenges, and if 
so, how. It is possible, however, from the discussion so far to identify the policy options 
as regards liability and consumer protection: 
(1) No intervention. A generalised ‘no intervention’ approach is not the best solution, for 
two reasons, one specific and empirical and one normative. First, clear market 
failures in the broadly defined domain of liability and social protection must be 
tackled because they have caused incidents and raised social alarm. Second, a level 
playing field must be created where platforms and established industry players can 
compete on fair terms; 
(2) Generalised regulation of the sharing economy. This option would consist of the 
wholesale application of existing regulation for ‘offline’ businesses to the ‘sharing 
economy’, in order to create a level playing field. This option should be discarded on 
the grounds that existing regulation is outdated, cumbersome, and ineffective even 
for existing businesses; 
(3) Regulation and liberalisation. In this option, the level playing field would be created 
by applying light-touch regulation on the ‘sharing economy’ while, at the same time, 
liberalising existing industries, so that gradually the two sides of the current dispute 
would converge toward a middle ground; 
(4) Hybrid approach with ad hoc regimes. This option would be coherent with the 
conceptual and empirical analysis that clearly indicates that ‘one size does not fit all’. 
Future research 
Wide gaps in terms of empirical evidence were identified especially for Europe. The 
following are ways to start filling them:  
 Follow up and extend the review of platforms and sources presented in this essay in 
order to better cover European platforms and find more studies covering European 
empirical realities. 
 Gather qualitative and quantitative evidence in the EU in order to provide policy 
makers with a more reliable and comprehensive picture of the impact of ‘sharing’ 
platforms on the welfare of consumers and service producers. 
 Continuous monitoring and mapping the developments of the supply side (i.e. 
‘sharing’ platforms) both at global and at European level. 
 Gather and analyse big data:  
o automatic web scraping of relevant data from the selected platforms; 
o build stakeholder engagement and consensus to obtain data held by platforms 
and industry, and city-level statistics, which would provide the needed 
measurements for full cost-benefit analyses; 
o Carry out descriptive analysis of the data to provide preliminary insights into 
some of the impacts discussed in this essay; 
o Estimate and model costs and benefits. The data should be analysed using 
appropriate econometric techniques to estimate the costs and benefits of the 
selected platforms. The results could then be calibrated into a modelling 
simulation of the aggregate economic and social effects. 
 Develop statistical analyses and behavioural experiments to detect whether or not 
there is manipulation of reputational ratings and social influence effects.   
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1 Introduction 
This essay analyses digital platforms, often operating as two-sided markets and 
generally placed under the label ‘sharing economy’ (and various others, see infra), 
matching different groups of users and providers and enabling the increase in scale and 
speed for traditional transactions such as selling, renting, lending, labour trade, and 
provision of services; in many cases these platforms mediated activities involve peer-to-
peer or peer-to-business transactions that are not yet fully regulated. Anthropological 
and neuroscience studies are sometime cited (i.e., Agyeman et al. 2013) to affirm that 
sharing and collaborating are innate evolutionary and cultural traits of humanity; indeed, 
communities have shared and collaborated for millennia. Car sharing was first launched 
in 1948 in Zurich (Shaheen et al., 1999) and several small community-based car sharing 
cooperatives were operating in Northern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s (Jonsson, 
2007); yet, such activity did not scale up. The recent sustained growth of ‘sharing’ 
platforms has many explanations, but one key driver is clearly the coming of age of the 
last twenty years of industry expertise in designing market places (Horton & Zeckhauser 
2016). Currently, expressions such as the ‘sharing economy’, the ‘collaborative economy’, 
and many others (see Technical Annex, Evidence Box 4) are used indiscriminately to 
refer to very different digital platforms. Lack of conceptual clarity hinders a rational 
debate on policy and regulation, which is informed by empirical evidence and focuses on 
a clearly and consensually-defined phenomenon. 
This essay is one of a kind contribution both for the extensive evidence base comprising 
primary (analysis of 70 platforms) and secondary sources (a total of about 390 unique 
sources have been used) and for the inter-disciplinary approach it takes in which 
theoretical and empirical economics, sociology, anthropology, regulatory and legal 
studies, and rhetorical analysis converge. This theoretically-inspired and empirically-
informed critical essay unpacks the ‘sharing economy’ rhetoric and clears the field of 
semantic and conceptual ambiguity. Bringing some conceptual clarity and disentangling 
the key issues from the rhetoric is needed to design well targeted policy and regulatory 
initiatives in a context where there is no 'one size fits all' solution. It also presents the 
limited empirical evidence available on key aspects (motivations to participate, trust and 
social capital, platform matching and rating mechanisms) and impacts (environmental, 
economic, and social). Finally, it discusses policy and regulatory implications and 
presents a research agenda. 
1.1 Context: disputed values and uncertain facts 
According to Hirschman (1977), passions and interests are counterpoints that integrate 
each other. This view challenges both those who see the self as a utility-maximizing 
machine and the communitarian thinkers who long for a world without avarice and the 
quest for lucre. Passionate idealism and uncompromising utilitarian individualism are two 
faces of the same coin. Economic activity is also driven by passions and practices that 
cannot be reduced to competition between individuals or firms. At face value the ‘sharing 
economy’ seems the perfect candidate for a positive integration of passions and 
economic self-interest: an opportunity for richer human experiences and utilitarian 
gains, for both economic and social innovation. Its success could be seen, to borrow 
again from Hirschman (1970), as a mixture of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’, empowering individuals 
as both consumers and independent entrepreneurs.  
In practice however, the metaphor ‘sharing wars’ (Rauch & Schleicher 2015) may be 
more appropriate to characterise the current debate. The purposive sampling of media 
and blogs coverage performed for this essay, corroborated by other similar exercises (for 
instance, Dredge & Gyimóthy, 2015; Martin, 2016), indicates that attention peaked in 
2014-2015 and increasingly started to focus on controversies and conflictual aspects.  
The conflict between the ‘passions’ and the ‘interests’ is evident in the claim that ‘true’ 
and ‘authentic’ sharing and collaborative movements have been hijacked and co-opted in 
the rhetoric and public relations campaign of big commercial platforms such as Uber and 
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Airbnb to pursue their economic self-interest through traditional lobbying strategies 
(Caldararo, 2014; Kuttner, 2013; Lee, 2015; Walker, 2015). These ‘wars’ surrounding 
the ‘sharing economy’ have influenced the tone of the public debate and some concrete 
actions taken during the past two and a half years (2014 till mid 2016). In less than five 
years the ‘honeymoon’ with the ‘sharing economy’ has ended. Optimistic and utopian 
narratives have been substituted by accounts of legal disputes and of the ‘dark side of 
sharing economy’ (Malhotra & Van Alstyne, 2014). Accounts of the prevailing mood at 
the 2015 OuiShare festival held in Paris provide an example (Kaminska, 2015; Mims, 
2015). Five years ago in March 2011, Time Magazine placed ‘sharing’ among the 10 
ideas that would change the world (Walsh, 2011).  In the course of 2015, however, one 
of the most telling headlines was that the ‘sharing economy’ had become a matter of 
conflict among US presidential candidates (Greenhouse, 2015; McCabe & Devaney, 
2015; Wood, 2015). Equally, in Europe the period 2014-2015 has seen various legal 
disputes, controversial court decisions, and violent strikes regarding Uber and to a lesser 
extent Airbnb (see Evidence Box 3). 
Based on the observations of participants at the aforementioned 2015 ‘OuiShare’ festival 
and analysis of the vocabularies of online platforms, Richardson argues that the ‘sharing’ 
economy represents a paradox (2015). It is defined simultaneously as part of the 
capitalist economy and as an alternative to it. Some see it as a remedy to a hyper-
consumerist culture: access rather than ownership, reuse and leveraging of underutilised 
goods and assets. The perception that the vocabulary of sharing hides new forms of 
inequality and polarisation is gaining ground. As recently illustrated by Martin (2016), 
‘sharing economy’ discourses are framed in conflicting ways ranging from a path to 
sustainability (i.e. economic opportunity for all, sustainable form of consumption, 
decentralised and equitable economy, etc.) to a nightmarish form of neoliberalism' (i.e. 
unregulated market places, reinforced neo-liberal paradigm, false innovation, etc.). 
These controversies arise in debates between supporters and opponents, who harness 
conflicting rhetoric and present ad hoc ‘evidence’. Disputes flourish as robust evidence is 
limited and/or inconclusive, and there is no basis on which to adjudicate opposing 
claims. The practice of platforms not to disclose important metrics or to make them 
available only to some researchers further fuels a debate that is not informed by 
evidence. For instance, the paper co-authored by Krueger and a researcher working for 
Uber (Hall & Krueger 2015), has done more to provoke further controversies than to 
provide evidence for a more balanced debate. Hence, not only in the press and in reports 
by politically-positioned think tanks, but also in many peer-reviewed academic essays 
one finds value-loaded, normative, and prescriptive claims. These contributions are at 
times visionary and futuristic and can have both an optimistic (more often) and a 
pessimistic bent. Even ‘academic’ essays can contain apocalyptic visions of a ‘sharing 
economy’ that accelerates social degradation and further deepens inequality (Caldararo, 
2014). There is also the opposite vision that the sharing economy renews and revives 
the ‘American Dream’ (Jefferson-Jones, 2015).  
It is important to note that there is a closed self-reproducing loop between conceptual 
ambiguity, rhetorical controversies, lack of sound measurements and empirical evidence, 
and fragmented or non-existent policy and regulatory approaches. The various 
expressions used to refer to these new digital platforms which match different groups of 
users and providers, now appropriated by practitioners and stakeholders, are ‘floating 
signifiers’ for all sorts of different activities, in what can be called the rhetorical politics of 
platformisation. Current usage is confused and confusing to the point of making 
expressions such ‘sharing economy’ or ‘collaborative economy’ conceptually trivial. It is 
at times difficult to ascertain whether advocates, opponents, regulators, and policy 
makers are discussing the same phenomenon. In reality 'sharing' platforms diverge in 
terms of dimensional relevance (i.e. from a few hundred users to millions of users), 
interaction modality (i.e. peer-to-peer or P2P vs. business-to-consumers or B2C), and 
type of assets being exchanged (i.e. a property vs. one’s labour). Hence, they differ also 
in terms of their current regulatory implications (e.g. market access and licensing, 
liability and insurance, consumer protection, labour laws), and their potential to disrupt 
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incumbent industries. It is pointless to discuss, for instance, BlaBlaCar and Uber (see 
Evidence Box 5 in the Technical Annex), or TaskRabbit and Time Banksi, as part of the 
same domain. Grouping highly profitable companies like Airbnb and Uber alongside 
voluntary gift-giving exchanges like Freecycle or CouchSurfing contributes to fuel 
conflicting rhetorics and controversies. It comes as no surprise that without a clearer and 
consensual definition, no reliable measurement of the phenomenon’s dimensional 
relevance exists. Different estimates of the ‘sharing economy’, either in terms of its 
monetary value, or in terms of the number of people involved, sometimes differ by 
orders of magnitude. 
1.2 Policy Relevance 
The heated debate is not unjustified and is clearly important for policy given the 
phenomenal growth of some of the platforms included under the ‘sharing economy’ 
label. In addition, a vast range of economic sectors is affected by platforms which define 
themselves, or are defined by others, as part of it. Finally, aside from symbolic and 
rhetorical battles, there are tangible juxtapositions of interests among clearly identifiable 
stakeholders.  
As said, lack of a clear definition prevents reliable measurement of the size of the 
sharing economy, however we look at it. These quantitative measurements are 
presented and discussed in Section 2.2. Here, it suffices to anticipate that, regardless of 
the differences and possible methodological flaws, estimates agree that the broadly-
defined ‘sharing economy’ is a statistically detectable phenomenon. An indirect way of 
providing a preliminary view of the importance of ‘sharing’ platforms is to look at a few 
facts about the largest ones. As of June 2015, there were 17 ‘sharing economy’ 
companies (11 private and 6 listed on stock exchanges) worth more than 1 billion US $ 
(Owyang, 2015c; VB Profiles & Crowd Companies, 2015). Of these, 12 were based in the 
US (of which 8 in California), one in India (Olacabs), one in China (Kuaidi Dache), one in 
Australia (Freelancer), one in New Zealand (Trademe), and one in the UK 
(TransferWise).  Uber was valued at between $40 and 50 billion and Airbnb at between 
$10 and 20 billion (Austin et al., 2015; Bloomberg Brief, 2015) – i.e. more than Avis 
($5.2 billion) and Hertz ($12.5 billion) and more than the Hyatt hotel chain (Cannon & 
Summers, 2014). Airbnb claims that it is present in 34,000 cities covering 190 countries; 
that it has had 35 million guests since its launch in 2008 and 1.2 million listings 
(Bloomberg Brief, 2015)ii. Uber is present in 230 cities in 58 countries. The French ride 
sharing start-up, BlaBlaCar, has expanded beyond France's borders, recruiting 10 million 
members in 13 countries. In the summer of 2014, it raised 100 million US $ in venture 
capital (Bisserbe & Landauro, 2014). Since 2014 platforms such as Airbnb, Uber and 
BlaBlaCar have grown between 150% and 250% in terms of the countries they cover, 
number of transactions, and number of users. From the analysis of 70 platforms 
conducted for this essay, it emerges that they are increasingly involved in important 
sectors of the economy such as transportation, accommodation and rental, retail, office 
space and logistics, finance and consumer credit, and the labour market. Lately, new 
start-ups, such as Mosaic or Yeloha, are also entering the energy market (Owyang, 
2015d). As a matter of fact, the platforms reviewed cover both factor markets (capital, 
labour) and product markets (goods and services), and therefore the entire economy. 
They could also potentially affect society at large, in as much as they deliver on the 
promises of building social capital and reviving participation and solidarity.  
In view of the potential of these platforms for disruptive economic and social innovation, 
it should come as no surprise that there are several interests at stakes:  
a. users/consumers (who supposedly receive large benefits from cheaper and more 
convenient choices as a result of more competition. However, they may also face 
risks due to lack of consumer protection and clear liability rules);  
b. users/providers (i.e. the alleged ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ who drive the cars, let their 
homes, or perform errands using the various platforms. This is the most diverse and 
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controversial group from a policy perspective since economic opportunities may be 
offset by concerns about erosion of workers’ rights.);  
c. the platforms (the owners of the ‘sharing economy’ platforms who have much to gain 
or lose, depending on future regulatory decisions);  
d. established operators (i.e., operators in potentially disrupted industries such as taxi 
drivers, who stand to lose the most if the ‘sharing economy’ remains unregulated);  
e. general public interest (the ‘sharing economy’ can have positive or negative spill 
overs also for the economy and society as a whole, as it does, for instance, with the 
positive externalities of innovation, or with security risks, or the alleged erosion of 
the broadly defined labour contract and of the tax base).  
Opinions and rhetoric on the above issues abound, but solid evidence is lacking. In this 
context of conflicting views and interests, and limited evidence, policy makers and 
regulators face the challenging task of tackling entirely new activities that blur the 
personal and the commercial. They must avoid stifling potentially beneficial innovation 
but ensure competition and consumer protection, preserve labour rights, and avoid the 
erosion of the tax base (Ranchordas, 2015; Sunil & Noah, 2015).  
Indeed, in the past five years many platforms have reached scale and developed to 
some extent not fully regulated; a main point voiced by disrupted incumbents and critics 
is, in fact, that they are benefitting from a regulatory arbitrage. One of the various 
cleavages currently characterising the public debate on the ‘sharing economy’ sees those 
in favour of no regulation and of letting platforms self-regulate opposed by the 
proponents of strict regulations and bans. In between these two extremes a consensus is 
emerging that recognises platforms cannot stand above the law but neither should they 
be stifled by outdated regulatory regimes (Einav et al., 2015; Edelman & Gerardin 
2015). On the other hand, as pointed out by law scholars (i.e., King, 2015; Lougher & 
Kalmanowicz, 2016), it cannot be ruled out that ‘sharing economy’ platforms will raise 
serious competition policy challenges such as concentration through network effects 
(single dominant player), locking in parties located on one side (lack of real multi-
homing possibility), power to reference rivals and users with risks of collusions and 
discrimination. 
In the midst of symbolic and tangible controversies and conflicts, both in the U.S.A and 
in Europe fragmented responses to this new phenomenon have been given only by local 
administrations and courts, which undermines the existence of national (in the USA) and 
European single market conditions; this at European level is further exacerbated by the 
fact that in 2015 and in the first months of 2016 some fairly different national level 
legislative and regulatory proposals are emerging. In this context, 2015 was a year in 
which various more encompassing assessments were announced whose key elements 
include both competition laws and consumer protection legislation. 
In the U.S.A the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced the launch of an inquiry 
into the ‘sharing economy’ in order to adopt regulation that would protect consumers 
without hindering innovation (Jopson & Bradshaw, 2015). This was followed by a 
consultation and a high level workshop taking place in June 2015 (FTC, 2015a, 2015b, 
2015c)iii. In the UK, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in its annual plan for 
2015 planned to scrutinise the business practices of internet ‘intermediaries’ and 
‘gatekeepers’ (Lougher & Kalmanowicz, 2016, p. 88). At the same time, the House of 
Lords has conducted an inquiry into online platforms and the EU Digital Single Market 
strategy, including oral and written contributions also by Uber and Airbnb 
representatives (House of Lords, 2016). Also in the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) have looked into the ‘sharing economy’ as regards the implications of P2P lending 
for consumers and competition (Lougher & Kalmanowicz, 2016, p. 88). 
In 2014, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in an opinion on the 
‘sharing economy’ called the Commission to take appropriate action to ensure both the 
right conditions for innovation and consumer protection(EESC, 2014, p. 2 and 9). In 
2015, the European Commission took action in both the Digital Single Market Strategy 
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(DSM) and the Single Market Strategy. The latter announced an assessment of digital 
platforms (including those of the ‘sharing economy’) in order to decide whether further 
action was required. At the time this essay was being finalised (early June 2016), a 
Communication from the Commission (European Commission, 2016) that provides 
guidance to Member States had just been released. The ‘sharing economy’ has also 
called into question EU level competition policy (Lougher & Kalmanowicz, 2016, p. 88). 
The EU Competition Commissioner, Margrethe Vestager, reported that the Commission 
has received complaints from key ‘sharing’ platforms with respect to restrictions they 
have encountered in some Member States. She announced that issues related to the 
‘sharing economy’ will be monitored in both the short and the long termiv. Subsequently, 
the EU’s Director General for Competition, Johannes Laitenberger, announced that 
Internet platforms will also continue to be assessed through public consultationv. Finally, 
the ‘sharing economy’ has been analysed in various reports published by the European 
Parliament (European Parliament, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016), the most recent of which 
warns about the costs that could be incurred by the lack of a unified European approach 
(European Parliament, 2016). 
The conceptual and empirical analyses presented here will shed light on various issues 
that will have to be operationalised now that the guidance Communication has been 
released, and on various other aspects concerning both consumer protection and 
competition policy. 
1.3 Objectives, approach, and sources 
In view of the context and importance described above, the five key objectives of this 
essay are to:  
i. provide a better conceptualisation that is both heuristically useful and empirically 
grounded, and an assessment of the current dimensional relevance of the ‘sharing 
economy’ and its future prospects (presented in Section 2). 
ii. critically analyse and unpack rhetorical discourses and controversies (presented in 
Section 3.1), in order to, subsequently:  
iii. map these controversies against the available empirical evidence on how ‘sharing’ 
platforms function (presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3) and their environmental, 
economic and social impacts (Section 3.4). 
iv. review the debate and literature, focussing on regulatory and policy issues (Section 
4).  
v. discuss the policy and regulatory implications of the main findings of (ii), (iii), and 
(iv) in view of the typology and other aspects resulting from (i), and suggest a 
future agenda for research in support of EU level policy (presented in Section 5). 
As should be obvious from the previous considerations and the objectives above, this 
essay is not limited to the analysis of available empirical evidence but it has also tackled 
conceptual issues and rhetorical dimensions. The decision to do so is obviously related to 
objectives (i) and (ii) and springs from theoretical and epistemological inspirations. 
These in turn shaped the method and design for the identification and selection of the 
secondary sources reviewed. This essay, in fact, departs from a-critical empiricism in the 
holistic study of the ‘sharing economy’ developed to support the policy-making process.  
In a famous passage from his First Book of Aphorisms (1620)vi Francis Bacon juxtaposed 
‘ants’ (the empiricists) to ‘spiders’ (the rationalists), but noted that often human 
observers behave like ‘bees’ because they gather material from the flowers but digest it 
and transform it by their own power. This means that between the bare empirical facts 
and abstract theories there is a middle ground where interpretation, concepts, and ideas 
are not entirely determined by facts. Following the pragmatist critique of two 
empiricismsvii and, as anticipated in the foreword, finding inspiration from the ‘empirical 
idealism’ viii  of Albert O. Hirschman, ideas, values, and rhetorical discourses are 
considered in this essay as having autonomous effects on the process of change itself, 
regardless of whether or not they are empirically grounded. They are part of the 
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endogenous mechanisms of social and economic change that the scholar aims to 
understand and explain and the policy maker would like to influence. In their analysis of 
discourses on the ‘sharing economy’ and its impact on the tourism industry Dredge & 
Gyimóthy (2015, pp. 2-3) show that the initial framing of issues publicly debated create 
path dependencies that prioritise certain aspects to the detriment of others and end up 
determining the agenda for public and policy discourses and debates. Furthermore, this 
affects the identification of research needs and how solutions to problems are shaped. It 
is, thus, important to uncover the power mechanisms leading to asymmetric production 
of knowledge and discourses. 
The ‘sharing economy’ is currently a typical situation where values are disputed, facts 
uncertain, and stakes high. In this context, this essay tries to disentangle the rhetoric 
with available empirical evidence to enable a more rational debate, at least in the 
discussion of policies, if not in the public arena. In recent years, the ‘Evidence-Based 
Policy’ (EBM) agenda has been challenged and the expression turned on its head by 
authors who talk about ‘Policy-Based Evidence Making’ (Sanderson, 2011; Strassheim & 
Kettunen, 2014; Torriti, 2010)ix. Critics argue that, even where facts are uncertain and 
values in disputex, the EBP approach still relies on a-critical forms of empiricism and 
technocratic 'scientisation' xi . The present essay, however, does not aim to provide 
regulators and policy makers with clear-cut, ‘pure scientist’ solutions. Instead, it unpacks 
the rhetoric, removes semantic and conceptual confusion, and identifies what empirical 
evidence is available and what is missing. It is designed and written in the spirit of what 
Pielke (2007, p. 18-20) defines as the ‘honest brokering of policy options’. It does not 
follow a purely scientific approach, nor does it stealthily reduce the options to advocate 
specific solutions. This does not mean, however, that the principle of scientific analysis 
based on sound design, methods, and evidence gathering should be abandoned in favour 
of a relativistic and constructivist account. On the contrary, it is strongly rooted in the 
scientific method but starts from the ‘humble’ premise that scientific research will not 
solve all disputes. It follows that sources were selected to capture both empirical 
evidence and rhetorical discourses. Specific attention was paid to cases where evidence 
produced by scholars is used in the media or vice versa where media accounts are used 
by scholars. It is, in fact, under these circumstances that evidence can be manipulated 
and may stir up more controversy instead of facilitating more rational debate. A case in 
point is an article on Uber drivers (Hall & Krueger, 2015) that has attracted very 
negative comments in the media. Another example is a study, widely covered in the 
media, which uses preliminary evidence to conclude that ‘sharing’ platforms 
disproportionately benefit lower income groups compared to other groups (Fraiberg & 
Sundararajan, 2015) xii. 
The evidence upon which this essay rests comprises both primary and secondary sources. 
A detailed illustration of the methodology and process followed for the gathering of 
evidence and of its limitations is presented in the Technical Annex (Section 6.1).  Below 
a brief description of these aspects is presented:  
1) an exploratory review of 120 media items (newspapers and magazine articles; blogs 
especially by ‘sharing economy’ advocacy groups and organisations xiii ; industry 
briefs, etc.) was performed; this identified key controversial aspects and the most 
visible platforms, and the most frequently cited reports and academic contributions. 
This review informed the following two steps (listed sequentially, but mostly 
conducted in parallel); 
2) primary data from an in-depth analysis of a purposive sample of 70 platforms 
(websites, blogs, public relations and self-reports, etc.); a summary table with 
classification, brief descriptions, and metrics (when available) is reported in the 
Technical Annex (Table 6).  
3) using a combination of the scoping and critical review methods (see Section 6.1) 140 
sources, including scientific items (115) and broadly defined reports (25), were 
selected using a formalised protocol and systematically reviewed; summary statistics 
on these sources are presented in Section 6.3.1 (see Table 2;Table 3; and Table 4), 
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and they are all analytically summarised in Table 5 spanning forty pages of the 
Technical Annex. With a few exceptions, these sources only include contributions 
produced by ‘disinterested third parties’xiv. 
4) a total of 60 reports released by interested parties (industrial associations, platforms 
own reports and public relation materials) have not been included in the formal 
review but have been used to support the analysis of platforms and of the 140 
formally-reviewed sources. Similarly, about 70 indirectly relevant scientific 
contributions and policy reports have also been used as sources to contextualise and 
integrate the above-mentioned sources. 
So, in total 460 sources were used (70 platforms and 390 secondary sources), of which 
400 are fully referenced either in the table that gives an overview of the platforms 
(Table 6) or in the references section at the end of the document. 
The disclaimers on the limitations in the empirical evidence used are presented 
transparently in the cited Technical Annex (see Sections 6.1.3 and 6.3.3). First, in both 
the scoping review method and in the sampling of platforms, there is a purposive 
element of selection based on relevance with respect to the conceptual and theoretical 
framing of this essay. Second, the last less systematic update in the literature search, 
given the time lag between the completion of the first formalised review and final 
publication, may have missed some important contributions and/or added an additional 
element of selectivity. Third, it is possible that the criteria used for the search strategy 
may have led to give preference to English language sources and to more visible and 
large platforms, which in turns is reflected in the imbalance toward North American 
based analyses. Apart from the observation that a EU28 review was beyond the 
objective and scope of this essay, it can be safely stated that such an imbalance is the 
empirical result of the fact that debates and evidence are more advanced in the U.S.A, 
as the most successful platforms originated there.  
Another aspect worth mentioning, that is not a limitation but a choice, concerns the 
literature on car sharing and on how ‘sharing’ platforms function as digital labour 
markets. The first search identified a substantial and consolidated body of literature 
dealing with car sharing. This has been studied for some years and a few literature 
reviews already exist (i.e. Furuhata et al., 2013; see also Evidence Box 5). Given the 
more general nature of this essay only a selection of contributions on car sharing are 
included and, by choice, a more extensive vertical focus on this specific domain was not 
pursued. As a result of the same first search, it became clear that there is an emerging 
body of literature which deals specifically with digital labour markets. This literature 
became the object of study in the second essay on these markets mentioned earlier 
(Codagnone et al., 2016) and only a few exemplificative studies are considered in this 
one. 
The sheer volume of sources reviewed and presented for the sake of transparency and 
perusal by the readers justifies the split between a core text, and a much longer 
Technical Annex which occupies much of the space. The core text has 5 sections, 
including this introduction and its contents have already been described at the beginning 
of this section next to each of the objectives. Here, therefore, only the contents of the 
Technical Annex are briefly illustrated. The Technical Annex is included for the sake of 
referencing as Section 6. The method and sources are presented in more detail in 
Section 6.1. Section 6.2 contains supplementary material on conceptual issues and 
integrates the analysis presented in Section 2. Section 6.3 contains synthetic and 
analytical accounts of the sources and of the platforms reviewed and a table with basic 
information on the 70 ‘sharing’ platforms. Note also that additional illustrations and 
evidence, including those from the 140 formally-reviewed sources, are placed in the 
notes at the end of this essay. 
On the way the contents are structured and presented, a consideration is in order with 
regard to how the findings of component (3) of the evidence base are used. The formal 
review of 140 sources is potentially a self-standing output and will, in fact, be refined 
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and updated and sent for publication in peer-reviewed journals. Its findings, however, 
are not reported, as is usual for reviews, with details on homogenous groups of 
contributions. Instead, they are used selectively to discuss the various topics around 
which this essay is built. So these findings, while mostly reported in Section 3 where 
they are integrated with other sources, also inform the conceptual and prospective 
analysis contained in Section 2 and the overview of regulatory issues presented in 
Section 4. 
Finally, two clarifications are in order as to terminological use and attribution of 
normative and prescriptive views and narratives. First, the use of the ‘sharing economy’ 
label in sources and/or by players is considered to be empirical evidence and is taken at 
face value. Accordingly, although in Section 2 such usage is challenged and critically 
discussed, this general expression is used throughout this essay and should be 
understood in the broadest possible sense xv . Second, excessively optimistic or 
pessimistic (critical) normative and prescriptive views also form part of the empirical 
evidence and are attributed as far as possible to specific sources. This essay maintains 
an impartial position and if, at times, the reader should get a different impression, this is 
only due to limits of expression. 
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2 Conceptualisation, sizing, and future prospects 
In the approach adopted, ideas, rhetorical discourses, and controversies are part of the 
empirical evidence and must be considered when envisaging policy and regulatory 
approach. On the other hand, they contribute to a semantic and conceptual ambiguity 
that hinders a comprehensive and sound identification of the most relevant issues for 
regulatory and policy actions. It is, thus, useful to review and unpack ‘sharing’ and 
‘crowd’ rhetoric as this will help to clear the fog obfuscating conceptually what is at stake.  
2.1 Conceptual clarification and typology 
The ‘sharing economy’ (and other alternative labels) is used as a ‘floating signifier’ for a 
diverse range of activities (Nadeem, 2015, p. 13). This is shown in Figure 1 and can be 
gathered from all the additional material and evidence in Section 6.2 of Technical Annex 
(see, for instance, Evidence Box 4, which gives a dozen different definitions), and in the 
wide diversity of the 70 platforms reviewed, all of which are defined or define 
themselves as being part of the ‘sharing economy’ (Table 6). This section builds on, and 
refers to, this supplementary empirical evidence, so that many of the details and sources 
presented there are taken for granted and not always referenced in what follows. 
Figure 1: Floating signifiers  
 
Source: authors’ elaboration  
The confused and confusing way in which practitioners use the various labels is one of 
the empirical findings of this essay. This makes it hard even for scholars to formulate 
‘externally rigorous’ definitions when they empirically have to consider how agents 
define themselves. One of these empirical contributions, for instance, is entitled ‘The 
sharing economy: Why people participate in collaborative consumption’ (Hamari et al., 
2015). One wonders what the conceptual relation between the ‘sharing economy’ and 
‘collaborative consumption’ is. Are they synonyms? Or were the authors interested in 
collaborative consumption but had to include ‘sharing economy’ in the title because it is 
currently ‘trendier’? In some cases, authors pragmatically accept this semantic confusion 
that characterises practice. They are satisfied for the purposes of their inquiries to 
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consider the ‘sharing economy’ as comprising ‘peer-to-peer internet platforms (including 
Airbnb, Uber, TaskRabbit, Just Park...) which empower individuals to monetise their 
underutilised assets, time and skills’ (Martin, 2016, p. 153). A briefing paper by the UK 
Office for National Statistics, after stressing that the lack of a good definition and 
consensual definition of the ‘sharing economy’ hampers its measurement, concludes that 
it can be regarded ‘… as being activity that is facilitated by digital platforms which enable 
people or businesses to share property, resources, time, or skills, allowing them to 
‘unlock’ previously unused or under-used assets’ (ONS, 2016, p. 5). Martin, who adopts 
a widely-used broad categorisation, identifies four domains: accommodation ‘sharing’ 
platforms; car and ride ‘sharing’ platforms; peer-to-peer employment markets; and, 
peer-to-peer platforms for sharing and circulating resources (2016). There are several 
other broad-based categorisations (see summary in Section 6.2.2) such as the one 
proposed by Shor and associates (Dubois, et al., 2014; Schor, 2014, 2015; Schor & 
Fitzmaurice, 2015; Schor et al., 2014): recirculation of goods (i.e. Craigslist, eBay); 
increased utilisation of tangible assets (i.e. Zipcar, Relay Rides, Uber, CouchSurfing, 
Airbnb); exchange of services (i.e. Time banking, TaskRabbit, Zaarly); sharing of 
productive assets; and building of social connections (i.e. Mama Bake, Soup Sharing, 
and EatWithMe). These broad-based categories are a hybrid mix of factor markets 
(goods and labour) with specific sectors (accommodation and transportation). More 
consistently, one could identify three broad categories and match them to a traditional 
economic classification as follows: a) recirculation of goods (second-hand and surplus 
goods markets); b) increased asset utilisation (production factors markets); and c) 
service and labour exchanges (labour market). 
All of these pragmatic approaches represent a good enough first approximation that, 
however, does not fully capture aspects that are important from both an analytical-
empirical and a policy-oriented perspective. First, one of the key rhetorical and 
ideological discourses about ‘unlocking the potential of idle assets’ is used as a key 
definitional element without empirically questioning the differences in the kind of asset 
used and to what extent this asset is actually under-utilised. The essay on digital labour 
markets explains that (i) leveraging a property or just labour makes a difference in 
terms of distributional and employment effects, and (ii) in many cases, it is not a matter 
of using free time for ‘pin money’ but a way of making necessary income (Codagnone et 
al., 2016). Second, differences in the interaction modality (peer-to-peer, P2P, business-
to-consumer, B2C, and various other modalities that the review of 70 platforms 
document) are not fully considered. Digital platforms which define themselves as part of 
the ‘sharing economy’ include cases of B2C transactions (i.e. one of the early ‘sharing 
champion’ such as Zipcar), but also of business-to-business (B2B, see for instance 
Cargomatic or Cohealo in Table 6) and government-to-government (G2G, see for 
instance MuniRent in Table 6). Third, the distinction between commercial and not-for-
profit (NFP) platforms, an aspect that is also related to current rhetorical battles, is not 
receiving enough attention. Fourth, platforms diverge in terms of dimensional relevance 
(from a few hundred users to millions of users). Fifth, the review of the 70 platforms 
presented in Table 6 shows that there are many more domains of the four broad groups 
listed above. Finally, and most importantly, there are differences that cut across these 
broad-based categorisations in terms of the regulatory and policy implications. Platforms 
placed in the same broad category (for instance, Uber and BlaBlaCar) differ widely in 
terms of their current regulatory implications (e.g. market access and licensing, liability 
and insurance, consumer protection, labour law), and of their potential to disrupt 
incumbent industries. Indeed, the various distinctions are important from a scientific 
perspective but most of all for regulation and policy, as clearly a 'one size fits all' policy 
and regulatory approach is inappropriate. It is worth pointing out that this is also the 
perspective expressed (orally or in writing) in public consultations by representatives of, 
for instance, Relay Ridesxvi, and of Airbnb and Uberxvii. 
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The reason why the first approximations above are considered insufficient is that they do 
not enable us to produce a typology (rather than a taxonomyxviii) to inform policy making 
or a future research agenda, both of which are key objectives of this essay. A typology is 
an organised system of types that can be used for ‘forming and refining concepts, 
drawing out underlying dimensions, creating categories for classification and 
measurement, and sorting cases’.(Collier et al., 2012). Most importantly ‘typology 
mapping is a strong form of theory development in that it tends to ensure greater 
parsimony’ (Cohen & Muñoz, 2015, p. 4)xix. A good typology should (i) have descriptive 
power and be empirically grounded, (ii) reduce complexity, and (iii) identify similarities 
and difference. 
Current definitions do not help build a typology because they tend to be ‘ostensive’ (by 
pointing and exemplification) rather than ‘intensional’ (connotative)xx. Even when they 
are ‘intensional,’ they sometimes cut our important empirical parts of the ‘sharing 
economy’ field. So, they are either all-encompassing and ‘trivial’ (grouping together 
items that are similar with regard to a few characteristics and dissimilar with regard to 
many others), or too restrictivexxi. A few typologies have been presented for the ‘sharing 
economy’ as whole (i.e. Lamberton and Rose 2012; Cohen & Muñoz, 2015; Schor, 2014) 
xxii, and there are also industry-based sectoral categorisations (i.e. Owyang, et al., 2014; 
VB Profiles & Crowd Companies, 2015; PIPAME, 2015; see illustration in Section 6.2.3). 
Yet, only for the broadly-defined ‘transportation sector’ there are exhaustive and 
empirically-grounded distinctions between different business models that are used in the 
typology proposed here (see sources and description in Evidence Box 5). 
The starting point for the typology proposed here is the following pragmatic and 
practice-oriented definition of the ‘sharing economy’: ‘the expression sharing economy is 
commonly used to indicate a wide range of digital commercial or non-profit platforms 
facilitating exchanges amongst a variety of players through a variety of interaction 
modalities (P2P, P2B, B2P, B2B, G2G) that all broadly enable consumption or productive 
activities leveraging capital assets (money, real estate property, equipment, cars, etc.) 
goods, skills, or just time’. This is an all-encompassing definition that nonetheless 
contains better specified elements (i.e. profit or not for profit orientation, interaction 
modalities, the concrete distinction between types of assets). If these elements are 
integrated with a reasoning on policy and regulatory concerns, it is possible to arrive at a 
more delimited and useful typology by progressive elimination. 
This progressive elimination aims to identify consistent types that are relevant 
scientifically and especially from a policy perspective in terms of the regulatory and 
policy concerns they raise in the short term. The types discarded from the first typology 
(Figure 2) are still interesting from a scientific perspective and some of the formally 
reviewed sources focus on them and are discussed in Section 3. Currently, they do not 
raise regulatory concerns, but they could be the target of support policy measures (i.e. 
for social innovation, public sector innovation, and industrial innovation).  
It is important to stress that the dimensions used to define the next two typologies (see 
Figure 2 and Figure 3Error! Reference source not found.) must be seen as defining a 
continuum rather than clear-cut dichotomous classes. They are displayed in discrete 
clusters for simplicity’s sake, but in both graphs a ‘hybridisation’ area is delimited for 
cases that to some extent overlap different types. 
Platforms can be categorised and distinguished according to their commercial 
orientationxxiii, dimensional relevancexxiv, and interaction modalityxxv, all which in turn 
shapes their importance for regulatory concernsxxvi. In the first preliminary typology used 
for progressive elimination of cases, the following two dimensions are used: a) profit 
orientation (commercial vs. not-for-profit); b) the interaction modality in the sense of 
whether the transaction is peer-centred/led or instead organisation-centred/led. Cases 
that possibly overlap either one of these two dimensions are placed in the hybridisation 
areas. 
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Figure 2: First typology (profit orientation and interaction modality) 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration  
So, in the above typology Quadrant 1 (Q1) contains an empirically very marginal type 
that is not worth considering further. In Q4, there are not-for-profit peer-to-peer 
(P2P) small platforms (e.g. for time-banking, lending of goods, makers’ spaces), which 
often act locally and though they provide potential for social innovation, they currently 
raise no regulatory or policy questions. A sort of hybrid case is represented by platforms 
for collaborative production in that they can be either P2P, P2B, or B2P and they may or 
may not have a fully commercial for-profit orientation. At any rate, they are small and 
not currently a matter of regulatory concern (with the possible exception of Intellectual 
Property Rights) and could be the target of industrial innovation policy. Q2 includes 
commercial platforms that are B2P, B2B, or G2G: (i) Business-to-Consumer (B2C) or 
Business-to-Business (B2B) platforms, no matter how innovative or large, are fully 
regulated by existing legislation and raise no new regulatory challenges. (ii) 
Government-to-Government (G2G) platforms (i.e. hospitals renting from each other 
under-utilised medical equipment using Cohealo, or municipalities renting from each 
other under-utilised heavy duty equipment using MuniRent) are currently small. In the 
future, they may become a source of public sector innovation and related support policy, 
but currently they do not pose urgent regulatory issues.  
The core type identified by this preliminary step is represented by the platforms in Q3 
(including those that are placed in the hybridisation box as they involve also P2B and not 
only P2P interactions). These are Commercial peer-to-peer (P2P) or peer-to-
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business (P2B) platforms such as Uber, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, Upwork. They have a large 
user base, raise short-term regulatory concerns (market access, taxation, consumer 
protection and liability, and labour law), and the largest players disrupt incumbent 
industries and trigger their protest. This group still includes platforms with important 
differencesxxviiand, thus, is further broken down into four types in the following final 
typology proposed in this essay.  
Figure 3: Final typology (interaction modality and asset mix) 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration  
The extreme values of the ‘interaction modality’ dimension are exchanges between peers 
(P2P) and peers selling their labour to businesses (P2B). The second dimension 
considers that broadly defined ‘under-utilised’ assets can take different forms and entails 
a different mix of tangible things (money, real estate property, a car, second hand or 
bespoke goods), less tangible but very valuable skills, or free time to offer one’s labour. 
For this dimension, it is important to repeat that it must be seen as defining a continuum 
and not clear-cut, dichotomous classes. Obviously, letting an apartment on Airbnb and a 
car with Relay Rides, or selling goods also requires some work. It is equally obvious, 
however, that in these cases most or the larger part of value obtained comes from the 
property or goods, unlike doing errands for other peers in TaskRabbit or performing 
micro-tasks for businesses in Amazon Mechanical Turk.  At any rate, at one extreme 
there is time and basic labour (L) and unskilled work is offered, whereas at the other 
extreme only capital is offered, with no or little labour (K). In between these two 
extremes, other mixes are possible, such as a lot of labour using a physical asset (a 
car), labour and skills to produce a good (Etsy), only goods to sell or loan, or 
professional skills. 
In Quadrant (1) the extreme ideal-typical case is the lending of money with basically no 
labour input but from peers to peers (i.e. Lending Club). Because lending (and to some 
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extent crowdfunding platforms) represents vertical specific activities with very distinct 
regulatory implications, they are no longer considered here. In addition, no scientific 
study was found on this topic. Hence, quadrant (1) can be described as ‘asset-intensive 
provision of goods and services’. Platforms where more skills (i.e. Etsy) and/or work (i.e. 
BlaBlaCar) are needed, or where there is also possible interaction with businesses, are 
placed (i.e. loaner goods) in the hybridisation area. Quadrant 2 includes platforms which 
enable peers to provide labour-intensive services to other peers through unskilled 
manual work (i.e. TaskRabbit). Uber and Lyft are placed in the hybridisation area 
because while they evidently provide unskilled manual work for the drivers, this work is 
enabled by a tangible asset. Quadrant 3 covers ‘labour-intensive unskilled provision of 
services to businesses’. Note that digital labour platforms (in Q4hyb, Q3, and Q4), 
together with ride services (Uber and Lyft) are discussed in depth in the second essay 
cited earlier (Codagnone et al., 2016), so their regulatory implications are only briefly 
mentioned here. Finally, in Quadrant (4), the clear-cut and ideal-typical case is a 
platform where peers use just their capital to provide something to businesses. This is 
the case, for instance, of the platform Funding Circle, where individual investors lend 
money to small and medium-sized firms. On the other hand, in the hybridisation area 
inside this Quadrant (Q4hyb), there are platforms that digitally match skilled labour-
intensive services to businesses (P2B and skilled cognitive work is considered to be 
closer to being a tangible asset than unskilled manual labour). There is still some in-
quadrant variability that may require further subdivision of the four types into more 
vertical and specialised sub-typesxxviii. Where this concerns digital labour platforms, the 
issues are discussed elsewhere (Codagnone et al., 2016). 
Moving to the regulatory and policy rationale of this typology it can be observed that in 
quadrant (1) a range of new P2P activities raise regulatory concerns regarding consumer 
protection that will be discussed in Section 4. In this quadrant, Airbnb has also been the 
object of other controversies (zoning, taxes and local rules for short-term rental). On the 
other hand, quadrants (2), (3), and (4hyb) have implications for employment and social 
protection that are not relevant for quadrant (1). On the other hand, ride sharing (Uber) 
is the utmost source of concerns as it entails both consumer protection and labour 
protection issues. In this respect this typology helps appreciate the different regulatory 
implications of ride services (Uber and Lyft), as compared to ride sharing (i.e., 
BlaBlaCar) and car sharing (i.e., RelayRides). The former is labour intensive and 
currently at the centre of labour disputes, whereas car sharing entails little or no work, 
and ride sharing only a limited amount of work. In P2P car and ride sharing, reservations 
are made in advance, the two peers eventually meet, driving is mostly for personal use, 
with less frequent but longer utilisation. In ride services, on the other hand, scheduling 
is on demand with a short lead-time, the driving is for commercial use, utilisation is very 
frequent (with more risks entailed). When one peer is the owner, just giving a ride or 
renting his/her car, and not a driver carrying paying passengers, liability policy is much 
more straightforward. The fact that provider and consumer meet increases trust; and 
the less frequent use reduces risks to safety. From a regulatory perspective, these are 
important factors. Last but not least, as shown in Section 3.3, Uber is possibly the only 
‘sharing’ platform which could become the object of concern as regards competition law. 
2.2 Dimensional relevance 
According to a briefing paper recently released by the UK Office for National Statistics 
(ONS, 2016), the lack of a common definition and understanding of the ‘sharing 
economy’, together with certain features such as transactions among individuals, are the 
main obstacles to measuring the ‘sharing economy’ in terms of either its economic value 
or the number of individuals involved as users or providers.  
As regards the first measurement (monetary), the ‘sharing economy’ does not fall within 
standard classifications used in business and economic statistics, since businesses in any 
industry may contribute to it. In addition, statistics capturing business-to-business and 
business-to-consumer sharing transactions are obviously an underestimation as they 
only account for the revenues of the platforms. Finally, and most importantly, the 
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volume of peer-to-peer transactions is almost entirely lost to consumer statistics and 
price indexes. As regards measurement through surveys, the ONS briefing paper reports 
the result of piloting qualitative interviews and also casts doubts on the reliability of 
these surveys. Individuals and experts interviewed, or those who participate in focus 
groups, have very different understandings of what the ‘sharing economy’ is. Those who 
have used ‘sharing’ platforms have clear difficulties in recalling exactly how many times 
they did it, the average expenses they incurred, or the income they obtained. These 
aspects, thus, cast some doubts on the data coming from surveys of the general 
populations. Bearing these caveats in mind, some exemplificative estimates of monetary 
values and findings from surveys are reported below. 
In 2013, Forbes estimated that the revenue flowing through the ‘sharing economy’ 
directly into people’s wallets reached $3.5 billion(Geron, 2013). A report released by 
PwC in August 2014 calculated that on a global basis the ‘sharing economy’ was worth 
$15bn and could reach $335 billion by 2025 (Vaughan & Hawksworth, 2014)xxix. For the 
UK alone, the report indicates that the ‘sharing economy’ was worth around £500 million 
in 2014 and could grow to £9 billion by 2025. A study released in January 2016 by the 
French government estimates that in France the ‘collaborative economy’ activities turn 
over $2.5 billion, involve about 15,000 firms (including self-employed micro-
entrepreneurs), and generate 13,000 permanent jobs (Barbezieux & Herody, 2016). This 
would amount to approximately 0.1% of French GDP generated by 0.5% of French 
companies for 0.05% of French total employment. In the study by the European 
Parliament cited in the introduction (2016) the potential value of under-utilisation of 
labour, accommodation and cars that could be leveraged through the ‘sharing economy’ 
is estimated at €572 billion in EU28. Besides quoting the usual PwC estimate of $3.5 
billion, this report also estimates that, currently in the EU28, the value of the sharing 
economy is €20 billion. Most of these estimates, however, should be taken with caution 
as because of the lack of reliable data and consolidated empirical evidence they are 
inevitably based on questionable assumptions. 
Moving to surveys that attempt to measure at least the ‘prevalence’ of participation in 
sharing economy platforms, a first large survey conducted in 2013, which included the 
UK, the US and Canada, found that 29% of the British population had engaged at least 
once in a ‘sharing’ transaction and 23% used one or more platforms such as Airbnb, 
Uber, TaskRabbit, Etsy, Kickstarter (Owyang et al., 2014). A report by NESTA estimated 
that in 2014, 25% of the UK adult population shared online in some way (Stokes et al., 
2014). A survey based on a nationally-representative sample of the UK population aged 
16-75 and conducted at the end of 2015, reported that 72% of the respondents are 
either making an income from online activities or buying labour from others (Huws & 
Joyce, 2016b). Of these, around 1% are only involved in online rental schemes such as 
Airbnb. Another survey by the same authors conducted in Sweden at the beginning of 
2016 provides similar shares (Huws & Joyce, 2016a). Around 68% of the Swedish adult 
population are active in some way in the online economy, for instance selling goods 
online or renting out rooms on platforms like Airbnb (those involved only in online rental 
are around 1% in Sweden as well). A large representative survey of Amsterdam’s 
citizens shows that 38% of respondents are willing to take part in all possible forms of 
‘collaborative consumption’ and 84.1% are willing to take part in at least one form (van 
de Glind, 2013). Another study by the French government reports the findings of a 
survey conducted in 2009, indicating that, at that time, 89% of the respondents had 
engaged at least once in a ‘collaborative consumption practice’ (PIPAME, 2015). In 
Denmark, the national statistical office has included a short module on the sharing 
economy. It focuses on ride services and renting in the traditional ICT usage by 
household survey. It found that by mid 2015:  
a) 3.1% of Internet users let out through digital platforms and 8.7% rented from Airbnb 
and similar platforms abroad and 4.4% in Denmark;  
b) Uber was used by 2.8% of the Internet users (Nielsen, 2015).  
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In the US, two surveys (one conducted in 2013 and one in 2015) designed by 
researchers at the Boston branch of the Federal Reserve both found that 26% of the 
adult Internet population use ‘sharing’ platforms as either consumers or providers. 
Obviously surveys which report higher percentages have used less stringent definitions 
of participation in the sharing economy compared to those which more explicitly restrict 
participation to renting and ride services. However, even surveys which give 
conservative estimates suggest that the phenomenon is not statistically marginal.  
2.3 Trends, drivers, and development paths  
From the reviewed sources and from other additional sourcesxxx, the macro trends and 
respective drivers that explain the rise of the sharing economy and predict its further 
development are plotted in the graph below. 
Figure 4 Trends and drivers 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration on sources cited in note xxx 
The picture places macro-level trends in the outer ring and meso- /micro-level drivers in 
the inner ring. The graphic assumes that all trends interact with each other, as do the 
drivers. As seen, some claim that sharing and collaborating are evolutionary and 
culturally innate traits of human beings and forms of car sharing date as far back as 
1948. So, what explains the explosion of collaborative platforms during this decade? The 
obvious place to start is the macro technological trend of increased penetration and 
accessibility of Internet and smart phone, although concretely the driver is the coming of 
age of the last twenty years of industry expertise in designing market places; search 
algorithms and reputational rating have abated almost to zero Bring to Market (BTM) 
costs for individuals and harnessed the trust mechanisms supporting transactions and 
collaboration among strangers. These new possibilities are in a positive feed-back loop 
with socio-economic and cultural trends and drivers. Lower BTM costs and engineered 
trust met the obvious socio-economic need and possibility to leverage excess capacity 
both for the sale or rental of durable goods (i.e. owners of homes or cars do not use 
them 100% of the time so they can let this excess capacity) as well as under-utilised 
labour.  New technological possibility and the economic crisis started in 2008 have 
triggered participation of individuals in platforms as consumers and providers of rental 
services and/or sellers of goods (imbalance between rich and poor countries with inflows 
of cheap goods to the former have produced accumulation of unused goods in the 
former). The same process occurred for the offer and use of on demand labour traded in 
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platforms. Such socio-economic drivers are co-evolving alongside socio-cultural changes 
with increasing preference for access-based consumption (as opposed to ownership) and 
to some extent also for more flexible forms of employment. More recently, 
environmental pressures and sustainability objectives have encouraged individuals to 
use resources more parsimoniously, which add a further driver for more efficient forms 
of consumption. Finally, the concentration of billions of individuals in large cities puts 
mobility, logistics, and space systems under strain, and here again platforms enabling 
new forms of mobility, accommodation, and delivery are playing and will play a role. 
 
Figure 5 Possible development paths for the ‘sharing economy’  
 
Source: author’s elaboration on sources cited in Section 3.1 and in corresponding notes. 
The four possible development paths described above allow us to summarise the various 
rhetorical and normative contributions that are discussed in Section 3.1. They should not 
be taken as foresight scenarios, but simply as an impressionistic means of summarising 
the views expressed by the authors of the reviewed sources. 
The development paths extracted from contrasting narratives consider two dimensions: 
embeddedness of economic activity within the community and its values; empowerment 
of individuals and organisations. Both dimensions can take two extreme values, 
respectively, ‘re-embedding’ vs. ‘dis-embedding’ and ‘empowerment’ vs. ‘dis-
empowerment’. In the optimistic view, the ‘sharing economy’ can contribute to 
reincorporating economic activities within communitarian interaction and (new) values 
(i.e. green consumption). In the pessimistic view, it can be seen as contributing to 
further isolation and separation of economy from community and to fragmentation (dis-
embedding). In the same way, participating in the sharing economy can empower 
consumers to improve their wellbeing and workers/firms to leverage new opportunities 
and access new markets.  On the other hand, it may create new risks for consumers, 
alienate and disempower workers and small firms to the advantage of increasingly 
oligopolistic and quasi-monopolistic platforms (dis-empowerment) 
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Great transformation. Obviously this is the most optimistic development path with 
triple wins (green, social, and fair economic prosperity). It is important to stress that 
this path, mostly coinciding with the early utopian views on the crowd and sharing 
movement, is entirely community-led and requires no major regulatory intervention by 
the state. The re-embedding of the economy is achieved entirely as a result of changes 
in behaviour and culture; individuals and firms internalise new values of collaboration 
and sustainable consumption. Platforms may be enlisted to provide public goods and 
services and even eventually disintermediated (i.e. using block chain) by local 
government for these purposes. 
Regulated sustainability. In this path, re-embedding is attempted by the governments 
through regulatory and traditional intervention, which aims to steer society toward 
sustainability (as new communitarian values do not take hold) and also to find remedies 
for the disempowerment and inequality compounded by the way the sharing economy 
develops.   
Growth-oriented globalisation. Individuals and firms are empowered but in a more 
competitive and individualistic way as there is no societal and cultural re-embedding. 
Market forces are left uncontrolled since government intervention and regulation is 
minimal or absent altogether. To some extent, this is the status quo development path, 
in which inequality and social polarisation increase and environmental concerns and 
sustainability are sacrificed to the imperative of economic growth within heightened 
globalisation. ‘Sharing’ platforms, and especially those functioning as online labour 
markets, remove geographical distance and contribute to human capital specialisation 
and ‘virtual labour migrations’. 
Barbarisation. This path, if it were to be strictly considered from the perspective of the 
sharing economy could also be called ‘uberisation’. Traditional firms and work are first 
dis-intermediated, decentralised, and deconstructed into smaller elements, to be re-
intermediated through panoptical control implemented through algorithms. It is the 
world of the ‘lumpen cognitariat’ or ‘algorithmic salariat’ and ‘algocracy’. Workers are 
substituted by robots or they are transformed into ‘robots’ (i.e. Mechanical Turk) 
performing highly routinised, repetitive, micro-tasks. Dis-embedding and dis-
empowerment increase unemployment and inequality to unprecedented levels and 
further fuel antagonist feelings not only towards ‘out-groups’ (i.e., immigrants) but also 
toward ‘in-groups’.  
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3 Main findings: rhetoric, motives, functioning, and impacts 
The main findings of the formal review of 140 sources, presented together with 
supporting elements from other sources, is divided into four sections. In Section 3.1 
rhetorical discourses and controversies are presented together with an account of more 
tangible battles. The former refers to issues discussed in public debates or academic 
work, and the latter to real social conflicts such as the taxi drivers’ protests, 
controversies reaching the courts, and other dire events which give rise to social alarm 
and regulatory concerns. So, Section 3.1 identifies a number of themes that are then 
contrasted with available empirical evidence. In Section 3.2 motivations to participate in 
‘sharing’ platforms are discussed in view of quantitative and qualitative findings, which 
shed light on questions such as social capital and community revival. In Section 3.3, 
articles from empirical economics which study the matching functioning of the platforms 
are presented. These provide insight into reputational ratings as a form of self-regulation 
and into the potential of scaling up to dominance. Finally, in Section 3.4, public claims 
about the positive impacts of the ‘sharing economy’ are examined in the light of 
available empirical evidence and of the results of a few modelling simulations.  
3.1 Rhetorical and more tangible ‘battles’ 
Whereas only three out of the 140 reviewed sources are entirely focussed on rhetorical 
and discourse analysis (i.e., Cohen & Muñoz, 2015; Dredge & Gyimóthy, 2015; Martin, 
2016), a large number of other sources contain either critical assessment of these 
discourses (Belk, 2014a, 2014b; John, 2013a, 2013b; Lee, 2015; Schor, 2015; Walker, 
2015), or are themselves a source of normative and rhetorical narratives of both an 
overly optimistic or overly pessimistic nature (Agyeman et al., 2013; Allen & Berg, 2014; 
Caldararo, 2014; Cohen & Sundararajan, 2015; Guttentag, 2013; Heimans & Timms, 
2014; Heinrichs, 2013; Koopman et al., 2014, 2015; Kuttner, 2013; Matzler & Kathan, 
2015; Morgan & Kuch, 2015; O’Regan, 2009; Sundararajan, 2014; Thierer et al., 2015; 
WEF, 2013, 2014; Wittel, 2011; Wosskow, 2014). The latter type of sources can be 
divided into (i) social utopianism xxxi , (ii) business xxxii  and economics laissez-faire xxxiii 
driven optimism, and (iii) social pessimismxxxiv.  
According to the discourse analysis presented in Dredge & Gyimóthy (2015, pp. 3-5), 
framing the sharing economy has gone through four stages:  
a) the book and Ted talk by Botsman brought the topic to wider attention in 2010;  
b) next came the powerful message that technologically-enabled matching and 
reputational trust could unlock idle assets, favour the activation of the commons and 
trust among strangers, and lead to sustainable consumption;  
c) this was followed by large-scale public relations campaigns by Uber, Airbnb, and 
other platforms which established research departments and government relations 
department and flooded the debate with their own reports (based on opaque and 
unreliable methodologies) about their benefits;  
d) fourth, proliferation of discourses has been delegated to advocacy groups.  
This is a good reconstruction that, however, from a historical perspective misses one 
important aspect. Before the popularisation by Botsman, the sharing discourse emerged 
out of the broader narrative on the wisdom of the crowds and the creativity of the 
commons (see endnote xxxi) as social utopianism. As the movement took a more 
‘commercial turn’, it can be said that social utopian thinkers and analysts were 
disillusioned and joined the social pessimists in a rhetorical battle against business- and 
economics-driven optimism. Without considering this aspect, some of the ongoing 
controversies cannot be fully grasped. 
From their analysis, Dredge & Gyimóthy (2015) uncover five discourses that they 
critically assess and deconstruct: (D1) social technologies unlock hidden wealth; (D2) 
they enable more equal distribution of benefits; (D3) they facilitate resilient communities, 
authentic relations, and the moral economy; (D4) invoking the invisible hand; (D5) self-
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regulation. On the other hand, Martin (2016) identifies six discourses (three positives 
and three negatives): (M1) economic opportunity; (M2) more sustainable form of 
consumption; (M3) path to decentralised and equitable economy; (M4) unregulated 
market places; (M5) reinforcing neo-liberal paradigm; (M6) incoherent field of innovation. 
In an earlier draft (completed before Martin 2016 and Dredge & Gyimóthy 2015 were 
publicly available) the main author of this essay had instead identified the following five 
themes: (C1) co-optation of the sharing movement for lobbying purposes; (C2) claim of 
reviving community and social capital; (C3) self-reported positive impacts; (C4) 
reputational ratings as a form of self-regulation; (C5) dispute on regulation. If we put 
these three analyses of rhetoric and discourses together, the following themes can be 
identified: 
1) Neo-liberal cooptation of the ‘sharing’ rhetoric and movement (D1+M5+C1); 
2) Social capital and community revival (D3+M3+ C2); 
3) Distributional effects (D2+ M3+ C3);  
4) Environmental and socio-economic impacts (D1+M1&M2+C3); 
5) Regulation (D4 & D5;M4; C4 & C5) 
Apart from (2) that is addressed only in Section 3.2, all other themes are presented in 
this section (though to different degrees of depth), together with an overview of more 
tangible ‘battles’. Themes (1) and (4) are merged and treated together. On the other 
hand, themes (3) and (4) are treated also in Section 3.4 by reporting empirical evidence 
on them, whereas (5) is treated in Section 4. 
3.1.1 Neo-liberal co-optation and impacts as lobbying 
One controversy divides the activists of the ‘sharing movement’ on what is and what is 
not the ‘sharing economy’ (Belk, 2014a, 2014b; John, 2013a, 2013b). It originates in 
the contrast between optimistic social views and reality. When an ethnographic study 
(Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012) produced evidence that Zipcar members were not inspired by 
a sense of community and altruism, this was vehemently rebuffed in the Magazine 
Shareable (Gorenflo, 2012) but welcomed by a more sceptical observer (Badger, 2012). 
When in 2010, CouchSurfing became a for-profit ‘B Corporation’ xxxv  it gave rise to 
controversies and heated debates (Lapowsky, 2012; Marx, 2012). These examples 
testify to the value-loaded ways in which sharing was originally conceived. Activists and 
hippies supporting CouchSurfing are supposedly in a different league from the founders 
and users of Airbnb. It further demonstrates the rhetorical and ambiguous significance 
and importance that the vocabulary of sharing has assumed not only in the context of 
the ‘sharing economy’ but also more generally in the broadly-defined Web 2.0 
ecosystems (John, 2013a, 2013b). Because sharing has a positive and progressive 
connotation, more and more companies have started to claim that they are part of the 
‘sharing economy’.  In this respect, it has been proposed that large companies have co-
opted the sharing movement to pursue their own economic interests through traditional 
lobbying strategies (Lee, 2015; Schor, 2015; Walker, 2015)xxxvi. According to Lee (2015, 
p. 17), the ‘sharing economy’ “is just another example of how ‘insurgent sentiments’ are 
used to ‘sell the bona fide of profit-making corporations”. The anti-establishment 
ideology disseminated by the magazine Sharable and the association Peer.org are 
increasingly seen as mouthpieces of big companies such as Uber and Airbnb that use this 
rhetorical weaponry to pursue their own economic interests (Kerr, 2014).  
Indeed, both Airbnb and Uber (and other larger players) are pursuing aggressive market 
growth strategies and calling for no regulation in a classical neo-liberal fashion. At the 
same time, they are exploiting the ‘sharing’ rhetoric in public relations activities: they 
are participating in official hearings and releasing their own reports on the positive social 
impacts they have. In a public hearing with the UK House of Lords (see more in endnote 
xvii, Patrick Robinson (Head of Public Policy Europe and Canada for Airbnb) affirmed: 
“In our case, the public interest at stake here is, first, about consumers and consumer 
choice not just to consume services but to be producers of services too. The additional 
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income that Airbnb hosts are making is very important to them. Identifying outdated 
rules and regulations that might stop people engaging in what is beneficial activity is a 
good exercise and one that I am delighted that we undertook in London earlier this 
year when they introduced the new rules allowing people to share their homes without 
the need to seek planning permission, for example. That then raises other issues that 
we need to be mindful of. We need always to be mindful of the impact that that could 
have on neighbours or on local communities. That is why we and many other 
companies in the collaborative economy spend a lot of time measuring impacts and 
finding effective ways to deliver good public interest outcomes.”(House of Lords, 2016, 
p. 45). 
In a Harvard Business Review piece, Cannon & Summers (2014) advised big players in 
the ‘sharing economy’ to lobby in various ways, using for example reports on their 
positive impacts. Airbnb and Uber, following this advice or anticipating it, have cobbled 
together evidence to show the benefits their products/services produce. Few young tech 
start-ups have publicly ruminated on their economic impact in quite the same way that 
Airbnb has (Badger, 2014). Uber has also released reports on the benefits of its services. 
These are summarised in the next two boxes. 
Evidence Box 1: Airbnb self-reported impacts 
 81% of hosts share the home where they live, 52% earn low to moderate incomes, 53% 
affirmed that hosting helped them remain in their home, and 48% that they use earnings from 
hosting to pay for regular household expenses. Airbnb commissioned former White House 
National Economic Advisor, Gene Sperling (Sperling, 2015) to write a report, which allegedlyxxxvii 
shows that the platform creates a 14% annual increase ($7,350 per year for an average of 66 
days of hosting) on the income of middle class families hosting guests in their homes;  
  Conducted in 2012, the study on S. Francisco found that Airbnb generated approximately 
$56 million in local spending and supported 430 jobs; 
 A 2013 study reports that in Paris, Airbnb generated €185 million (approximately 
US$240 million) of economic activity in Paris, and supported 1,100 jobs; 
 Conducted in 2014, the study on the UK reports that Airbnb generated £824 million in economic 
activity and supported 11,600 jobs; 
 Other studies report that Airbnb supports 1,600 jobs in Sydney and 4,000 in Barcelona. 
Source: (Airbnb, 2015b)xxxviii  
Evidence Box 2: Uber self-reported impacts 
 Uber has published various reports on its impacts on cities. These are presented as being 
generated by additional rides (in addition to those of the established taxi industry) and creation 
of jobs (Uber, 2014, 2015d, 2015e); 
 For Chicago, for instance, $43 million from new economic activities and 1,000 new jobs are 
reported. In another report, the ‘sharing economy’ giant claims that its services are improving 
the reliability of drivers in communities where military bases are located (Uber, 2015b); 
 It also claims that Uber has contributed to a sharp decline in the DUI (driving under influence of 
alcohol or drugs) rate in cities where it operates; 
 The most ambitious effort is a two volume report entitled Ubernomics: How Ridesharing Can 
Impact The German Economy (Uber, 2015f, 2015g). This report basically argues that with Uber, 
more rides and lower prices will increase consumer welfare and provide more earnings to drivers. 
In order to produce this study, Uber collaborated with Justus Haucap, Director of the 
Düsseldorfer Institut für Wettbewerbsökonomie (DICE) and former Chairman of the German 
Monopolies Commission, and with DIW Econ, the consulting arm of the German Institute of 
Economic Research (DIW); 
 Last but not least, Uber provided data to Krueger for the paper he wrote with Hall on the 
allegedly high earnings and flexibility enjoyed by its drivers (Hall & Krueger, 2015) 
Sources:(Uber, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015f, 2015g)  
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As regards impacts on consumers and sustainability, it is worth noting that BlaBlaCar 
reports that an estimated £216 million per year is saved by drivers and that CO2 is 
reduced by 700,000 tons (https://www.blablacar.co.uk/blog/blablacar-about ). 
It was not possible to access details on the methodology supporting these reports. 
Hence, the robustness of these self-reports cannot be evaluated. On the other hand, it 
can be observed that both Airbnb and Uber commissioned reports by influential 
academics, who had formerly held important governmental posts: a) Gene Sperling was 
a White House Economic Advisor; b) Alan Krueger was formerly Chairman of President 
Barack Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers; c) Justus Haucap, was formerly Chairman 
of the German Monopolies Commission.  As regards the first two economists, it has been 
shown that Silicon Valley is the new revolving door for Obama staffers (Kang & Eilperin, 
2015). 
3.1.2 Do the ‘sharing economy’ benefits trickle down? 
One very important and still highly uncertain and controversial issue is whether or not 
the ‘sharing economy’ has positive redistributive effects. Evidence to support this claim 
is lacking or inconclusive (see Section 3.4 in general; and Codagnone, et al., 2016 as 
regards labour markets effects). A Financial Times’ article, entitled ‘‘Sharing economy 
benefits lower income groups” (Bradshaw, 2015), cites a modelling simulation as proof 
that the ‘sharing economy’ will benefit lower income groups and have a democratising 
effect in terms of access to goods and services (Fraiberger & Sundararajan, 2015). 
However, as this essay shows later, this model only represents a first exploration that 
does not warrant the conclusion trumpeted in the newspaper headlines. The Sperling 
report commissioned by Airbnb (Sperling 2015), see the previous box, reports that that 
the platform creates a 14% annual increase ($7,350 per year for an average of 66 days 
of hosting) on the income of middle class families. In this respect, two observations are 
in order:  
a. as there currently are about 2 million listings worldwide and some individuals have 
multiple listings, the additional middle class income is an important contribution that, 
however, concerns a very limited pool of individuals;  
b. this positive income integration can also be seen as having two possible 
shortcomings: (i) increasing inequality between propertied and property-less middle 
class individuals, and/or (ii) leading marginal groups to make a living just by renting 
a room and therefore entirely dropping out of the labour market. 
Another debate, analysed in further detail elsewhere (Codagnone et al., 2016), concerns 
the conditions of workers who advocates call ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ and opponents call 
‘gigs’ or the ‘new precariat (Kuttner, 2013).  Investigative journalists’ reports have shed 
light on the conditions of these ‘on demand’ workers (Singer, 2014; Weber & Silverman, 
2015) and showed that in some cases their earnings are not as high as companies such 
as Uber and Lyft claim (Weiner, 2015). In a critical essay, (Kuttner, 2013) argues that 
practices such as those emerging in the ‘sharing economy’ add to the erosion of the 
labour contract and to the increase of what economists call ‘contingent labour. In the 
US, this issue is currently the object of hundreds of court cases about the 
misclassification of workers as contractors. 
3.1.3 Tangible ‘battles’ 
The rhetorical polarisation between the ‘passions’ and the ‘interests’ has recently turned 
into real conflict, legal disputes, and consumer protection concerns. As empirically 
documented (McNeill, 2016), one place where this is being played out most visibly, 
creating urban policy tensions and conflicts, is the San Francisco Bay area. Mc Neill 
(2016) reconstructs the political processes and tensions surrounding the rise of San 
Francisco as a city of unicorns. He underlines the important role played by technology 
and venture capital in the political economy of urban development. The urban policy 
tensions associated with the evolution of new ‘sharing economy’ firms such as Uber and 
Airbnb, have, according to the author, aggressively challenged municipal regulations in 
34 
the taxi and property rental fields. In addition, legal disputes have given rise to various 
forms of protests related to negative externalities in neighbourhoods and to shortages 
and rising prices in the long-term housing rental market. 
As reported in Evidence Box 3, the ‘sharing economy’ giants Uber and Airbnb have been 
the object of legal challenges and bans. Violent protests by taxi drivers have erupted in 
many U.S. and European cities, leading to Uber being banned by local decree or court 
rulings (in Europe). Airbnb has also been challenged for not respecting city regulations in 
New York, for violating zoning rules, and for indirectly contributing to the erosion of the 
local government tax base. Now, the Airbnb website informs and requires hosts to be 
aware of local laws and their landlord’s rental policies and comply with them, which may 
prohibit short-term rentals (Miller, 2015; Zrenner, 2015). Furthermore, Airbnb has also 
started to collect taxes in some US cities and in Amsterdam. 
In addition, concrete cases have raised regulatory concerns, for instance: liability and 
insurance, identification, licensing and permits, safety standards, reliability of 
reputational ratings, information and privacy, frauds, etc. These aspects are discussed in 
Section 4.3 on regulatory approaches and open issues, and they are only selectively and 
briefly mentioned below. Incidents reported for Uber drivers and/or with Airbnb hosts 
have raised concerns about the fact that suppliers of lift and rental services are not 
required to obtain licenses, permits, or certification (i.e. Sablik, 2014; Rauch & 
Schleicher, 2015). It is not clear, for instance, whether the platform is liable when a 
hired car crashes or a host’s apartment is damaged (McLean, 2015) or whether it is 
responsible for the security of the service provided by its platform to users. Furthermore, 
platforms, in order to escape liability, can argue that they are only intermediaries 
providing a “matching service”, not direct service providers (Malhotra & Van Alstyne, 
2014). 
Evidence Box 3: Conflicts, Bans, and Court cases 
 Taxi companies complaints against Uber Technologies have led to the prohibition of Uber in 
several cities, including Berlin and Brussels, since April 2014 (Vasagar, 2014).  
 In Germany, the Frankfurt District Court went further than previous cases on the topic and 
highlighted the fact that Uber did not have the necessary licenses and insurance.  It was 
therefore competing unfairly with the local taxi industry (Scot & Eddy, 2014).  
 Uber has been banned in Spain, and risks being banned in the Netherlands (Kroet, 2014). It is 
also a very sensitive issue in Brussels (Keating, 2014); 
  On 26 May 2015, a judge in Milan blocked UberPop in Italy on the grounds that it represents 
‘unfair competition’ (http://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/15_maggio_26/uber-pop-bloccati-
app-servizio-tutta-italia-vittoria-tassisti-277dd376-038b-11e5-8669-0b66ef644b3b.shtml (8-6-
2015)  
 Uber is operating in London, but the clash between the interests of licensed taxi drivers and Uber 
operation is far from resolved (Collins, 2014).  
 In New York City, Airbnb has faced several problems. Its hosts have been fined (Liber, 2013) and 
a very strong and negative report on its practices in the city was released by the NYC state 
attorney office (Schneiderman, 2014). The report concludes that according to New York 
regulations, Airbnb rooms and apartments qualify as illegal hotels. It also contains the following 
information: a) as little as 6% of Airbnb dominated the platform, offering hundreds of unique 
units, receiving 36% of private short-term bookings, and earning $168 million (37% of the host’s 
revenue; b) Airbnb Rentals displaced long-term housing for about 5,000 apartments; c) bookings 
in just three Community Districts in Manhattan — the Lower East Side/Chinatown, Chelsea/Hell’s 
Kitchen, and Greenwich Village/ SoHo — accounted for approximately $187 million in revenue to 
hosts, or more than 40% of private stay revenue to hosts during the Review Period. By contrast, 
all the reservations in three boroughs (Queens, Staten Island, and the Bronx) brought hosts 
revenue of $12 million — less than 3% of the New York City total.  
 So far in Europe, Airbnb seems to have been hit less hard than Uber, although it has been 
seriously constrained in Barcelona. In Amsterdam, however, it has been regularised 
(Ranchordas, 2015, p. 8).  
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Ratings can be biased and inflated and it is possible that platforms present the results of 
search in a way that is more convenient to them than to the users (Einav et al., 2015). 
With respect to the utilisation of data by the platforms, the same authors pose questions 
such as: can consumers limit platforms’ use of data? Can platforms share/sell ratings 
and purchase history? What about potential gender and race discrimination in ratings 
leading to these groups getting fewer opportunities? It is obvious that small Not for 
Profit (NFP) platforms with a few thousand members and platforms worth $ billions, 
engaging millions of users and providers, are very different and pose different regulatory 
and policy challenges. But there are also stark differences among commercial platforms 
between, for example, providing ride services (i.e. Uber: who is liable? and what type of 
insurance could cover the drivers) and giving a ride in your own car for a fee covering 
the costs (i.e., BlaBlaCar: the car owner is liable but fully covered by standard 
insurance). This is why a conceptual clarification is needed that, based on regulatory and 
policy importance, selectively identifies the most important types of platforms.  This is 
done in the next section. 
3.2 Motivation to participate and social capital 
The evidence on the motivation of individuals to participate in sharing activities and on 
the impact that this may have on social capitalxxxix and generalised trust is mixed.  
A survey testing the extent to which participation in one ‘sharing’ platform was a form of 
‘anti-capitalism’, found that individuals have different motives and identified four 
clusters: ‘socialites’, ‘market avoiders’ and two other profiles with no particular 
ideological motivation (Ozanne & Ballantine, 2010). Lamberton & Rose (2012) found the 
same mix of utilitarian and socially/environmentally-oriented motivations in a study 
based on three surveys of the users of three different platforms. A qualitative study of 
time banks found that anti-capitalist sentiments, discontent with consumption, and an 
ideology of sustainability emerged as strong motivations for participation (Dubois et al., 
2014). The authors, however, also found that the different levels of cultural capital and 
the distinctions they produce matter and create contradictionsxl. An ethnographic study 
of Italian home-swappers (Forno & Garibaldi, 2015) also found both social and utilitarian 
motives. Sustainability, enjoyment of the activity, and economic gain were the key 
motivations found among users of a platform in Finland (Hamari, et al., 2015). A large-
scale survey of free reuse groups (e.g. Freecycle and Freegle) in the UK, shows that the 
majority of participants do have significantly stronger self-transcendence (i.e. pro-social) 
values than the wider UK population, but they also have other more extrinsic values 
(Martin & Upham, 2015). Möhlmann (2015) found a mixture of self-interest and socially-
oriented motivation through surveys of users of the car sharing service car2go, and of 
Airbnb (N=187) in Germany. The Baumeister & Wangenheim (2014) survey of a 
representative sample of 2,000 German respondents, randomly assigned to express their 
views and attitudes to accessing rather than owning different types of products, found 
that the attitude to access is consistently worse than the attitude to ownership across all 
product categories. 
An in-depth qualitative study of Freecycle found thick relations and social capital at work 
and also tensions between the goals of the institution (the owners of the Freecycle 
brand) and those of its community members (Arsel & Dobsha, 2011). Three exploratory 
studies of local level platforms found that while traditionally relational and reciprocal 
exchange is highly valued, the weak ties of non-reciprocal exchange allow the 
communities to tap into the significant distributed expertise of the community (Ozanne & 
Ozanne, 2011). A qualitative empirical analysis of non-monetary market places (Really 
Really Free Markets, RRFMs), which blend online and offline sharing events, found that a 
sense of community is both a driver of participation and an outcome of these events 
(Albinsson & Yasanthi Perera, 2012). The findings of the ethnographic study done by 
Bardhi & Eckhardt (2012) on Zipcar users came as a thunderbolt for both activists and 
earlier scholars of the ‘sharing economy’. The authors report that Zipcar members did 
not feel any sense of attachment to the organisation, their main motivation was use 
value. These consumers did not refer to hedonist or altruistic values, and engaged in 
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opportunistic behaviour toward the company and one another (negative reciprocity). An 
empirical qualitative analysis of gift-giving, sharing, and commodity exchange at 
Bookcrossing.com underscored the importance of collective reciprocity and anonymous 
sharing (Corciolani & Dalli, 2014). Empirically, the most robust study of social capital 
and social networks in the ‘sharing economy’ was performed on CouchSurfing by Parigi 
and colleagues (Parigi & State, 2014; Parigi et al., 2013). The first study consisted of a 
network analysis using data obtained by CouchSurfing.com for the period from 2003 to 
2010 (Parigi, et al., 2013). A random sample of 10,000 American users, whose monthly 
logins were counted and recorded over their career in the association was created and 
analysed. The study tested two alternative hypotheses about individuals’ participation in 
associations: a) participation as by-product of existing friendships; b) participation 
driven by the association’s capacity to form new identities. The authors reported that 
new friendship ties had a significant impact on participation, whereas pre-existing ties 
(defined here as ties to other members formed outside of the organisation’s context) had 
a negligible impact. This would seem to suggest that a platform like CouchSurfing is 
generating new social capital. On the other hand, the second study, where quantitative 
analysis was integrated with ethnographic work, produced a somewhat paradoxical 
result on the disenchanting effect of technology (Parigi & State, 2014). The accumulation 
of ratings about users (whether guests or hosts) had a double-edged effect on the 
emergence of trust and relationships; it made relationships easier to establish initially 
but it also weakened them above a certain threshold. That is, technology facilitated the 
emergence of interpersonal trust among CouchSurfers, but it also made establishing 
strong ties harder as users acquired more and more reviews. This case illustrates a 
process of disenchantment created by technology, where technology increases the ease 
with which friendships are formed and, at the same time, diminishes the bonding power 
of these experiences. 
Although the evidence base is still limited and the findings mixed, at this preliminary 
stage it is nonetheless reasonable to conclude that:  
a) the motivations that lead individuals to join the ‘sharing economy’ range from 
altruism to utilitarian goals and also include a scattering of anti-capitalist and 
anti-consumption ideologies and sentiments;  
b) the ‘sharing economy’ creates some form of genuine social capital but is also 
based on reciprocal (negative and positive) exchanges;  
c) judging from the reviewed sources, altruistic and ideological motivations and 
social capital building seem clearly to characterise more the early not-for-profit 
initiatives.  
Once again, it can be stated that, going beyond the polarised rhetoric and controversies, 
the ‘sharing economy’ overall is a mixture of ‘passions’ and ‘interests’.  
3.3 Platforms functioning: matching and ratings 
For the general purposes of this essay the literature on two-side markets or platforms 
(TSP) is not central (Armstrong, 2006; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Evans, 2003; King, 
2013; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2000; Parker & Alstyne, 2005; Rochet & Tirole, 2003, 
2006; Wright, 2004). It is not crucial to debate or ascertain in this essay which ‘sharing’ 
platforms qualify as TSP and which do not. Nonetheless, a few key points from this 
literature are included here to illustrate the empirical findings coming from economic 
studies of some ‘sharing’ platforms.  
In very simple and possibly simplistic terms, TSPs bring together two groups of users 
(i.e. two sides) on different sides (i.e. consumers and providers) with direct and indirect 
network externalities that they internalise. Success depends on bringing both sides on 
board, as there is a reinforcing loop between increasing the size of the group on one side 
and bringing more individuals on board on the other side. The efficiency of the matching 
and reputation ratings mechanisms contribute to this. The literature on two-sided 
markets also describes potential implications for competition law, such as network 
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effects leading to dominant market power and the conditions for ‘single-homing’ or 
‘multi-homing’ for different sidesxli. 
Matching and ratings have been analysed recently in an emerging body of micro-
economic studies focussing on Airbnb, TaskRabbit, and oDesk (Cullen & Farronato, 2015; 
Einav et al., 2015; Fradkin, 2014; Fradkin et al., 2015; Horton, 2014; Horton & Golden, 
2015). The key characteristic of these platforms is the trade-off between minimizing 
transaction costs for users (i.e. search and deliberation) and optimising the use of 
information for matching the two sides, when there is a high level of heterogeneity in 
what is offered and who demands it (Einav et al., 2015). This trade-off entails designing 
the platform so that it centralises or decentralises choice. As the authors explain, Airbnb 
has adopted a decentralised design because, in the case of renting apartments, it is 
justified by differences in preferences and in seller costs. Uber, on the other hand, needs 
to match customers with rides in real time (especially at peak hours). The type of cars 
and type of drivers is probably less important than getting a ride at a right time, which 
justifies its centralised design at least with respect to the goal of maximising matches 
and revenues. Pricing mechanisms can also help in coping with the trade-off between 
transaction costs and efficient use of information. 
Indeed, three studies show that Airbnb (Fradkin, 2014), oDesk (Horton, 2014), and 
TaskRabbit (Cullen & Farronato, 2015) are characterised by: a) high level of 
heterogeneity; b) frictions; c) high percentage of non-matched potential; and d) 
congestion (i.e. a match falls through because of multiple requests at the same time).  
Fradkin (2014), for instance, reports that in Airbnb:  
 potential guests typically view only a subset of potential matches in the market and 
more than 40% of listings remain vacant for some dates;  
 hosts reject proposals to transact by potential guests 49% of the time, causing the 
potential guests to leave the market although there are potentially good matches 
remaining; and  
 if there were no search frictions (i.e. guests had all market options and knew which 
hosts were willing to transact with them), there would be 102% more matches and 
revenue per searcher would be $117 higher.  
In TaskRabbit, Cullen and Farronato (2015) found that the auction mechanism is not 
very efficient as it does not vary much with market conditions. They suggested that a 
simpler mechanism may be preferable; this market clears due to suppliers’ elasticity: in 
periods when demand doubles, sellers work almost twice as hard, prices hardly increase 
and the probability of requested tasks being matched falls only slightly. Similar results 
were found by Horton (2014) for the oDesk market for professional services. These 
authors seem to suggest that this type of peer-to-peer market is inherently frictional, 
but no data and analysis of this kind is available on Uber.   
Another important mechanism is that of reputational ratings (henceforth simply ratings). 
These are the evaluative reviews (usually 5 stars rating systems) that the two sides of a 
platform make of each other (i.e. in Airbnb hosts rate guests and guests rate hosts). 
They are both a source of information on ‘product quality’ and of trust. Exchange among 
strangers is one of the salient characteristics of ‘sharing economy’ platforms and building 
trust to get both sides of a market on board has been a key challenge and driver of 
success for the biggest players such as Airbnb and Uber. As we have seen, the 
motivations to participate are mixed and the ‘sharing economy’ is not unequivocally 
based on social capital and generalised trust as there is self-interest, and positive and 
negative reciprocity, and opportunistic behaviour cannot be ruled out. Therefore, it is 
obvious that the generalised trust that makes the ‘sharing economy’ possible is the 
combined result of users’ attitudes and of how these attitudes are effectively leveraged 
by online reputational rating systems. The reliability of reputational rating systems is a 
regulatory relevant topic as it is claimed that they reduce information asymmetry and 
are a reliable form of self-regulation. It is also claimed that they ensure consumer 
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protection and security and should not be altered by any form of regulatory intervention 
(Allen & Berg, 2014; Koopman, et al., 2014; Thierer, et al., 2015).  
In practice, however, there are two main potential biases: under-provision of ratings and 
strategic behaviour in providing ratings. Leaving an accurate rating is a public good and 
is likely to be under-provided (Avery et al., 1999; Miller et al., 2005). As a result, a 
given user may not always leave a rating and the distribution of his/her evaluations may 
not accurately represent the outcomes of that agent’s previous transactions. Fear of 
retaliation or intentional collusive behaviour with friends can lead reviewers not to reveal 
their experiences in the review. An experiment has shown that a system in which 
reviews are hidden until both parties submit one (“simultaneous reveal”) reduces 
retaliation and makes markets more efficient (Bolton et al., 2012). Whereas the topic of 
online ratings and trust is discussed in a growing body of literature (Abdul-Rahman & 
Hailes, 2000; Ba, 2001; Burnham, 2011; Corritore et al., 2003; Gefen et al., 2008; Hogg 
& Adamic, 2004; Jøsang et al., 2007; Kwan & Ramachandran, 2009; Pavlou & Gefen, 
2004; Swamynathan et al., 2008), only five empirical contributions focussing on 
reputational ratings with respect to the ‘sharing economy’ were found (Cullen & 
Farronato, 2015; Fradkin, et al., 2015; Horton & Golden, 2015; Lauterbach et al., 2009; 
Overgoor et al., 2012; Zervas et al., 2015). The first two studies focussed on 
CouchSurfing and use big data scraped from the web. They conclude that there is a bias 
toward positive reviews and that there can be collusive reciprocity among individuals 
belonging to the same network (Lauterbach, et al., 2009; Overgoor, et al., 2012). A 
comparison of the distribution of reviews for the same property on both TripAdvisor and 
Airbnb shows that ratings in the former are lower than those on Airbnb by an average of 
at least 0.7 stars (Zervas, et al., 2015). More generally, the rate of five star reviews is 
31% on TripAdvisor and 44% on Expedia (Mayzlin et al., 2014) compared to 75% on 
Airbnb. This difference in ratings could be interpreted as showing that the two-sided 
review system induces bias in ratings. A recent study, involving researchers affiliated 
with Airbnb, documents through field experiments conducted on Airbnb itself that there 
is some bias. However, this study also shows that when the bias is removed through 
experimental treatments, the five star rates on Airbnb remain substantially higher than 
even 44% (Fradkin, et al., 2015). This would imply they are a reliable measure of quality 
to inform other consumers. The study of another platform (oDesk) documents through a 
laboratory experiment that reputational ratings are fairly inflated (Horton & Golden, 
2015). The evidence is, thus, inconclusive and mixed and further evidence is needed to 
know whether or not reputational ratings are a sufficient and reliable measure of quality 
and consumer protection, especially in European contexts.  
To sum up, the evidence on the functioning of digital ‘sharing’ platforms provides some 
food for thought on competition law and consumer protection. First, evidence on 
heterogeneity and matching frictions suggest that platforms such as Airbnb and 
TaskRabbit are less likely to scale up to market dominance. In Airbnb, multi-homing is 
viable and fairly widespread on both sides (hosts and guests). Whereas empirical 
evidence (e.g. like the evidence reviewed on Airbnb and TaskRabbit) is not available, it 
is possible to speculate that Uber is more likely to achieve a dominant position (the 
billions of US$ that investors are betting on it constitute an indirect proxy). It may suffer 
less friction due to the lower heterogeneity of the object transacted, its centralised 
model, and its use of the surge price algorithm that allows price per mile to vary as 
supply and demand conditions change. There is also little possibility for drivers to ‘multi-
home’, which means that, as Uber market power grows, it may charge them a higher 
transaction fee for the monopolistic supply of access to ‘single-homing’ users. Second, it 
can be said that empirical evidence casts at least some serious doubt on reputational 
ratings as the best and only possible form of consumer protection through self-regulation. 
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3.4 Impacts: ex-ante hypotheses and empirical evidence 
3.4.1 The ex-ante big picture 
This section is dedicated to the findings from the sources that have been reviewed and 
that provide empirical evidence or modelling simulation on the potential effects of 
‘sharing’ platforms. By way of introducing the findings that will be discussed, the figure 
below provides an ex-ante theoretical big picture of the potential effects drawn from all 
the sources gathered (including those not formally reviewed). Note that, although they 
are not discussed here but elsewhere (Codagnone et al., 2016), for the sake of 
completeness, the picture also includes the potential effects of digital labour markets. 
Figure 6: Big Picture of Sharing Economy potential effects 
 
Source: author elaboration from all reviewed sources 
Individuals as providers can let their assets, sell goods, offer their labour to businesses 
(high or low skilled work delivered digitally) or to consumers (ride services or generic 
personal services matched digitally but delivered physically as in TaskRabbit). 
Conversely, individuals as consumers can rent homes and cars, buy goods, share rides 
on BlaBlaCar, use Uber instead of traditional taxis, pay for personal services, and 
businesses can hire on demand workers for digital work. Ex ante it can be reasonably 
assumed that the digital matching between users and providers may deliver a wide 
variety of efficiencies such as reducing transaction and search costs, improving allocative 
efficiency, reducing information asymmetries, and producing price efficiencies. By 
lowering geographical barriers (except in the case of more localised digitally-enabled 
markets such as ride services and generic personal services, e.g. Uber and TaskRabbit) 
they greatly enlarge the pool of potential matches, favouring international specialisation 
(especially in the case of digital labour platforms). These direct efficiency gains may 
translate into various intermediate outcomes and final global impacts as shown in the 
picture. Considering the consumer markets (i.e. rental, goods, and labour-intensive 
services to consumers), platform-generated efficiencies may result in consumer welfare 
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effects (increased access at better prices). Furthermore, renting assets, selling goods, 
driving passengers, and performing errands and delivering other personal services are 
sources of income. Looking at the provision of on demand labour to businesses, 
platforms may produce social welfare effects in terms of increased efficiency at 
aggregate level both for labour markets (better and more matches between supply and 
demand, mismatches avoidance) and production (unbundling of tasks and lowering of 
geographical barriers favour vertical and international human capital specialisation, and 
lower coordination costs favour outsourcing); these could have spill-over effects on 
employment levels and quality, on productivity and eventually on growth. As said, these 
are reasonable assumptions of direct and indirect effects from platform-generated 
efficiency-enhancing activities and are conveyed by the solid lines in the picture. The 
dotted lines, however, concern more ambiguous effects whose net impact or direction 
cannot be assumed ex ante and can only be verified empirically. The green and 
sustainability effects of platforms, for instance, are subject to contrasting forces: re-use 
of goods and car sharing in principle reduce emissions, but if improved accessibility 
produces an aggregate increase in travelling and income obtained from platforms is 
spent on more consumption, then the net sustainability impact could be negative. The 
net distributive and employment effects are also hard to assume ex ante.  Platforms 
disrupt incumbent industries and by reducing their revenues may lead to loss of secure 
jobs that may not be fully offset at aggregate level by the income and flexible jobs 
created by labour platforms and by consumer welfare effects. The net distributive effects 
of all income-generating activities and consumer welfare can either reduce or increase 
the level of inequality, depending on how they spread across different social groups. 
They can have either equalising or polarising effects. For instance, the income 
integration from renting for middle class families shown by a study Airbnb commissioned 
a former member of the Obama’s administration to carry out, may have equalising 
effects with respect to upper middle class families and polarising ones with regard to 
property-less middle class and lower middle class families. Labour platforms may 
increase or decrease employment levels and quality (i.e. security and social protection), 
and income polarisation, not only for and among on demand workers but also for regular 
workers (i.e. competition between platform and regular employment affecting wage 
levels). The overall impact on labour may be different depending on other effects that 
ex-ante are ambivalent; for instance, depending on how ‘super star’ or ‘long-tail’ effects 
play out, they could increase income for a limited group and lower it for others as a 
result of competition between platforms and traditional employment for most sought 
workers; the overall impact on employment depends also on the extent to which 
platforms favour or not generalised outsourcing and firm’s boundary contraction.  
This quick broad-brush illustration should have clarified the complexities of potential 
interactions. The following paragraphs show how limited the empirical evidence is, as it 
is available only for some of these interactions. Together these two considerations 
further underscore how simplistic and obfuscating both the prescriptive narratives and 
the current public debates are and how further empirical evidence is needed to support 
policy making and regulatory initiatives. For instance, some of the grand narratives 
about the sharing economy and particularly peer-to-peer rentals, including those about 
its contribution to sustainability and to consumer welfare, require answers to a number 
of questions. For instance: how does ‘sharing’ affect ownership and usage of resources? 
Does it unequivocally decrease ownership levels, decrease usage, or both? Under what 
conditions? Who benefits the most: owners or renters? To what extent would a profit-
maximizing platform, through its choice of rental prices, improve social welfare? To what 
extent do frictions, such as moral hazard (additional wear and tear renters place on 
rented resources) and inconvenience experienced by renters affect platform profit and 
social welfare? What determines the rental rate and the quantity exchanged in a P2P 
rental market? How much total surplus is “unlocked” by the P2P rental market, and how 
is it distributed? When there are substantial bringing-to-market costs (such as labour, 
excess depreciation, and transaction costs), who bears them, and how does it affect 
short- and long-term equilibria? To these questions, so far, answers come only from 
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theoretical economic modelling. One of these answers is based exclusively on solving 
equilibrium equations from economic theory (Benjaafar et al., 2015), and another two 
are very partially corroborated by empirical data (Fraiberger & Sundararajan, 2015; 
Horton & Zeckhauser, 2016). 
3.4.2 Environmental impacts 
The environmental benefits of the ‘sharing economy’ are often presented as obvious and 
are much advertised in platforms’ own promotional descriptions. In practice, however, 
the evidence is scant and it is extremely challenging and complex to demonstrate at 
aggregate level the net impacts in terms of environmental sustainability (Shor, 2014). 
First order effects can reasonably be expected to be positive: staying in existing 
accommodation would reduce the construction of new hotels and/or work spaces, while 
sharing tools or goods would reduce the production of new goods, both of which should 
reduce ecological and carbon footprints. Yet, a net impact at aggregate socio-economic 
level should also consider second order effects: what happens with the extra money 
providers earned with the ‘sharing economy’ or users saved? As seen, Airbnb to 
demonstrate its impacts on city economies provides ‘evidence’ that its guests spend 
more than traditional tourists, which is self-defeating with respect to the claim that it 
produces environmental benefits. Only one empirical study of these kinds of impacts was 
found (Martin & Shaheen, 2010). Some preliminary estimates have been produced for 
France (Demailly & Novel, 2014), and two modelling simulations have been carried out: 
one focussed on New York (Santi et al., 2014) and the other on Teheran 
(Seyedabrishami et al., 2012). One study evaluated the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
changes that result from individuals participating in a car sharing organisation across the 
US using data from a survey and plugging them into an estimation model (Martin & 
Shaheen, 2010). The authors report a measurable reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions when a small fraction of households reduces substantially their emissions. This 
is, however, almost totally offset by the fact that, for the majority of households, car 
sharing expands access to cars and obviously increases emissions. According to 
estimates using data from the French Environment and Energy Management Agency 
(ADEME), if sharing models in France were operated under the most favourable 
conditions, savings of up to 7% in the household budget and 20% in terms of waste 
could be achieved (Demailly & Novel, 2014). A modelling simulation of the effects of 
carpooling, which calibrates data for New York and makes assumptions about take up 
and removal of barriers, concludes that in positive scenarios cumulative trip length could 
be cut by 40% or more, resulting in decreased service cost and emissions (Santi, et al., 
2014). The modelling simulation of car fuel saving produced by carpooling in Teheran 
calibrates the data obtained through a Stated Preference (SP) survey (Seyedabrishami, 
et al., 2012) in a model. Given the user preferences revealed and assuming that 
appropriate strategies to help users identify suitable rideshares would be adopted, the 
author concludes that carpooling could increase by 30% which would reduce annual fuel 
consumption by about 240 million litres. 
3.4.3 Socio-economic impacts 
In the literature, no empirically robust and comprehensive cost-benefit studies were 
found which weigh consumer welfare benefits and additional income for suppliers against 
reduced revenues and jobs for incumbent industries, the cost to the public budget from 
tax base erosion or future expenditure to provide social protection to on demand 
workers. Obviously, at this stage of development in the evidence base it would be 
unrealistic to expect this analysis for the entire ‘sharing economy’. However, this kind of 
aggregate costs / benefits analysis is not available even for single platforms. Neither is 
there any conclusive evidence on the impact on the labour market and on re-distributive 
effects. While prescriptive and critical essays on these topics abound, only a very few 
empirical (or modelling) studies are available:  
a) as anticipated, as regards consumer welfare one theoretical economic modelling is 
based exclusively on solving equilibrium equations from economic theory 
(Benjaafar et al., 2015), and another two are very partially corroborated by 
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empirical data (Fraiberger & Sundararajan, 2015; Horton & Zeckhauser, 2016). 
Of the latter two, only Fraiberger & Sundararajan (2015) consider distributional 
effects; 
b) a quasi-experimental study on the impact of Uber in reducing DUI (Driving Under 
Influence) accidents (Greenwood & Wattal, 2015);  
c) a quasi-experimental study of Uber’s competitive pressure effects on the 
traditional taxi industry (Wallsten, 2015);  
d) a qualitative study on the effect of sharing practices on issues of inequality (Schor 
et al., 2014);  
e) a statistical analysis of racial discrimination on Airbnb (Edelman & Luca, 2014);  
f) a statistically descriptive analysis of the negative impacts of Uber on the taxi 
industry in three US urban areas (Bond, 2015);  
g) a quasi-experimental study of Airbnb impacts on the hotel industry in Austin 
(Zervas et al., 2014);  
h) a quasi-experimental study of Airbnb’s impacts on the hotel industry in Norway, 
Finland, and Sweden (Neeser, 2015); 
i) an econometric study (Farronato & Fradkin, 2015) of Airbnb’s two effects on the 
hotel industry: ‘expansion’ (meeting demands of previously under-served 
consumers) and ‘stealing’ (attracting consumers away from conventional 
suppliers); 
j) one panel study of Airbnb’s effect on tourism industry employment in the US state 
of Idaho (Fang et al., 2015).  
On digital labour market effects, a more dedicated analysis has been provided in a 
separate paper (Codagnone et al., 2016). In this essay, as regards labour impacts only, 
the Hall & Krueger (2015) paper and a review of online labour markets (Agrawal et al., 
2013) are briefly mentioned. The findings of these studies are organised partially by 
theme and partially by platform. Relatively more space is devoted to the consumer 
welfare topic, because this is one of the most publicised benefits and also because, from 
the reviewed sources, implications of the unrealistic narratives about sustainability 
effects can be derived. Furthermore, some implications of theoretical models are also 
relevant with respect to consumer protection issues. 
Consumer welfare and distributional effects. In the theoretical model by Benjaafar 
et al. (2015), consumers allegedly always benefit from the P2P rental. However, this 
does not necessarily imply sustainability outcomes. According to their model, depending 
on rental price, P2P rental can result in both higher ownership and higher usage. It is 
also possible for ownership to decrease but usage to increase. Only under very specific 
circumstances, is it possible for both ownership and usage to decrease. Hence, except in 
the latter case, there is no guarantee that there is economisation in the usage of 
resources and in the related activities producing emissions. On the other hand, according 
to this model, it cannot be ruled out that profit maximising platforms may not have an 
incentive to completely eliminate moral hazard (by the renters causing wear and tear on 
the rented assets possibly as a result of the renter’s potential negligence and 
mishandling). This means that some elements of consumer protection (for the owners) 
may be circumvented by platforms in order not to decrease volume of transactions (from 
which they draw their revenues). 
Horton & Zeckhauser (2016) present a theoretical model similar to that of Benjaafar et 
al. (2015), which they partially test with data from a survey on a convenience sample 
drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk. These authors model the choice of owning or 
renting with and without the presence of digital platforms for P2P rental. They also find 
that ownership and usage can either increase or decrease, depending on various key 
parameters. Whereas Benjaafar et al. (2015) model also consider matching (i.e. how 
utility of being owner or renter depends on the likelihood of finding a match in P2P rental 
platforms), this is not done in Horton & Zeckhauser (2015). Another difference is that 
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Horton & Zeckhauser (2015) model how the rental rate influences owners’ and renters’ 
decisions on how much they use a given good, which is not done in Benjaafar et al. 
(2015). Despite these differences, Horton & Zeckhauser’s model also predicts that 
consumer welfare will increase as a result of the presence of digital P2P rental under all 
configurations and hypotheses. Their model predicts that surplus increases (both in 
short- and long-term market equilibria for P2P rental) compared to a situation where 
digital P2P rental was absent. Whereas owners consume less, they are significantly 
compensated by the income they receive in a way that more than offsets the loss of 
utility as consumers. When renters value the goods almost as much as the owners 
(therefore they demand these goods), having the chance to rent them represents a 
consumer surplus for them. An important aspect to mention from Horton & Zeckhauser 
(2015) concerns how ‘bring-to-market costs’ (simply BTMs) affect P2P rental markets 
and platform strategies.  For the ideal-typical example of Airbnb, BTMs include: cleaning 
up an apartment, doing check-in and check-out, depreciation from usage, plus the fee 
charged by the platforms (covering conventional transaction costs inherent in finding 
trading partners, coming to terms, executing payments). BTMs can obviously increase or 
reduce the renters’ supply curve. From the platform’s perspective, lowering these BTMs 
is convenient when the demand is elastic since in this case, as the supply curve shifts 
out, demand increases without reducing price, which increases the revenue from the 
platform’s fees. The implication is that when demand is elastic, competition between 
platforms would produce more benefits for consumers and society (i.e. one dominant 
platform would not lower its fees, even when demand is elastic).  
Last but not least, from both models it can be deduced that all of these potential gains 
depend on the possibility of matching. Neither model ensures that matching is always 
perfect or that all the excess capacity is put to work. As seen in Section 3.3, empirical 
evidence shows that matching frictions and inefficiencies are widespread. These cast 
serious doubt on the optimistic prediction of both these two theoretical model. It cannot 
be ruled out, for instance, that ‘super star effects’ prevail over ‘long-tail effects’. In this 
case, only a small percentage of renters would receive a relatively higher proportion of 
earnings from renting. In this respect, it is worth recalling that the earlier cited (see 
Evidence Box 3, p. 34) inquiry conducted by Office of the Attorney General of the State 
of New York on Airbnb’s operation in the city (based on administrative data forcefully 
obtained from the platform) found that: a) as little as 6% of Airbnb hosts offer up to 
hundreds of unique units, getting 36% of private short-term bookings, and receiving 
$168 million equal to 37% of all host revenue in NYC; b) bookings in just three 
Community Districts in Manhattan — the Lower East Side/Chinatown, Chelsea/Hell’s 
Kitchen, and Greenwich Village/ SoHo — accounted for approximately $187 million in 
revenue to hosts, or more than 40% of private stay revenue to hosts during the Review 
Period; c) by contrast, all the reservations in three boroughs (Queens, Staten Island, 
and the Bronx) brought hosts revenue of $12 million — less than 3% of the New York 
City total (Schneiderman, 2014) 
Fraiberger & Sundararajan (2015) model short-term P2P rental markets and calibrate 
the model using transaction and survey data from Getaround (one of the leading US P2P 
car rental platform), integrated with official US statistics on car ownership, the second-
hand car market, and patterns of car usage in order to provide a first empirical 
assessment of the welfare implications of these kinds of markets. They model various 
effects and costs that can be summarised as follows. As regards positive effects, P2P 
rental for cars may: a) increase allocative efficiency by creating new gains from trade 
between consumers; b) produce surplus for consumers who cannot afford ownership; c) 
shift consumption toward higher quality products; d) lead to surplus for manufacturers 
by inducing new 'ownership for peer-to-peer rental supply.' On the other hand, P2P 
rental could also induce more rapid depreciation, and hurt manufacturers as a result of 
lower equilibrium production volumes if durable goods are used more efficiently. There 
are obvious limitations in the dataset used and some technical aspects of calibration (i.e. 
estimates of transaction costs function and of depreciation rate) which may heavily 
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shape the results obtained. Having made these limitations clear, the key results from the 
modelling simulations are briefly reported below: 
 New car ownership would drop (-5%), as would ownership of second hand cars  
(-12%) even under a P2P rental adoption scenario where only 25% of the overall 
pool of potential users adopt P2P rental. The shift from ownership to rental would be 
more pronounced among those who use the car below the average usage rate; 
 People with above median incomes tend to maintain car ownership for longer than 
people with below median income; 
 The installed base of cars in the economy drops but usage intensity increases, 
especially of older car. This occurs as the car market becomes more efficient, and, in 
this respect, it is worth noting that, according to the simulation, below median 
income car owners significantly increase their supply of cars to the rental market. 
Consumer surplus increases across the board, but especially for individuals with below 
median income as a result, according to the model, of the following:  
a) lower-income consumers who could not afford to own a car and were thus excluded 
from participation now consume through the peer-to-peer rental marketplace;  
b) a different fraction of below-median income consumers shift from being owners to 
being non-owner renters, realizing ownership cost savings, gains from greater usage 
efficiency and higher quality consumption;  
c) a small fraction of below-median income consumers switch from being non-owners to 
being owners, induced in part by lower used-car prices, realizing surplus gains 
through their supply activity on the peer-to-peer rental marketplace.  
 
The simulation also clearly shows that usage will increase and so will emissions of CO2, 
which once again undermines the claimed sustainability effects. 
Given the preliminary, exploratory, and very partial empirical validation of the model, 
headlines such as ‘‘Sharing economy benefits lower income groups” (Bradshaw, 2015), 
are exaggerated at best. 
Uber. Exploiting the natural experiment created by the staggered entrance of Uber in 
different Californian cities between 2009 and 2013, Greenwod & Wattal (2015) adopted 
a difference-in-difference identification strategy to estimate Uber effects on DUI 
accidents. They concluded that Uber services reduced alcohol-related motor vehicle 
homicides. Wallsten (2015) used Google trends as proxies to measure the demand for 
Uber services. They also looked at administrative records of taxi complaints placed by 
consumers in New York and Chicago for improved service quality by the traditional taxi 
industry. They identified a negative correlation (increased usage of Uber correlates with 
fewer complaints) and hazard the conclusion that Uber’s competitive pressure has led 
traditional taxi drivers to improve their customer service. Bond (2015) analysed Uber 
impacts in San Francisco, District of Columbia and New York using extensive statistics on 
the taxi industry in these areas pre- and post-Uber (statistics are used only descriptively 
and there is no design/ attempt to document causal effects). The descriptive data show 
that Uber has a clearly negative impact on both taxi industry revenues and one the value 
of the medallions. 
Airbnb. Zervas et al (2014) used data obtained for the Austin areas from both Airbnb 
and the hotel industry. They exploited the significant spatio-temporal variation in the 
patterns of Airbnb adoption across city-level markets to adopt a counterfactual 
identification strategy (‘Difference in Difference’). They find that Airbnb’s impact on the 
hotel market is in the order of an 8%-10% reduction in revenues. This is non-uniformly 
distributed, and lower-priced hotels, and hotels that do not cater for business travel are 
the most affected segments. They also find that affected hotels have responded by 
reducing prices, an impact that benefits all consumers, not just participants in the 
‘sharing economy’. Neeser (2015) replicated the same study as Zervas and colleagues 
with data on Sweden, Norway, and Finland. The paper uses a difference-in-differences 
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strategy with many time periods and different levels of treatment. The data are used to 
differentiate among Airbnb listings and to identify which type of hotel customers Airbnb 
is more likely to attract. The main findings are that: a) Airbnb does not significantly 
affect hotel revenue per available room on average; b) it contributes to a reduction in 
the average price of a room where Airbnb is most present; c) it is relatively more 
attractive for foreigners than locals. Farronato & Fradkin (2015) found that the market 
expansion and business stealing effects of Airbnb differ by location, and attribute this 
heterogeneity to supply constraints – both legal and geographic - relative to the level of 
demand. According to the competition model developed by the authors, hotels and peer-
to-peer suppliers differ in their fixed (higher for hotels) and marginal costs (higher for 
peer-to-peer suppliers). Having run the model, the authors were able to conclude that 
efficient market structure depends on the level and variability of demand. They were 
also able to quantify the welfare gains from peer-to-peer entry in the accommodation 
industry. A statistical analysis of a datasets constructed from Airbnb (combining pictures 
of all New York City landlords on Airbnb with their rental prices and information about 
quality of the rentals) finds what can be seen as indirect evidence of racial discrimination 
(Edelman & Luca, 2014). The main finding is that, controlling for other relevant 
covariates, non-black hosts charge approximately 12% more than black hosts for 
quality-equivalent rentals. These effects are robust when controlling for all information 
visible in the Airbnb marketplace. These findings highlight the existence of discrimination 
in online marketplaces as an important unintended consequence of a seemingly routine 
mechanism for building trust. 
Forms of class distinctions within NFP platforms. A qualitative empirical study 
based on fieldwork conducted at four sites (interviews and participant observation at a 
time bank, a food swap, a maker space, and an open-access education site) aimed to 
analyse how class and other forms of inequality operate within this type of economic 
arrangement (Schor, et al., 2014). The authors find considerable evidence of 
distinguishing practices and the deployment of cultural capital (i.e. some individuals did 
not share with others who made grammatical errors in texts exchanged online). This 
exercise of class power undermines the ability to forge relations of exchange and 
reduces the volume of trade. This yields an inconsistency between actual practice and 
the widely articulated goals of openness and even equality, which the authors call 
‘paradox of openness and distinction’.  
Labour impacts. As mentioned earlier, further and more detailed analysis is presented 
in a separate paper, which shows that evidence on labour impacts is limited and not 
conclusive. Hall & Krueger (2015) performed a statistically descriptive analysis of data 
obtained from Uber on driver profiles, their motivation, and earnings. The main findings 
are that drivers:  
a) are more similar in terms of their age and education to the general workforce than to 
taxi drivers and chauffeurs;  
b) appear to be attracted to the platform largely because of the flexibility it offers and 
the level of compensation;  
c) earn on average $6 per hour more than regular taxi drivers.  
However, as documented by Codagnone et al., (2016), the latter two findings have been 
seriously challenged. Agrawal et al (2013) review the evidence on the market 
functioning and impacts of online labour markets, such as oDesk. The evidence is not 
conclusive, although it suggests that these markets tear down geographical barriers and 
seem to increase female participation. On distributional and aggregate welfare effects, 
the evidence is ambiguous and does not warrant any preliminary conclusions. 
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4 On regulatory matters  
In this final section, first the general positions of the reviewed sources which focus 
specifically, and also indirectly on regulatory matters, are presented (Section 4.1). From 
these sources, the key consumer protection (Section 4.2) and competition law issues 
(Section 4.3) are illustrated. One additional important matter concerns taxation that, 
given its specific and peculiar technicalities is not discussed at length here. It can be 
briefly reported here, that, as noted (Oei & Ring, 2015), substantive law on tax sharing 
activities exists. However, enforcement may present challenges because: a) some 
platforms opportunistically pick the more favourable regulatory regime; and b) micro-
providers raise unique compliance concerns. Platforms have already been taking action 
to address some of these issues. In this regard, Airbnb is currently engaged with 
legislators in drafting or adjusting existing legislation. In addition, its website informs 
and requires hosts to be aware of and comply with local laws and their landlords’ rental 
policies, both of which may prohibit short-term rentals (Miller, 2015; Zrenner, 2015). 
Furthermore, Airbnb has also started to collect taxes in some US cities and in 
Amsterdam.  
4.1 Debating regulations 
In the midst of controversies and legal disputes, the various regulatory essays reviewed 
are to some extent polarised between those radically against any intervention (Allen & 
Berg, 2014; Cohen & Sundararajan, 2015; Koopman, et al., 2014, 2015; Sundararajan, 
2014; Thierer, et al., 2015), and those that are in favour of some forms of regulation 
(Cannon & Chung, 2015; Edelman & Geradin, 2015; Gobble, 2015; Malhotra & Van 
Alstyne, 2014; McLean, 2015; Ranchordas, 2015; Rauch & Schleicher, 2015; Sunil & 
Noah, 2015; Zrenner, 2015).  There are also some more specialist legal approaches 
(Barry & Caron, 2014; Cohen & Zehngebot, 2014; Daus & Russo, 2015; Miller, 2014; 
Miller, 2015) which propose very strict interventions in, for example, transportation 
services (Daus & Russo, 2015). 
The libertarian solution uses the weaponry of text-book economics about the failures of 
regulation and the self-regulatory nature of markets (Allen & Berg, 2014; Koopman, et 
al., 2014; Thierer, et al., 2015). A key and objectively valid point is the risk of 
regulatory capture of regulators by incumbent industries. This dynamic can promote 
socially unproductive but costly rent-seeking behaviour by firms seeking to maintain 
their market stronghold through lobbying, donations and other means. From a libertarian 
standpoint, excessive legislation and regulation could absorb and neutralise the benefits 
to consumers and the efficiency gains allegedly produced by technological innovation. 
According to this perspective, the ‘sharing economy’ has allegedly overcome market 
imperfections without recourse to traditional forms of regulation. The Internet and the 
rapid growth of the sharing economy alleviate the need for much of this top-down 
regulation, and these recent innovations probably do a much better job of serving 
consumer needs. It is argued that the ‘sharing economy's reputational feedback 
mechanisms solve the information asymmetry, commonly called the ‘lemons problem’ 
(Thierer, et al., 2015)xlii. From this perspective, a new approach to bottom-up self-
regulation is needed where:  
a) various forms of licensing should be reduced to allow private certification schemes 
and reputation mechanisms to evolve;  
b) regulations making it difficult for start-ups to compete for labour (contractors should 
not be turned into employees) should be avoided; and  
c) regulation should remain general and not industry-specific. 
More nuanced and less radical approaches call for innovative and smart forms of 
regulation, which attempt a compromise to ensure consumer protection and safety 
without stifling innovation (Barry & Caron, 2014; Miller, 2014; Miller, 2015; Ranchordas, 
2015; Rauch & Schleicher, 2015; Sunil & Noah, 2015). By and large, the smarter 
regulations envisage a number of possible solutions:  
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a) use of information-based regulation (metrics and performance);  
b) development of a general but differentiated regime for the ‘sharing economy’;  
c) co-opting of the ‘sharing economy’ organisations into the city governance structure, 
as was done in the past with industries that performed a quasi-public service;  
d) not applying traditional regulation to the ‘sharing economy’ but rather, if necessary 
for the sake of fair competition, gradually deregulating incumbent industries.  
Sunil & Noah (2015), for instance, recommend that governments should establish a 
strategic operating framework, re-align political and cultural incentives, and modernise 
their structures in order to be ready to manage smart regulation regimes. Importantly, 
they also stress that sharing economy companies will have to make their data fully open, 
if a regime like this is to emerge. Rauch & Schleicher (2015) interestingly observe and 
then challenge the current sharing wars for they rely on an unstated assumption: if the 
sharing firms win these fights, their future will be largely free from government 
regulation. Local governments will either shut sharing down, or they will leave it alone. 
However, they envisage that, as ‘sharing economy’ firms move from being start-ups to 
being important and permanent players in key urban industries (transportation, 
hospitality and dining), local and state governments are likely to adopt the mixed 
regulatory strategies they apply to the types of firms with which sharing firms share 
important traits: e.g. property developers and incumbent taxi operators. In this spirit, a 
very technical but interesting solution has been suggested by Miller for the short-term 
rental market in general and Airbnb in particular (2014). They propose a ‘transferable 
sharing right’ (TSR) mechanism, which is modelled on existing transferable development 
rights regimes. This TSR regime would provide cities with a means of regulating short-
term rentals while also charging a fee equal to the resulting externalities and lost city 
revenues. Furthermore, TSRs could be used to re-invest in neighbourhoods where short-
term rentals occur, or to drive economic development to neighbourhoods where cities 
seek to encourage tourism. Cannon & Chung (2015) argue in favour of a co-regulation 
approach, as certain areas of the ‘sharing economy’ are suited to regulatory intervention 
and others to self-regulation. They warn, for instance, that when both suppliers and 
consumers depend on one another for reviews, there is the risk of retaliation which can 
lead users to soften negative reviews and make (as documented in Section 3.6) ratings 
less negative and, thus, less reliable. They also underscore the need for introducing a 
minimum insurance requirement, as imposed by California, for instance, on ride-sharing 
companies.  
A couple of very balanced appraisals mix economic analysis and regulatory 
considerations. They argue that old-fashioned and ineffective regulation should not stifle 
innovation and undermine efficiency gains and consumer welfare gain and they 
recognise that platforms cannot continue from above the law as they currently do 
(Edelman & Geradin, 2015; Einav et al., 2015). Edelman & Geradin (2015, pp. 9-13) 
consider imposing licensing schemes on platforms ineffective and a source of regulatory 
capture by incumbents. However, they urge platforms to be ready to accept 
requirements which genuinely protect both customers and non-customer. With respect 
to the latter, they stress the need for intervention when platforms’ negative externalities 
affect non-customers who lack any contractual relationships with platforms or service 
providers. Einav et al. (2015) recognise that ratings can be biased and inflated and that 
it is possible that platforms present the results of search in a way that is more 
convenient to them than to the users. On the other hand, they also point out that 
imposing licensing and certification on the platform may protect incumbents without 
really protecting consumers. Although these requirements can be seen as remedies to 
market failures, their implementation takes the form of lengthy processes after which 
little monitoring is performed. In this respect, they seem to favour small interventions, 
which allow traditional industries and new platforms to compete on an equal footing. 
With respect to the use of data by the platforms, they observe that several questions 
emerge such as: can consumers limit the use by platforms of data? Can platforms 
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share/sell ratings and purchase history? What about potential gender and race 
discrimination in ratings leading to certain groups getting fewer opportunities?  
Regardless of the regulatory debate described and despite the availability of various 
proposals, in practice regulatory regimes are lagging behind. As a result, many ‘sharing’ 
activities occur in a ‘grey area’. They are neither legal nor illegal, but at times violate 
local level ordinances (Miller, 2015). The European Sharing Economy Coalition has 
indicated that there is a lack of European policy frameworks and of institutional support 
for regulating this sectorxliii. This situation favours the incumbents’ claim that ‘sharing’ 
platforms avoid regulation and have an unfair competitive advantage (McLean, 2015; 
Oei & Ring, 2015; Rauch & Schleicher, 2015; Zrenner, 2015). Most open issues concern 
consumer protection and are reviewed in the next section. 
4.2 Consumer protection open issues 
These issues include: trust in the provider, product/service safety, quality and rating, 
safety standards, liability, fraud, data and privacy, pricing, dispute resolution and 
redress, and information. These are briefly reviewed below, where the most important 
aspects from the various regulatory essays and sources used are reported. 
4.2.1 Negative externalities and issues of liability and insurance 
On New Year’s Eve in 2013 in San Francisco, a driver for UberX failed to give way to a 
six-year-old girl, thus killing her. The parents sued the driver and Uber, but the driver 
was under-insured and Uber attorneys said the company was not liable because the 
driver was an independent contractor and had no reason to be actively engaged with the 
app at the time (Daus & Russo, 2015). Uber claimed that the driver was logged onto the 
app and was searching for a client but had not got one at the time. Several other 
incidents have occurred, most of them less severe. One, however, involved a death 
caused by a Lyft driver (Pfeffer-Gillett, 2016, pp. 234-235). It is reported that in the US 
Uber and Lyft continue to publicly represent themselves as online networking platforms, 
not transportation services and to include in their terms of agreement a clause waiving 
any liability (Pfeffer-Gillett, 2016).  
The main negative externalities for ride service platforms derive, thus, from unsafe and 
uninsured or under-insured drivers/cars. Without empirical evidence on the capacity of 
these new drivers and on the conditions of their cars, Edelman & Geradin recognise that 
they should be held to the same higher standards of training and inspection applied to 
other commercial vehicles and call for the insurance gaps to be closed (2015, p. 17-18). 
Pfeffer-Gillett, (2016, pp. 263-264) has a more radical approach. They propose that 
plaintiffs, instead of determining an employment relation (i.e. ‘respondeat superior’), 
should instead apply the principle of ‘a non-delegable duty to operate safely’ in order to 
demonstrate liability and crack down on the misleading statements contained in Uber’s 
and Lyft’s terms of agreement. Short-term rental of accommodation produces negative 
externalities on neighbourhoods (increased traffic, parking places occupied, noise, 
tenants disturbing neighbours, etc.) and removes properties from long-term rental 
markets. This may require regulatory intervention under specific circumstances 
(Edelman & Gerardin, 2015, pp. 19-21). 
Liability and insurance, however, are not only a matter of negative externality and may 
also concern the two sides of a ‘sharing’ transaction. The issue is again to determine who 
is liable if something goes wrong and to guarantee that ‘sharing’ activities are insured. It 
is not clear, for instance, if the platform is liable when a hired car crashes or a host’s 
apartment is damaged (McLean, 2015), or if it is responsible for the security of the 
service provided to a user of its platform. Platforms, as seen, in order to escape liability, 
argue that they are only intermediaries providing a ‘matching service’, not direct service 
providers (Malhotra & Van Alstyne, 2014). Platforms in the food businesses, which are 
being investigated in some cities for tax and health code violations, have argued that 
they are merely “network services” and not restaurants (Rauch & Schleicher, 2015). 
Similarly, Airbnb maintains that it only facilitates the contact between hosts and 
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travellers and ensures the payment. In the UK, existing insurance policies for physical 
persons often do not cover them when they engage in activities through ‘sharing’ 
platforms (Wosskow, 2014). It is difficult to determine how these activities should be 
insured because they do not fit in with either individual or commercial insurance. 
4.2.2 Information asymmetries and related issues 
In view of the possibly safety risks seen above, some level of protection could increase 
consumer welfare. In this respect, the reliability of reputational ratings is a key question 
as they help platforms to be successful (Dervojeda et al., 2013; Koopman et al., 2014) 
and to ensure that bad apples are known to all (Rauch & Schleicher, 2015). If they work 
well, they represent a channel of consumer protection both ex-ante (helping the choice) 
and ex-post (producing reviews that will help future users). However, ratings and 
reviews can be abused and have shortcomings, such as low response rates and 
incomplete information (see Section 3.3). Overall, it is evident that people are reluctant 
to provide negative ratings and almost all Airbnb and Uber ratings are at the top of the 
valuation scale (Edelman & Geradin, 2015 p. 22), which casts doubts on their 
usefulness.  
If ratings are not fully reliable, there is a clear ex-ante information asymmetry on the 
quality and safety of the good or services purchased through platforms. On eBay, this is 
mitigated by a money-back guarantee that refunds buyers if they do not receive their 
item or it does not match the listing description (Thierer et al., 2015). This solution is 
not available, however, for apartment rental and ride services. Another concern is that 
they are not subject to the same safety standards as traditional industries (Rauch & 
Schleicher, 2015). Ranchordas (2015) stresses that private kitchens are not licensed, or 
subject to health or safety standards, which may put the health of customers at risk. 
Similarly, Airbnb and Uber are not directly legally responsible for the same safety 
standards as hotels or taxi (Zrenner, 2015). Where a hotel must install automatic fire 
suppression systems such as sprinklers, most private homes and apartments lack this 
equipment, as do many apartments.  
These asymmetries can be exacerbated by the information overload facing potential 
consumers, who tend to suffer from the typical cognitive biases documented in the 
behavioural economics literature, e.g. in Edelman & Geradin (2015, pp. 23-24). This 
may increase the chances of consumers making poor decisions when faced with an 
overwhelming range of choices, poor regulation and unclear avenues for recourse in the 
case of a dispute, not to mention failure to fully appreciate risks and safety 
requirements. In these circumstances, regulation and/or nudges could help increase 
consumer protection. 
Indirectly related to information asymmetries and cognitive biases are matters 
concerning frauds, dispute resolution and redress. Payments on these platforms are 
usually made online, which may raise the issue of fraud. In the context of the ‘sharing 
economy’, Ranchordas (2015) indicates that here have been protests about scams on 
numerous websites. Platforms have taken a number of measures to avoid fraud. In 
Airbnb, the payment will only be transferred to the host after the traveller has checked 
in (Ranchordas, 2015). Likewise, eBay withholds payment for sellers for a number of 
days or until the buyer receives the item and leaves feedback (Thierer et al., 2015). 
Another issue is whether consumers are able to engage in dispute resolution if they are 
not satisfied with a product or service. The opportunity for consumers to file complaints 
and obtain complaint resolution is an important part of consumer protection. Airbnb’s 
website indicates that hosts can require guests to sign contracts or rental agreements 
prior to check-in. However, it adds that Airbnb cannot help to enforce any special 
policies in the contract.  Another important problem that might create insecurity is the 
fact that travellers can see their reservations in Airbnb suddenly cancelled with no 
warning (Ranchordas, 2015). Providers such as eBay already have an online dispute 
resolution system in place. 
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Finally, a matter that can also be seen as part of consumer protection, is that most 
legislations impose the requirement that businesses should offer their services to 
disfavoured groups, including racial minorities, low-income users, and low-income 
regions or neighbourhoods (Edelman & Geradin, 2015, p. 24-28). In this domain no 
regulation exists and ‘sharing’ platforms operate completely unchecked. 
4.2.3 Licensing and certification 
As anticipated, licensing and certification schemes tend to be ineffective and may unduly 
favour incumbents. Nonetheless, instances of serious incidents occurring with both Uber 
and Airbnb have led some scholars to call for imposing them on ‘sharing’ platforms. 
Trust in provider. Incidents to do with Uber drivers and/or with Airbnb hosts have 
raised concerns about the fact that suppliers of lift and rental services are not required 
to obtain certification (i.e. Sablik, 2014; Rauch & Schleicher, 2015). Hosts or drivers do 
not seek city operating permits because they do not know how to obtain them or do not 
think they need one. Uber and Lyft drivers are not required to obtain city certification or 
licenses or pass tests. Platforms try to boost confidence with ID checks (Dervojeda et 
al., 2013) because any information that confirms a person’s identity strengthens the 
trust and reputational ties between parties (Thierer et al., 2015). Many platforms require 
users to have a clear profile photo displayed with their accounts. They prefer people to 
sign up using their Facebook account, as this is linked to their real identity (Thierer et 
al., 2015). Airbnb uses technology to digitally verify the government IDs of its providers 
(Cohen & Sundararajan, 2015). BlaBlaCar also verifies drivers’ phone numbers, emails, 
and Facebook accounts along with real photos and names (Thierer et al., 2015). Some 
platforms use vetting and screening mechanisms to block questionable or untrustworthy 
users (Thierer et al., 2015). Concerning driver safety, it is argued that there is no 
transfer of cash and Uber possesses information about passengers’ addresses and credit 
cards. Drivers are therefore considered by and large to be safe (Koopman et al., 2014). 
Yet, concerns remain. Some argue that self-regulation measures are not sufficient and 
that it is the government which should be responsible for setting driver-fitness licensing 
standards via rulemaking or legislative processes, and for deciding who to license (Daus 
& Russo, 2015). There are doubts as to how transparent and rigorous these inspections 
are (Ranchordas, 2015).  
4.2.4 Data and privacy 
There are concerns about the amount of data that ‘sharing’ platforms are collecting 
about consumers, given the sensitive nature of some of these data, and how they are 
being used (Koopman et al., 2015). Having a large amount of personal data can provide 
a platform with a significant competitive advantage. However, this could be a problem 
for consumers if a dominant platform uses its market power to extract more data than 
consumers might want to disclose, or if it uses data to engage in behavioural advertising 
and price discrimination. Geradin (2015) concedes that online-enabled car transportation 
services collect sensitive information about passengers, such as their locations at various 
moments in time, and financial information, such as credit card details, etc. But he 
indicates that it is not clear whether there should be specific legislation for them, or 
whether they are already covered by existing legislation, which prevents holders of such 
data to misuse them. Likewise, Koopmans et al., (2015) argue that privacy-related 
concerns about ‘sharing’ platforms can be addressed through contract law: when 
platforms do not comply with the promises made to consumers, courts can act. 
4.3 Potential issues for competition law 
Two very recent essays have discussed for the first time the possible implications for 
competition law of ‘sharing’ platforms with a special focus on EU level matters (King, 
2015; Lougher & Kalmanowicz, 2016). They both report that competition issues first 
emerged in Europe as a result of complaints filed by Uber and Airbnb against restrictions 
imposed in certain Member States. This has been confirmed in the hearing that both 
companies had with the UK House of Lords (2016; pp. 25-50). According to King (2015), 
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there are three potential concerns: a) anti-trust implications when platforms activate 
network effects leading to dominance; b) lock-in of third parties on one side of the 
transaction; and c) power to reference rivals (i.e. leading to collusion or alternatively to 
discriminatory behaviour). King argues that Uber has also faced pricing complaints for its 
‘surge pricing’, which was voluntarily limited in New York, due to the potential for such 
pricing to breach price-gouging laws (King, 2015, p. 731). 
In the review by Lougher & Kalmanowicz (2016), it is not ruled out that ‘sharing’ 
intermediation markets can become concentrated and possibly dominated by a single 
market player. The activities of powerful platforms, for which data use is key, are likely 
to be scrutinised in merger control proceedings and in the long term potentially also in 
the area of market abuse. They cite statements by representatives of the French and 
Germany competition authorities to substantiate the claim that market power for such 
platforms comes from the capacity to collect a large amount of personal data and to use 
it commercially (2016, pp. 96-97). Finally, after noting that the regulation of ‘sharing’ 
platforms is hotly debated, they report that whereas some Member States have called 
for specific regulatory framework, however, the European Competition Commissioner 
Margrethe Vestager made clear in several statements that such platforms are too 
diverse to be monitored through a single regulatory framework and that it is preferable 
to apply existing antitrust rules case by case (2016, p. 102). 
From the evidence reviewed on the characteristics and functioning of the largest 
platforms it seems that market dominance is out of reach for most of them due to 
heterogeneity and matching frictions, but is not so unlikely for Uber. On the other hand, 
improvements in the matching algorithms, together with pricing strategies and use of 
personal data without any regulatory checks, may change the situation and make 
market dominance more likely also for a few other platforms.  
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5 Discussion and conclusions 
Policy makers and regulators are having to tackle entirely new activities that blur the 
boundaries between the personal and the commercial. They must avoid stifling 
potentially beneficial innovation and, at the same time, ensure consumer protection, 
preserve labour rights, and prevent the erosion of the tax base (Ranchordas, 2015; Sunil 
& Noah, 2015). Although more empirical research will be needed, this essay has touched 
upon many relevant policy and regulatory concerns. It has deconstructed and 
contextualised rhetorical and tangible controversies and brought conceptual clarity. It 
has also provided empirical insights and highlighted evidence gaps. 
The aims of this essay were to:  
i. provide a better conceptualisation that is both heuristically useful and empirically 
grounded,  
ii. critically analyse and unpack rhetorical discourses and controversies,  
iii. map these controversies against the available empirical evidence on how ‘sharing’ 
platforms function and on their environmental, economic and social impacts, and  
iv. review the debate and literature, focussing on regulatory and policy issues.  
Having gathered the evidence and the analysis resulting from these four goals, the final 
aim was to  discuss the policy and regulatory implications of the main findings and define 
the future agenda for research in support of EU level policy. In the following paragraphs, 
the main points and findings with regard to each of the first four objectives are recalled 
and summarised to prepare the discussion of policy implications and the proposal of a 
European research agenda. 
5.1 Discourses and concepts 
It has been shown that the various expressions used to refer to ‘sharing’ platforms, now 
appropriated by practitioners and stakeholders, are ‘floating signifiers’ for all sorts of 
different activities, in what can be called the rhetorical politics of platformisation. A 
closed self-reproducing loop exists between conceptual ambiguity, rhetorical 
controversies, and lack of sound measurements and empirical evidence. This loop, in 
turn, limits the possibilities of a rational debate of alternative policy options and 
contributes to the fragmented regulatory approaches, which currently address the 
‘sharing economy’. This essay has contributed to breaking this loop by deconstructing 
and contextualising rhetorical discourses and by proposing a typology to guide both 
policy and future research. 
The ‘sharing’ movement emerged as a form of social utopianism out of the broader 
narrative on the wisdom of the crowds and the creativity of the commons. After the 
development of ‘sharing’ platforms has taken a more ‘commercial turn’, disenchantment 
has fuelled growing criticism. Other more tangible interests and concerns exacerbated 
the conflictual debate that currently surrounds the ‘sharing economy’. These include the 
political activation of the disrupted incumbents, and urban tensions concerning the 
negative externalities caused by ride services and short-term accommodation rentals. 
The fact that ‘sharing’ platforms operate in a ‘grey area’ where they are neither legal nor 
illegal, but at times violate local-level ordinances, also raises genuine or instrumental 
concerns about consumer protection and the rights of independent on demand workers. 
This essay identified five controversies that it has deconstructed and mapped against 
available empirical evidence: 
(1) Neo-liberal co-optation of the ‘sharing’ movement. ‘Sharing’ activists and critical 
observers claim that this has been done by the large commercial platforms. As 
documented in this essay, these platforms have pursued aggressive growth 
strategies, and are calling for no regulation.  They are using the ‘sharing’ rhetoric in 
public relations activities (i.e. through official hearings and the release of reports 
they have written themselves on their positive social impacts). 
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(2) Social capital and community revival. Advocates for ‘sharing’ platforms claim that 
they help to revive communities by strengthening social capital and increasing 
generalised trust. Opponents, however, question this claim and suggest that not all 
individuals and communities have the option to ‘share’ and that less advantaged 
urban areas are not targeted by large commercial players. 
(3) Distributional effects. Advocates and platforms themselves use the arguments that 
the benefits of these activities trickle down to the needy, but there is no robust 
empirical evidence to document this claim. 
(4) Environmental and socio-economic impacts. The promises of greener consumption 
(positive environmental effects) and wide net socio-economic welfare gains are at the 
core of current platforms’ public relations campaigns, but even in this domain, 
empirical evidence documenting these effects is lacking. 
(5) Regulation. The debate is polarised between, on the one hand advocates of laissez-
faire and self-regulation, and on the other hand, those calling for the application, to 
‘sharing’ platforms, of the same regulatory requirements faced by the incumbent 
industries they disrupt  
In the midst of limited empirical evidence, polarised and contrasting normative and 
prescriptive narratives are widely produced and remain mostly unchallenged. This essay 
has grouped and categorised these narratives into social utopianism, business- and 
economics-driven optimism, and social pessimism, and has used them to construct four 
possible development paths:  
 ‘the great transformation’ path where the ‘sharing economy’ contributes to 
placing community and new values at the centre of society, and thus to achieving a 
triple win: green, fair, and socially-oriented prosperity;  
 the ‘growth-oriented globalisation’ where the ‘sharing economy’ is entirely at the 
service of markets, which, according to the critiques, would contribute to increasing 
inequality and social polarisation. Environmental sustainability would be sacrificed to 
the imperative of economic growth;  
 Radical opponents go even further in pessimistic views of the impacts of the ‘sharing 
economy’ in a way that is captured in the ‘barbarisation’ path;  
 In this respect, the fourth path ‘regulated sustainability’ intuitively suggests the 
kind of regulatory intervention that may be adopted in the coming years. 
Rhetorical discourses, public controversies, and more tangible ‘battles’, usual in any kind 
of polarisation process, fail to consider that ‘sharing’ platforms cover a wide range of 
different activities. In fact, these controversies flourish in semantic and conceptual 
ambiguity and contribute to it. Confused and confusing semantics and concepts are their 
bread and butter. Yet, policy makers need conceptual clarity and should be aware that 
the diversity of this domain rules out a ‘one size fits all’ approach to regulation. Some EU 
Member States have called for a single regulatory framework for the ‘sharing economy’.  
This is not only opposed by large platforms such as Airbnb and Uber (see for instance 
House of Lords, 2016, p. 25), but has also been deemed inappropriate by the EU 
Competition Commissioner (see for instance Lougher & Kalmanowicz, 2016, p. 102), 
Margrethe Vestager. 
Platforms can be categorised and distinguished according to their commercial orientation, 
dimensional relevance, and interaction modality; all of which in turn shape their 
importance for regulatory concerns. It makes no sense to treat together a commercial 
local platform for personal services such as TaskRabbit with community-based time-
banking where services are exchanged for time on non-monetary basis. Some platforms 
have a user base of a few hundred or thousand individuals whereas others have millions. 
The modalities of the exchange are different as some of the largest platforms (i.e. 
Airbnb) are pure P2P and others are B2C (i.e. Zipcar). B2C platforms, no matter how 
innovative their business model is (i.e. Zipcar), are already fully regulated by existing 
legislation.  
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One key contribution of this essay has been the purposive elaboration of a conceptually 
sound typology inspired by the current importance of different types of regulatory 
concerns. This has been done by first eliminating platforms that do not raise regulatory 
concerns, and then proposing a typology which identifies four types. The following 
groups do not currently raise regulatory concerns: a) not for profit peer to peer (P2P) 
small platforms (e.g. for time-banking, lending of goods, makers’ spaces), are a 
potential source of social innovation while currently not raising regulatory or policy 
questions; b) platforms for collaborative production (either P2P, P2B, or B2P, some 
commercial and some NFP) are small and not currently a matter of regulatory concern 
(with the possible exception of Intellectual Property Rights) and could be the target of 
industrial innovation policy; c) business to consumer (B2C) or business to business 
(B2B) platforms, no matter how innovative or large, are fully regulated by existing 
legislation and raise no new regulatory challenge; c) government to government (G2G) 
platforms (i.e. hospitals renting from each other under-utilised medical equipment using 
Cohealo or municipalities renting from each other under-utilised heavy duty equipment 
using MuniRent) are currently small, may become in the future a source of public sector 
innovation and related support policy, but currently do not pose urgent regulatory issues. 
After the elimination of the above groups, two dimensions (asset mix: from capital to 
just labour; interaction modality: P2P vs. P2B) were used to identify the following four 
types:  
1) peer-to-peer assets-intensive provision of goods and services;  
2) peer-to-peer manual labour-intensive unskilled provision of personal and home 
services;  
3) peer-to-business cognitive labour-intensive unskilled provision of services to 
businesses; and 
4) peer-to-business cognitive labour-intensive skilled provision of services to 
businesses.  
The range of new P2P activities in (1) raise regulatory concerns regarding consumer 
protection; Airbnb has also been the object of other controversies (zoning, taxes, local 
rules for short term rental). On the other hand, (2), (3), and (4) have implications for 
employment and social protection that are not relevant for (1) and are discussed at 
length elsewhere (Codagnone et al., 2016). Ride sharing (Uber) falling in (3) is the 
utmost source of concerns as it entails both consumer protection and labour protection 
issues. Ride services in this respect are very different from ride sharing (e.g. BlaBlaCar) 
and car sharing (e.g. RelayRides). The former is labour intensive and currently at the 
centre of labour disputes, whereas car sharing entails little or no work, and ride sharing 
only a limited amount of work. In P2P car and ride sharing, reservations are made in 
advance, the two peers eventually meet, driving is mostly for personal use, with less 
frequent but longer utilisation. In ride services, on the other hand, scheduling is on 
demand with a short lead-time, the driving is for commercial use, utilisation is very 
frequent (with more risks entailed). When one peer is the owner, just giving a ride or 
renting his/her car, and not a driver carrying paying passengers, liability policy is much 
more straightforward. The fact that provider and consumer meet increases trust; and 
the less frequent use reduces risks to safety. From a regulatory perspective, these are 
important factors. Last but not least, Uber is possibly the only ‘sharing’ platform with a 
potential to become object of competition law concerns. 
In this fashion, the focus of more urgent policy and regulatory actions and supporting 
research has been clearly delimited. Other sub-sets of the ‘sharing economy’ have been 
removed but are possibly of interest in other policy domains. For instance, NFP platforms 
in general and collaborative production platform can be the object of supporting policy 
measures, which aim to encourage respectively social and industrial innovation. 
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5.2 Facts  
In general, empirical evidence is limited on most of the topics raised in this essay, and 
evidence gaps are particularly acute for European contexts as compared to US ones. For 
instance, out of the 140 sources formally reviewed only about 20 focussed on European 
empirical realities. On the other hand, while evidence does not yet warrant conclusive 
judgements, it nonetheless helped deconstruct and shed some light on the key 
discourses and controversies. 
Lack of a consensual definition has hindered the development of reliable statistical 
measurements of both the monetary value of, and of the level of participation in, the 
‘sharing economy’. There are several estimates of the turnover such as the one by PWC 
that on a global basis the ‘sharing economy’ is worth $15bn and could reach $335 billion 
by 2025, or those presented in the report by the EU Parliament (2016) projecting the 
potential prospective value in EU28 at €572 billion. Various surveys about participation 
in the ‘sharing economy’, despite some variations due to the definition, converge in 
documenting that the phenomenon is by now statistically detectable and relevant. A 
number of trends and drivers explain the emergence of the ‘sharing economy’ and 
suggest great potential for future growth; these include technological developments, 
demographic changes and urbanisation, shifts in socio-cultural attitudes to consumption 
and work, as well as the need to economise on resource usage and to achieve a more 
environmentally sustainable growth trajectory. 
The empirical evidence found and analysed, despite evident limits, enabled to shed light 
especially on the issue of motivations and social capital, and on the functioning of 
‘sharing’ platforms; on the other hand, the empirical evidence on the expected 
environmental and socio-economic effects of ‘sharing’ platforms is very limited, 
fragmented, and inconclusive. 
With respect to motivations and social capital three broad preliminary conclusions 
emerge. First, the motivations that lead individuals to join the ‘sharing economy’ range 
from altruism to utilitarian goals and also include a scattering of anti-capitalist and anti-
consumption ideologies and sentiments. Second, the ‘sharing economy’ creates some 
form of genuine social capital but is also based on reciprocal (negative and positive) 
exchanges. Third, judging from the reviewed sources, altruistic and ideological 
motivations and social capital building seem clearly to characterise more the early not-
for-profit initiatives. So, going beyond the polarised rhetoric and controversies, it can be 
stated that the ‘sharing economy’ overall is a mixture of ‘passions’ and ‘interests’. 
The platforms delimited by the proposed typology are by definition two-sided markets 
where cross-side network effects emerge if more consumers (employers) will attract 
more suppliers and vice versa. The empirical evidence available shows that these 
platforms still struggle with market frictions and inefficiency, which limit their growth 
(Cullen & Farronato, 2015; Einav, et al., 2015; Fradkin, 2014; Fradkin, et al., 2015; 
Horton, 2014; Horton & Golden, 2015). In addition, they almost all allow ‘multi-homing’ 
(non lock-in for peers in one single platform). Frictions and ‘multi-homing’ do not seem 
to give these platforms the capacity to constrain users and providers or to scale up to 
market dominance. Though evidence is not available on how efficient the matching 
process is, in the case of Uber ‘multi-homing’ is in practice impossible and the platform 
clearly imposes constraints on drivers; possibility of market power is not entirely out of 
reach for Uber. On the other hand, the empirical evidence also unequivocally shows that 
the reputational rating systems harnessed by such platforms are not entirely reliable, 
can be manipulated, and suffer from lack of input and/or from input based on reciprocity 
(reluctance by users to provide negative ratings). 
The potential benefits, costs and welfare implications of P2P platforms can be identified 
theoretically and ex-ante. They add service delivery capacity, which should decrease 
prices and increase supply and consumer choice, thereby enhancing consumer welfare.  
On the supply side, they put pressure on the prices and sales of formal businesses, 
reducing their revenues and potentially the number of jobs they offer. On the other 
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hand, they create new gainful employment for additional market entrants and 
employment opportunities for independent contractors.  On this issue, however, it has 
been shown that there are also costs in terms of job security and quality (Codagnone et 
al., 2016).  
The net welfare balance from these positive and negative effects is an empirical question 
that cannot be answered by theory. Unfortunately, no robust and comprehensive ex-post 
empirical evidence on the aggregate welfare costs and benefits of these platforms was 
found. Available empirical evidence is very partial, un-systematic and inconclusive. 
Sound empirical works include only the following:  
a) as regards consumer welfare and distributional effects only three theoretical 
economic modelling are available (Benjaafar et al., 2015;Fraiberger & Sundararajan, 
2015; Horton & Zeckhauser, 2016). These focus on P2P rental markets and in only 
two cases is the modelling partially corroborated by some empirical data (Fraiberger 
& Sundararajan, 2015; Horton & Zeckhauser, 2016). Only one considers 
distributional effects (Fraiberger & Sundararajan, 2015). They all suggest that, under 
various hypotheses entailed in the theoretical models, P2P rentals increase consumer 
welfare (but does not necessarily reduce ownership and/or usage). These benefits 
seem to affect below-median income individuals more than the population as whole 
(Fraiberger & Sundararajan, 2015). Yet, the theoretical nature and very limited 
empirical validation of these contributions do not warrant any conclusions on 
consumer welfare effects;  
b) a quasi-experimental study reports that Uber has reduced DUI (Driving Under 
Influence) accidents in a number of US cities (Greenwood & Wattal, 2015);  
c) another quasi-experimental study documents that Uber has put competitive pressure 
on the traditional taxi industry leading to improvement in the quality of services in 
three US cities (Wallsten, 2015);  
d) a qualitative study on the effect of sharing practices on issues of inequality (Schor et 
al., 2014);  
e) a statistical analysis of Airbnb listing in New York documents racial discrimination in 
the price that hosts belonging to minority groups are able to charge for their property  
(Edelman & Luca, 2014);  
f) a statistically descriptive analysis has documented the negative impacts of Uber on 
the taxi industry revenues and values of the medallions in three US urban areas 
(Bond, 2015);  
g) a quasi-experimental shows that Airbnb decrease revenues for the low end of the 
hotel industry in Austin (Zervas et al., 2014);  
h) on the other hand, a study following the same design finds that Airbnb does not 
negatively impact the hotel industry in Norway, Finland, and Sweden (Neeser, 2015); 
i) an econometric study (Farronato & Fradkin, 2015) documents Airbnb’s two effects on 
the hotel industry: ‘expansion’ (meeting demands of previously under-served 
consumers) and ‘stealing’ (attracting consumers away from conventional suppliers); 
j) one panel study of Airbnb’s effect on tourism industry employment in the US state of 
Idaho shows that employment increases as a result of the extra expenditure of the 
guests in other areas, but the net effects may be offset by loss of jobs in the hotel 
industry (Fang et al., 2015). 
The first thing to note is that only one of the various contributions above is about 
European countries, while all the others focus on US contexts. 
Aside from the contributions summarised above, the rest of the evidence is simply 
anecdotal and often presented by stakeholders involved in the current controversies. For 
example, Uber and Airbnb have released dozens of reports but their reliability could not 
be independently validated because the methodologies are not transparently illustrated 
and data are not made accessible to researchers.  
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Equally inconclusive is the evidence on the promised positive environmental impacts of 
the ‘sharing economy’. It is extremely challenging and complex to demonstrate at 
aggregate level the net impacts in terms of environmental sustainability (Shor, 2014). 
First order effects can reasonably be expected to be positive: staying in existing spaces 
would reduce the construction of new hotels and/or work spaces, while sharing tools or 
goods would reduce the production of new goods, both of which should reduce the 
ecological and carbon footprints.  However, a measure of net impact at aggregate socio-
economic level should also consider the second order effects. What happens with the 
extra-money providers earned or users saved with the ‘sharing economy’? As seen, 
Airbnb has published ‘evidence’ that their hosts spend more than traditional tourists to 
show its impacts on city economies. This is self-defeating with respect to the claim of 
producing environmental benefits. 
5.3 Regulation 
The earlier cited report by the European Parliament (2016) on the ‘sharing economy’ and 
the possible costs of ‘Non Europe’, concludes that the current regulatory framework is 
not fit for purpose (e.g. eCommerce Directive). In addition, the difference in regulatory 
regimes for online and offline services leads to situations perceived as unfair 
competition. The report calls for adaption of the regulatory framework so as to allow 
online and offline services to compete on fair terms, which is currently not the case.  
Yet, the key policy question remains as to whether or not there is a need for regulatory 
intervention, at EU level or elsewhere. This question immediately gives rise to a second 
one: What would the costs and benefits of regulation of this kind be? To answer this 
question one would need to have empirical evidence on the current net welfare effects of 
‘sharing’ activities and then calculate how this would change after regulation is 
introduced. As the former is unavailable (see the previous paragraph), the latter is 
obviously not feasible. Hence, it is only possible to summarise below the different 
approaches, open issues, and options discussed in Section 4 (for those concerning labour 
issues, see Codagnone, et al. 2016). 
There is a debate between proponents of self-regulation who argue that formal 
regulation is costly and serves to protect vested interests, and the proponents of 
extending the reach of formal regulation to P2P platforms in order to correct market 
failures that private parties on their own cannot overcome. Libertarian thinkers argue 
that self-regulation by user-generated reputational ratings are more effective in ensuring 
consumer welfare than traditional consumer protection measures. Traditional command 
and control regulation would stifle innovation, and would turn contractors into 
employees. Instead of imposing private certification licensing schemes, reputation 
mechanisms should be allowed to evolve. Some empirical studies, however, challenge 
the libertarian view of the effectiveness and reliability of reputation ratings as a form of 
consumer protection and show that these systems can be manipulated. More empirical 
evidence will be required on the extent to which the 'libertarian' hypothesis could lead to 
less costly and burdensome self-regulation. However, opponents to the libertarian view 
have put forward radical proposals to impose all licensing and certification schemes on 
large commercial ‘sharing’ platforms. They want to crack down on these platforms’  
attempts to present themselves just as software companies, and to impose top-down 
liability and other responsibilities. 
However, more moderate approaches are evolving. Consensus is growing around the 
idea that the ‘sharing economy’ cannot be left entirely unchecked, nor can it be 
regulated by means of traditional command and control approaches. Innovative forms of 
smart regulation have been proposed: for instance, ‘information-based regulation’ that 
would tie regulation to some usage and performance metric. This approach would 
require that platforms adopt a policy of open data and information, which clashes with 
the secretive attitudes that platforms have about their data. Yet, if a less controversial 
climate is to be built around the ‘sharing economy’, these companies have no alternative 
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but to open up their data for screening and analysis of costs and benefits by neutral 
third parties. 
Regardless of the general approach reviewed above, there are still several unresolved 
issues that are briefly summarised below (except for labour issues that are addressed in 
Codagnone et al., 2016):  
(1) Taxation. Substantive law to tax sharing activities exists. However, enforcement may 
present challenges because: a) some platforms opportunistically pick the more 
favourable regulatory regime; b) micro-providers raise unique compliance concerns. 
Airbnb is currently engaged with legislators in drafting or adjusting existing 
legislation. In addition, its website informs hosts about local laws and their landlord’s 
rental policies and requires hosts to comply with them, both of which may prohibit 
short-term rentals (Miller, 2015; Zrenner, 2015). Furthermore, Airbnb has also 
started to collect taxes in some US cities and in Amsterdam; 
(2) Negative externalities, liability and insurance. Negative externalities for ride service 
platforms derive from unsafe and uninsured or under-insured drivers/cars. Short-
term accommodation rentals produce negative externalities on neighbourhoods 
(increased traffic, parking place occupied, noise, tenants disturbing neighbours, etc.) 
and by removing properties from long-term rental markets. Liability and insurance, 
however, are not only a matter of negative externality and may also concern the two 
sides of a ‘sharing’ transaction. The issue is again to determine who is liable if 
something goes wrong and to guarantee that ‘sharing’ activities are insured. It is 
reasonable to expect that some intervention may be needed to define liability, ensure 
safety, and close the insurance gap. Under specific circumstances, the negative 
externalities of short term rentals should also be addressed. 
(3) Information asymmetries and cognitive biases. Various information asymmetries, 
exacerbated by the typical cognitive biases documented in behavioural economic 
literature, cast doubt on the extent to which self-regulation fully protects consumers. 
This entails various more specific issues such as the reliability of reputational ratings, 
safety standards, fraud, dispute resolution and redress. The chances are that 
consumers will make poor decisions when faced with an overwhelming range of 
choices, poor regulation and unclear avenues for recourse in the case of a dispute, 
not to mention the fact that they may fail to fully appreciate risks and safety 
requirements. In these circumstances, regulation and/or nudges could help increase 
consumer protection. 
(4) Licensing and certification schemes. Licensing and certification schemes tend to be 
ineffective and may unduly favour incumbents. However, instances of serious 
incidents with both Uber and Airbnb have caused critics to call for them to be 
imposed on large commercial platforms. Platforms try to boost confidence with ID 
checks and vetting processes but there are doubts as to how transparent and 
rigorous these inspections are. 
(5) Data and privacy. There are concerns about the amount of data that ‘sharing’ 
platforms are collecting about consumers, given the sensitive nature of some of 
these data and how they are being used. 
(6) Competition law potential implications. From the evidence reviewed on the 
characteristics of the largest platforms and how they function, it seems that market 
dominance is out of reach for most of them due to heterogeneity and matching 
frictions. However, it is not so unlikely for Uber. On the other hand, improvements in 
the matching algorithms, together with pricing strategies and use of personal data 
without any regulatory checks, may change the situation and make market 
dominance also more likely for a few other platforms. 
Policy makers may approach some (if not most) of the issues above by splitting them in 
two groups: 
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 First, there is regulation that seeks to overcome information and coordination 
failures that prevent markets from operating efficiently. Digital information 
technology may offer innovative and better alternatives to this approach;   
 Second, there is regulation that seeks to overcome market failures in liability and 
consumer protection.  No amount of information can overcome these market failures 
and the need for third-party supervision and regulation remains. Typical examples 
include liability insurance for taxi drivers and tourist accommodation operators.  
There is evidence that platforms may at times try to avoid liability responsibility 
claiming that they are simply a matching service and not a service provider.  
Reported incidents with drivers and hosts have made this issue quite important.  
Some platforms have started to search for solutions to prevent incidents from 
happening. It appears that it is difficult in the EU to find insurance firms that can 
fulfil the needs of ‘sharing’ platforms.  For the mapping of regulatory and non-
regulatory approaches used by EU Member States and third countries (such as the 
US) only scattered evidence was gathered, mostly for the US and to a very limited 
extent the UK.  This represents a clear evidence-gap.   
The regulatory debate and policy response to the challenges posed by some sharing 
economy platforms is very fragmented in the EU.  Taxi and hotel sector regulation is 
mostly a competence for city councils and cities respond in various ways.  Labour market 
and social security regulation is mostly a state competence, handled differently by the 
Member States.  At a higher level, the EU may want to consider consumer protection and 
other liability issues. However, the literature reviewed in this paper does not give any 
indication of whether the EU should respond to these regulatory challenges, and if so, 
how to do so. It is possible, however, from the discussion so far to identify the policy 
options for the domain of liability and consumer protection: 
1) No intervention; 
2) Generalised regulation of the sharing economy; 
3) Regulation and liberalisation; 
4) Hybrid approach with ad hoc regimes.  
(1) No intervention. The laissez-faire approach relies on self-regulation and highlights 
two dangers of regulation that should be borne in mind. First, there is the possibility of 
regulatory capture of the regulators by incumbent industries and second, interventions 
which aim to tackle market failures can create regulatory failures. The laissez-faire 
approach also highlights the fact that it is worth remembering that many information-
related issues will be gradually resolved as technology progresses. However, having 
recognised this, a generalised ‘no intervention’ approach is not the best solution, for two 
reasons, one specific and empirical and one normative. First, clear market failures in the 
broadly defined domain of liability and social protection must be tackled because they 
have caused incidents and raised social alarm. Second, a level playing field must be 
created where platforms and established industry players can compete on fair terms. 
This is a general principle that, depending on the country, is enshrined either in the 
constitution or in fundamental legislation. Where it can be empirically demonstrated 
beyond any reasonable doubt that platform X and traditional business Y provide the 
same service, it is normatively embarrassing for a free market liberal democracy that 
the former extract advantages through regulatory arbitrage. 
(2) Generalised regulation of the sharing economy. This option would consist of 
the wholesale application of existing regulation for ‘offline’ businesses to the ‘sharing 
economy’, in order to create a level playing field. This option should be discarded on the 
grounds that existing regulation is outdated, cumbersome, and ineffective even for 
existing businesses. In some cities, taxi drivers face dozens of pages of licensing 
requirements, which spell out mandatory training, the minimum number of hours to be 
driven a month, and many more details that have accumulated across decades. Similarly, 
hotels have to deal with various pieces of national and local regulation. In these as in 
many other domains, regulatory elements have been added and stratified across almost 
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a century. Regulators have added pieces without ever removing old elements so that a 
lot of regulation no longer makes sense, given economic, social, and technological 
changes. It would be simply insane to apply existing regulation across the board. 
(3) Regulation and liberalisation. In this option, the level playing field would be 
created by applying light-touch regulation on the ‘sharing economy’ while, at the same 
time, liberalising existing industries, so that gradually the two sides of the current 
dispute would converge toward a middle ground. As reported by Einav et al (2015), this 
option is favoured by the majority of the US university economists, who were asked in a 
survey about what type of regulation they would prefer. 
(4) Hybrid approach with ad hoc regimes. This option would be coherent with the 
conceptual and empirical analysis that clearly indicates that ‘one size does not fit all’. 
Taking the transportation sector as an example, this essay has unequivocally 
demonstrated that Uber, RelayRides, and BlaBlaCar have little in common when it comes 
to liability and consumer protection matters. In this case, ad hoc regimes could be based 
on smart and information-based regulation or co-regulation. 
5.4 Future research  
This review has amply documented the fact that the ‘sharing economy’ is currently 
characterised by conflicting rhetoric and controversies between disputed values and 
interests. Factual evidence is currently limited, which creates an opportunity for science.  
Though epistemic uncertainty is a condition for science and cannot be removed, 
substantial research efforts are nonetheless needed to construct a more robust evidence 
base. These efforts could not promise to solve all the conflicts and controversies 
following a pure ‘technocratic’ model. They could, however, more ‘realistically’ and 
‘humbly’ partially reduce the current value-loadedness’xliv that characterises not only the 
public debate, but also many of the more academic and supposedly scientific 
contributions. A number of essential areas where gaps are evident and research is 
needed are presented in this section. Before doing this, however, it is worth going back 
to the relation between science and policy briefly introduced in Section 1.3.  
 
In many cases, the use of scientific advice from the ‘pure scientist’ (disinterested in 
policy making process and simply providing neutral information) or the ‘science arbiter’ 
(adjudicating claims through scientific research as part of panels or advisory boards) 
would amount to ‘stealth issue advocacy’. It is worse when the legitimacy of a scientist is 
used to reduce the scope of choices available for policy, as seen in some of the reports 
commissioned by Airbnb and Uber. This actually turns scientific work into issues 
advocacyxlv. 
Figure 7: Determining the role of science in policy and politics 
 
Source: Adapted from Pielke (2007, p. 19) 
The only possible way to progress when problems are intractable is to provide scientific 
expertise in the spirit of what Pielke (2007) calls the ‘Honest Broker of Policy 
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Alternative’. This approach is based on clarifying and possibly widening the choices 
available to decision-makers. Indirectly or directly, this approach facilitates the 
integration of scientific advice with the perspective and input of all the stakeholders 
involved. This spirit inspires the high-level research agenda presented in the next section 
and indicates the role that the JRC as a boundary organisation, which bridges science 
and policy, can play. In particular, it is important to avoid the possibility that new 
evidence counter-intuitively increases rather than defuses conflicts, as happened with 
the paper produced by Hall & Krueger (2015) using Uber data. The JRC can act as a 
neutral third party which can approach relevant stakeholders in order to obtain the 
necessary data for a fair analysis of all the issues at stake. Yet, for this to happen, a 
different attitude toward sharing their data with European researchers is also required 
from ‘sharing’ platforms. 
A paradox in the digital and Internet economy is that never before has so much data 
been collected, and never before has it been so difficult to access.  The value of this data 
is likely to be much higher for social and public policy purposes than it is for private 
purposes of the platform operators. However, online platforms in general - and 'sharing 
economy’ platforms are no exception – jealously keep their data to themselves and 
refuse to release them, except to selected academics and consultants who produce often 
narrowly-focused reports in favour of the platform. The controversial climate and 
suspicions that have built up around major ‘sharing’ platforms is partly fuelled by data 
secrecy. Opening up access to data to neutral third parties might deflate some of that 
tension.  
European-informed refinement of conceptual and theoretical framework. A 
systematic follow-up of the review of sources and platforms presented in this essay 
should expand the qualitative and quantitative evidence base on the presence and 
practices of the ‘sharing economy’ in Europe. A wider ranging and less time-constrained 
review of media accounts, scholarly work, and reports (which also searches non English 
language sources) should be performed. In addition, it is important to identify and 
analyse European platforms, and look at the practices that non-European platforms 
enact in Europe. Information on European short-term regulatory responses should also 
be gathered.  
Mapping and monitoring of ‘sharing economy’ platforms in Europe.  Extending 
the approach adopted in this essay, a supply-side mapping and monitoring of ‘sharing 
economy’ platforms in Europe should be performed and then regularly updated. This 
mapping and monitoring should include a global-level component (i.e. developments in 
Silicon Valley and few other areas in the world). For this purpose, the gathering and 
analysing of secondary sources (companies' datasets, newspapers and magazines, and 
platforms websites and blogs) should be complemented with in-depth interviews with 
selected stakeholders in Europe and the US.  
Big data gathering and analysis. This research stream has various components and 
steps:  
 automatic web scraping of relevant data from the selected platforms 
 stakeholder engagement and consensus building in order to obtain relevant data that 
is not publicly available. The stakeholders that should be involved include 
representatives of the selected ‘sharing economy’ platforms (Global-level 
representatives and those who are present in Brussels heading Europe-wide 
matters), representatives of selected city governments, and representatives of 
incumbent industries (i.e. taxi, hotel, etc.), also in the selected cities. The data that 
should be gathered of course include those held by the platforms, and also industry 
and city-level statistics, providing the measurements needed for full cost-benefit 
analyses. 
 Descriptive analysis of the data will provide preliminary insights into some of the 
impacts presented earlier in Section 3 (Bond, 2015; Edelman & Luca, 2014; Hall & 
Krueger, 2015; Schneiderman, 2014; Zervas, et al., 2015). This may include socio-
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demographic data on consumers and providers, trends in platform membership and 
revenues, trends in incumbent industry revenues and employment level, and 
geospatial analysis of listings and services. 
 Estimates and modelling of costs and benefits. The data will be analysed using 
opportune econometric techniques to estimate the costs and benefits of the selected 
platforms. The results could then be calibrated into a modelling simulation of the 
aggregate economic and social effects. 
Reputational ratings: statistical analysis and behavioural experiments.  The first 
component would consist of extending the kind of analysis presented in Section 3.3 to 
the European operation of key selected platforms. This would consist of web scraping 
data to analyse hundreds of thousands of reputational ratings in order to detect whether 
or not there is manipulation and social influence effects (Zervas et al 2015). The second 
component would be to design laboratory and/or field behavioural experiments to test 
the presence of generalised trust and of peer pressure mechanisms causing biases in the 
ratings and also treatments that could neutralise them.  
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6 Technical Annex 
6.1 Method and sources 
As anticipated in Section 1.3, this work is based on three distinct though integrated 
types of empirical evidence: a) a preliminary review of media accounts; b) a formalised 
review of the scientific and policy literature; and b) online field-work on a selective 
sample of platforms. This section illustrates the method for the secondary sources 
review, whereas the criteria for the selection of the platforms analysed are presented 
later in Section 6.3.3. 
6.1.1 Design 
Reviews can range from unstructured and fairly subjective in the selection of sources 
and limited in scope (i.e. narrative reviews) to very structured along the lines of the 
Cochrane protocol (Higgins & Green, 2011); they can be comprehensive with a narrow 
vertical but longitudinal focus including only empirical items (i.e. systematic review) and 
sometimes only quantitative empirical items (meta-analysis). Recently two ‘reviews of 
reviews’ have conceptually mapped the field and, if used jointly, identified as many as 
17 different review types (Grant & Booth, 2009; Paré et al., 2015). The literature 
sources used as evidence in this essay have been identified using a mix between the 
scoping and critical review methods (see summary of key features in the table below).  
Table 1 Scoping, critical, and systematic reviews 
Parameters Systematic Scoping Critical 
Scope of question 
Narrow  
(Longitudinal) 
Broad  
(Cross-sectional) 
Broad  
(Cross-sectional) 
Search strategy Comprehensive Comprehensive 
Selective and/or 
representative 
and/or iterative and 
purposive 
Nature of sources Empirical only 
Empirical and 
conceptual 
Empirical and 
conceptual 
Explicit inclusion 
criteria  
Yes Yes Not always 
Quality assessment Yes Not essential Not essential 
Reporting 
Statistical method 
plus narrative 
analysis 
Content/thematic, 
possibly frequency 
analysis 
Narrative / 
interpretative 
Source: adapted from (Grant & Booth, 2009; Paré, et al., 2015) 
Scoping reviews attempt to provide an initial indication of the potential size and nature 
of the available literature (Paré et al., 2015, p. 186), and are useful to inform 
policymakers as to whether a full systematic review is needed (Grant & Booth, 2009, p. 
101); they tend to privilege breadth over depth of coverage (Paré et al., 2015, p. 187), 
but they strive to be as comprehensive, transparent, and systematic as those called 
‘systematic reviews’ (Grant & Booth, 2009, p. 102). In scoping reviews inclusion and 
exclusion criteria are usually established to eliminate studies that do not address the 
initial research questions, however this usually does not involve exclusion on the basis of 
quality assessment (as in systematic reviews) but rather mostly based on the criteria of 
relevance and representativeness. Critical reviews go beyond mere description of 
identified articles and include a degree of analysis and conceptual innovation to provide 
a ‘launch pad’ for a subsequent phase of conceptual development and empirical testing 
(Grant & Booth, 2009, p. 93); they are also based on broad and diverse sources like 
scoping review, but they are usually less comprehensive and more selective in the 
inclusion of sources; the strength of a critical review lies in its ability to highlight 
problems, discrepancies, or areas in which the existing knowledge about a topic is 
untrustworthy, whereas its weakness is in the selectivity and less comprehensiveness of 
the search and in the lack inclusion and assessment criteria (Paré et al., 2015, p. 189). 
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With respect to the latter point it is important to notice that critical and scoping reviews 
include both broadly defined empirical studies and broadly defined conceptual essays 
(conceptual essays, theoretical essays, prescriptive/normative essays, other reviews, as 
well as essays discussing regulation and/or legislation). They consider both academic 
(journal articles, conference and working papers, book chapters, etc.) and other less 
academic types of sources (i.e. policy reports and similar). Compared to systematic 
review and meta-analysis, scoping and critical reviews therefore do not establish a 
hierarchy of sources and strict quality criteria for inclusion and exclusion. 
Systematic reviews usually tackle longitudinally and vertically a well-delimited and 
focussed research question, using explicit and reproducible criteria for inclusion and 
quality appraisal of items. Such a vertical and longitudinal focus is not possible in 
scoping and critical reviews as they tackle a domain holistically and in most cases at an 
early stage when it is not yet possible to vertically focus on just one simple research 
question; proposals for more focussed research questions for systematic reviews are 
possibly one of the outputs of scoping and critical reviews. Scoping and/or critical 
reviews are undertaken when a researcher is entering a new field and/or the field is 
known to be emergent and not fully researched; this is evidently the case of the broadly 
defined ‘sharing economy’, although for some of its sub-domains such as ‘car sharing’ 
that have been studied for some years already (see Evidence Box 5, p. 67) a more 
systematic review would be possible. The focus of both critical and scoping reviews is 
broader and cross-sectional (including inter-disciplinary literature and different topics 
potentially concerning very different research questions) and less longitudinal (they 
focus on a limited time frame in including items for analysis); they include both broadly 
defined empirical studies (qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods) and broadly 
defined conceptual items. By definition they may present some bias both in the search 
and in the inclusion of items for analysis, but such bias can be justified by the conceptual 
choices and the research objectives. The literature sources supporting this essay have 
been identified and analysed using a scoping approach with a critical bent in that: a) it 
matches the scoping type with respect to all the parameters of Table 1 and, as a result, 
it is more comprehensive and transparent than a critical review; b) it goes beyond mere 
description and includes a degree of analysis; c) the search strategy, given the state of 
the art, had to be to some extent purposive and iterative.  
6.1.2 Process and sources 
The first step was a comprehensive but unstructured free text search of media accounts 
using the Lexis Nexis dataset. The expressions ‘sharing economy’, ‘collaborative 
consumptions’, ‘accessed based consumptions’, and ‘collaborative economy’ were used 
to search newspapers and magazines (for the period January 2010-June 2015, a few 
items were added later as a result of the successive rounds of update), as well as 
industry sources and blogs/reports by advocacy groups (i.e. Peers, Shareable, OuiShare, 
etc.). Besides being instrumental to the search of literature sources (see below) and to 
the identification of ‘sharing’ platforms (see Section 6.3.3), this first search produced the 
evidence that partly supports the reconstruction of rhetoric and controversies. 
From the media accounts it was possible to identify a few much cited academic 
contributions. As a result, combing the media accounts and these academic contributions 
allowed us to extract the key dimensions and key words to perform the formal search in 
electronic databases. These dimensions included: a) definitions, taxonomies, and 
business models; b) conflicting narratives and rhetoric; c) issues related to social capital, 
motivation to participate, trust and reputational systems; d) environmental impacts; e) 
economic impacts (positive and negative); and f) legal disputes and regulatory issues. 
These dimensions then informed the search performed on key electronic datasets 
including: Scopus (Elsevier); JSTOR Archival Journals; Taylor & Francis Online – 
Journals; SciVerse ScienceDirect (Elsevier); SpringerLink; Wiley Online Library; Emerald 
Journals (Emerald Group Publishing); IEEE Conference Publications; ACM Digital Library. 
The following search string with Boolean operators was used:  
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(‘sharing economy’ OR collaborative Consumption OR access based 
consumption OR collaborative economy) AND (definition OR taxonomy OR 
business model) AND (Lobbying OR Political consumerism OR rhetoric OR true 
sharing OR exploitative practices OR "dark side") AND (social capital OR 
participation OR community revival OR civic sense OR motivation OR 
reciprocity OR trust Or reputation Or reputational rating) AND (impact Or 
benefits OR costs OR labour OR contingent labour OR gas emissions Or fuel 
consumption) AND (inequality OR lower income groups OR disadvantaged 
groups OR inclusion Or Exclusion) AND (innovation OR entrepreneurship OR 
micro-entrepreneurs OR contractors) AND (legal disputes Or regulation Or 
policy regimes Or courts decisions OR tax base). 
Two main criteria were used for inclusion in the analysis: a) representativeness of the 
conceptual dimensions deemed as relevant; and b) time of publication with a preference 
toward the items published in the period 2013-2015 over those published in the period 
2009-2012; this time criterion led us to exclude: a) conceptual and qualitative empirical 
items focussing more on the not-for-profit and ‘true sharing’ platforms that dominate the 
literature prior to 2012; and b) a fairly large literature on C2C eCommerce dating as far 
back as 2001 and mostly concentrating on eBay.  
While performing the search it became clear that: a) a more consolidated, vertically 
focussed literature on car sharing exists; and b) a body of literature is emerging on the 
employment implications of platforms interchangeably classified under the ‘crowd’ 
and/or the ‘sharing’ movements. For the former a few literature reviews exist already 
and, given the more general nature of this essay, only a selection of contributions on car 
sharing are included; the latter has been the object of a separate scoping review 
presented elsewhere (Codagnone et al., 2016).  
No quality assessment criteria were used and all empirical and conceptual contributions 
matching the two criteria described above were included.  This is fully in line with the 
characteristics of scoping reviews described earlier and responds to the substantive and 
theoretical interest in the emerging narratives (regardless of their empirical basis and/or 
quality of analysis). This means that the items reviewed formally do not only come from 
a wide array of different disciplines applying different methods and perspectives, but 
include scientific articles in peer-reviewed journals, papers in the pre-publication phase, 
think tank reports, as well as policy reports. 
The first round of search was conducted between May 20 and June 15 2015 and it was 
extended between August 10 and September 10 2015. The second draft completed 
September 13 2015 was presented at several internal seminar presentations and 
underwent peer-reviews before this final version was approved and published. This 
means that seven months have elapsed between the completion of the last formalised 
search and analysis and the final publication of this essay. In order to obviate to this lag 
time a final updated search on the sources was conducted between April 18 and May 20 
2016 that, however, was not as systematic and formalised as the previous rounds. 
Between the first search in May-June 2015 and the last update in April-May 2016 the 
number of sources identified and selected as relevant increased from 70 to 140, which 
shows that the literature on the broadly defined ‘sharing economy’ is growing very 
rapidly; this may also mean that despite the last update performed several important 
sources may have been missed. 
6.1.3 Limitations 
The main limitations are intrinsic both to the scoping-critical approach and to the current 
state-of-the-art. The search strategy has been very comprehensive and the criteria for 
inclusion/exclusion transparently described. Some purposive elements of selection are 
present and depend on the time frame and on the iterative process followed. The time 
frame chosen has determined the exclusion of conceptual and qualitative items 
published before 2009. The state-of-the-art (very limited quantitative empirical 
literature) and the theoretically inspired interest in narrative and discursive dimensions 
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have influenced the decision not to assess the quality of contributions when deciding for 
inclusion or exclusion from the analysis.  
Out of the 140 sources included for review, only about 20% focus on European contexts 
and the overwhelming majority focus on North American contexts; this may be the result 
of performing an English language search only and there may be other contributions 
focussing on European contexts that have been published in other languages. On the 
other hand, a few English language contributions in peer-reviewed scientific journals 
studying European settings have been found and usually scholars in Europe have a 
strong incentive to publish in such journals; hence even if this bias exists, it should not 
be overestimated. It is also important to stress that, since almost one year has passed 
between the first draft and the final publication, some parts of the analysis presented in 
this essay show similarity with contributions that have been published much later and 
were not available when the first draft was completed, like for instance for a few articles 
dealing with rhetoric and discourse analysis (i.e., Cohen & Muñoz, 2015; Dredge & 
Gyimóthy, 2015; Martin, 2016). These sources have now been included and cited. This 
actually shows that different scholars have been reaching similar conclusions following 
different paths and methods. 
Finally, the review of media accounts and of platforms (see more on this in Section 
6.3.3) is explicitly selective and exemplificative and does not aim to be representative, 
which is why it would probably be superfluous to discuss their limitations. 
Having clarified the above, it must nonetheless be stressed that to the best of our 
knowledge there is no review essay similar in scope and comprehensiveness as this one 
in the literature; for what concerns quantitative studies, modelling studies, and 
regulatory essays, those included in this essay are fairly representative of what is 
currently available.  
6.2 Supplementary material on definitions and classifications 
6.2.1 Selective review of definitions 
As summarised in Evidence Box 4, there are different expressions are used to refer to 
the platforms that are considered part of the ‘sharing economy’. The first definition to 
appear was that of ‘collaborative consumption’ by Botsman & Roger (2010, p. xv; but 
see also Botsman 2013); according to these authors the concept is defined as including 
‘bartering, lending, renting, gifting, and swapping’ and further divided into three 
categories: ‘product service systems’ (access to products or services without the need 
for owning the underlying assets), ‘redistribution markets’ (i.e. re-allocation of goods), 
and ‘collaborative lifestyles’ (i.e. exchange of intangible assets). Criticising this definition 
(Belk, 2014b) and distinguishing between ‘true’ and ‘pseudo-sharing’ (Belk, 2014a), 
Belk: a) defines collaborative consumption as ‘people coordinating the acquisition and 
distribution of a resource for a fee or other compensation’; and b) defines ‘true sharing’ 
has entailing temporary access rather than ownership, no fees or compensation, and use 
of digital platforms. Belk clearly makes the point that the majority of commercial 
platforms are improperly included in the ‘sharing economy’.  According to industry 
analyst Jeremiah Owyang the ‘collaborative economy’ can be simply defined as “An 
economic model where technologies enable people to get what they need from each 
other –rather than from centralised institutions” (Owyang, 2015d). Another expression 
used is ‘access based consumption’ defined as ‘transactions that can be market mediated 
but where no transfer of ownership takes place and differ from both ownership and 
sharing’ (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). A similar approach is used to define the ‘sharing 
economy’ as ‘consumers (or firms) granting each other temporary access to their under-
utilised physical assets ("idle capacity"), possibly for money’ (Frenken et al., 2015; 
Meelen & Frenken, 2015). On the basis of qualitative field work and of the review of 254 
platforms, collaborative consumption has also been defined as ‘a peer-to-peer-based 
activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing the access to goods and services, coordinated 
through community-based online services’ (Hamari, et al., 2015). Shor and associates 
have defined the ‘sharing economy’ as digitally ‘connect consumption’ to convey the 
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importance of the digitally mediated social component and make a distinction from 
earlier forms of sharing and collaboration (Dubois, et al., 2014; Schor, 2014, 2015; 
Schor & Fitzmaurice, 2015; Schor, et al., 2014)xlvi. Starting from this premise, they have 
provided slightly different formulation briefly reported here. Schor (2014, p. 2) presents 
the following illustration in terms of broad categories ‘Sharing economy activities fall into 
four broad categories: recirculation of goods, increased utilisation of durable assets, 
exchange of services, and sharing of productive assets’. It is worth pointing out the 
evident contradiction between defining it as ‘connected consumption’ and then including 
also ‘sharing of productive assets’.  In Schor & Fitzmaurice the four categories are ‘re-
circulation of goods, exchange of services, optimizing use of assets, and building social 
connections’ (2015, p. 415). Starting from the latter categorisation Shor’s last definition 
of what she calls the ‘new sharing economy’ is as follows ‘economic activity that is Peer-
to-Peer, or person-to-person, facilitated by digital platforms’ (2015, p. 14).  
Evidence Box 4 Conceptual and semantic ambiguity in the sharing economy 
Industry/advocates or opponents/policy 
 Collaborative consumption. This is the first expression popularised by Botsman and Rogers 
(Botsman & Rogers, 2010a, 2010b) that defined it as consisting of three systems (‘product 
service systems’; ‘redistribution markets’; ‘collaborative lifestyles’) based on organised sharing, 
bartering, lending, trading, renting, gifting, and swapping;  
 Collaborative economy (industry). According to a key industry analyst (Owyang, 2013; 
Owyang, et al., 2014), ‘An economic model where technologies enable people to get what they 
need from each other –rather than from centralised institutions’;  
 Collaborative/sharing economy (European Commission). In the fall 2015 the Commission 
launched a consultation on the collaborative economy, but no definition has been provided and 
the expression is used interchangeably with ‘sharing economy’; in the background document to 
the consultation the collaborative economy is defined as corresponding to ‘sharing economy 
service’, which in turns comprises platforms bringing together providers and users and allow 
assets, resources, time and skills to be shared. In a report delivered for DG Grow Business 
Observatory the sharing economy is defined as ‘companies that deploy accessibility based 
business models for peer-to-peer markets and its user communities’ (Dervojeda et al., 2013a); 
in other reports of the same observatory freemium, crowdsolving, and collaborative production 
platforms are put together as part of the ‘collaborative economy (Probst et al., 2015a, 2015b; 
Probst et al., 2015c) 
 Sharing Economy. According to PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) the “sharing economy uses 
digital platforms to allow customers to have access to, rather than ownership of, tangible and 
intangible assets” (Vaughan & Hawksworth, 2014); In two reports by the World Economic Forum 
(WEF, 2013, 2014) the ‘sharing economy’ is defined by its capacity of maximising the utility of 
assets and unleash their untapped social, economic, and environmental value by way of renting, 
swapping, lending, bartering, and giving in either P2P (also referred to as C2C) or B2C modes. A 
wide definition of the sharing economy is provided in a UK advocacy report as comprising online 
platforms enabling people to share access to assets, resources, time, and skills under a variety of 
business model and practices that include both for-profit and not-for-profit activities (Wosskow, 
2014); A OECD workshop background paper basically does not presents a definition, apart from 
referring to a variety of online platforms specialised on ‘matching demand and supply in specific 
markets, enabling peer-to-peer (P2P) sales and rentals’;  
 Peer Production (commons-based).  Collaboration among large numbers of individuals 
effectively cooperating and coordinating for the provision of information, knowledge, and cultural 
goods without having to rely on market mechanisms or managerial hierarchies (Benkler, 2004, 
2006) 
 Peers Inc.  The leveraging of business intelligences and peer-to-peer networks as defined by 
Chase of Zipcar (Chase, 2015), which is in practice a business-to-consumer model very different 
from real peer-to-peer markets; 
 The Mesh. Meshiness refers to networked nature of people and societal value and casts a large 
set of activities in which the author invests (Gansky, 2010; Gansky, 2011) 
 Temp Land and Gig Economy. These are two of the more critical and at times derogatory 
expressions that can be found in public commentaries. The expression temp land (see: 
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http://www.propublica.org/series/temp-land ) is used to refer to the transient and bit-sized 
nature of future work underscoring the many obstacles that peer denizens will face. The ‘Gig 
Economy’ is used to refer to the multiple micro-task people accept to put together an income and 
make a living (Horowitz, 2013). Another expression used to convey the negative impact on work 
is the ‘The TaskRabbit economy’ (Kuttner, 2013). 
Academia 
 True and pseudo-sharing. Belk criticises most definitions above and distinguishes between 
‘true’ and ‘pseudo-sharing’ (all commercial platforms); ‘true sharing’ entails access rather than 
ownership, no fees or compensation, and use of digital platforms(Belk, 2014a, 2014b).  
 Access-based consumption. transactions that can be market-mediated but where no transfer 
of ownership takes place and differ from both ownership and sharing’ (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). 
A similar approach is used to define the ‘sharing economy’ as ‘consumers (or firms) granting 
each other temporary access to their under-utilised physical assets ("idle capacity"), possibly for 
money’ (Frenken, et al., 2015; Meelen & Frenken, 2015); “a peer-to-peer-based activity of 
obtaining, giving, or sharing the access to goods and services, coordinated through community-
based online services”(Hamari et al., 2015). 
 Sharing economy. While recognising the conceptual difficulties, sociologist Schor and her 
associates have attempted to retain the expression and define it somehow in ways that are 
conceptually and empirically consistent (Dubois, et al., 2014; Schor, 2014, 2015; Schor & 
Fitzmaurice, 2015; Schor, et al., 2014); the sharing economy comprises activity that is Peer-to-
Peer, or person-to-person, facilitated by digital platforms in five categories: recirculation of 
goods, increased utilisation of durable assets, exchange of services, and sharing of productive 
assets’, building social connections; 
 Just peer-to-peer markets. Economists studying platforms generally considered part of the 
sharing economy and refer to them simply as peer-to-peer marketplaces for the exchange of 
underutilised goods and services or as spot labour markets (Cullen & Farronato, 2015; Einav, et 
al., 2015; Farronato & Fradkin, 2015; Fradkin, 2014; Fradkin, et al., 2015; Horton, 2014; Horton 
& Golden, 2015). 
The OECD background paper prepared for the earlier cited June 2015 workshop basically 
does not presents a definition, apart from referring to a variety of online platforms 
specialised on ‘matching demand and supply in specific markets, enabling peer-to-peer 
(P2P) sales and rentals’, and simply identifies three types: a) P2P selling (examples: 
eBay and Etsy); b) P2P sharing (examples: Airbnb, Uber, TaskRabbit); and c) 
crowdsourcing (examples: Mechanical Turks, Kickstarter, AngelList). According to 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) the “sharing economy uses digital platforms to allow 
customers to have access to, rather than ownership of, tangible and intangible 
assets”(Vaughan & Hawksworth, 2014). In this definition, besides typical examples such 
as Uber and Airbnb, collaboration geared toward productive activity is also included, as 
well as subscribing models for content and musical entertainment (i.e. Spotify). In two 
reports by the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2013, 2014) the ‘sharing economy’ is 
defined by its alleged capacity facilitated by digital technology to maximise the utility of 
assets and unleash their untapped social, economic, and environmental value by way of 
renting, swapping, lending, bartering, and giving in either P2P (also referred to as C2C) 
or B2C modes. This occurs through three systems: a) redistribution markets for items or 
services no longer required to someone or somewhere where they are needed (cited 
examples: eBay or Craigslist); b) product service systems that provide access without 
need for ownership (amongst cited examples: Zipcar, RelayRides); c) collaborative 
lifestyles platforms which allow people to share and exchange less tangible assets such 
as time, skills, money, experience or space (amongst cited examples: Airbnb, 
TaskRabbit). 
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Evidence Box 5 Distinct models in the broadly defined car sharing domain 
 The broadly defined car sharing domain has been the object of research much before the 
‘sharing economy’ hype picked up; there is relatively more consolidated literature (Cohen & 
Kietzmann, 2014; Furuhata et al., 2013; Shaheen et al., 2012) and clearer conceptual 
distinctions. 
 The first distinction is between ‘car sharing’ (i.e. Zipcar, Car2Go, Relay Rides) and broadly 
defined ‘ride sharing’ (BlaBlaCar, Uber, Lyft). Within the car sharing category there are another 
four sub-categories: a) Business-to-Consumer (B2C) point-to-point (Car2Go); b) B2C round-
trip (Zipcar); c) NFP cooperative (Modo); d) P2P (Relay Rides, EasyClub). Ride sharing is 
further broken down into: a) various forms of carpooling and ride sharing (i.e. BlaBlaCar; and 
b) ride services (i.e. Uber, Lyft). This classification is important because it clarifies that ‘car 
sharing’ is not necessarily B2C but it also includes P2P transaction where two individuals 
eventually meet, one renting and later returning the other’s car. Furthermore, it is also very 
important to distinguish Uber ride services from true ‘ride sharing’ platforms such as BlaBlaCar. 
P2P car sharing and/or ride sharing are very different from those of ride services and have 
different regulatory and safety implications. In P2P car and ride sharing the reservations are 
scheduled in advance, the two peers eventually meet and driving is mostly for personal use, 
with less frequent but longer utilisation. In ride services on the contrary scheduling is on 
demand and on short lead-time, the driving is for commercial use, utilisation is very frequent 
although shorter. When one peer is the owner and not a driver the issue of liability policy is 
much more straightforward; the fact that the peers meet increases trust; the lower frequency 
in utilisation should reduce risk and increase safety. These are relevant characteristics from a 
policy and regulatory perspectives. 
6.2.2 Broad objects-based categorisations 
There have been some attempts to pragmatically go beyond a clear cut definition and 
define the ‘sharing economy’ in terms of some broad categories. For instance, Botsman 
& Rogers identified three categories: ‘product service systems’ (access to products or 
services without the need for owning the underlying assets); ‘redistribution markets’ (i.e. 
re-allocation of goods); and ‘collaborative lifestyles’ (i.e. exchange of intangible assets); 
the World Economic Forum reports (WEF, 2013, 2014) refer to three systems: 
redistribution markets for items or services no longer required to someone or 
somewhere where they are needed (cited examples: eBay or Craigslist); product service 
systems that provide access without the need for ownership (amongst cited examples: 
Zipcar, RelayRides); collaborative lifestyles platforms allowing people to share and 
exchange less tangible assets such as time, skills, money, experience or space (amongst 
cited examples: Airbnb, TaskRabbit).  The OECD (2015b) proposes three types: a) 
selling (examples: eBay and Etsy); b) sharing (examples: Airbnb, Uber, TaskRabbit); 
and c) crowdsourcing (examples: Mechanical Turks, Kickstarter, AngelList). In the work 
of Shor and associates (Dubois, et al., 2014; Schor, 2014, 2015; Schor & Fitzmaurice, 
2015; Schor et al., 2014) four categories are presented: recirculation of goods (i.e. 
Craigslist, eBay); increased utilisation of tangible assets (i.e. Zipcar, Relay Rides, Uber, 
CouchSurfing, Airbnb); exchange of services (i.e. Time banking, TaskRabbit, Zaarly); 
sharing of productive assets; and building of social connections (i.e. Mama Bake, Soup 
Sharing, and EatWithMe). Fradkin et al refer to exchange of services and underutilised 
assets between buyers and semi-professional sellers (2015, p. 5).  The next evidence 
boxes use the four categories presented by Shor and associates; they include examples 
that can be associated to each category. 
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Evidence Box 6 Recirculation of goods: examples 
eBay and Craigslist were the first two online market places for the exchange of pre-owned goods 
to be launched in the mid-1990s. By the beginning of the current decade dozens of new initiative 
emerged including both free exchange and swapping platforms (Freecycle, Freegive, Yerdle, 
Swapstyle) and for profits marketplaces (i.e. Etsy). With respect to the recirculation of goods a 
sensible segmentation into pre-owned goods (eBay), bespoke goods (Etsy), and ‘loaner products’ 
can be introduced. This latter category includes, for instance, ‘Bag Borrow or Steal’ a platform 
facilitating the borrowing, collecting, and sharing of luxury accessories (especially clothing). A 
conceptually more difficult issue is whether or not the Food category could be placed under 
recirculation of goods. Certainly activities that facilitate the sharing of foods and meals could be 
placed here. Leftoverswap, for instance, allows individuals to share their leftovers with people in 
their community who have signed up and are notified by a mobile app. On the other hand, the 
sharing of food preparation would probably fit better under the ‘building of social connection’ 
category (examples are placed there).  
Evidence Box 7 Increased assets utilisation: examples 
This category could include activities that optimise the use of tangible assets. The first big ‘sharing 
economy’ success was Zipcar that in 2009 started placing cars offered for rent in convenient urban 
locations. With the promise of lower gas emission and more sustainability, initiatives in this 
domain proliferated and boomed with well-known cases such as Uber (ride services), BlaBlaCar 
(ride sharing) and various others. The other big success in increased use of assets is in the area of 
accommodation and hospitality business. The first and most famous example is CouchSurfing that 
between 2003 and 2012 paired travellers and people willing to offer them a bed or couch as a not-
for-profit activity. Today it is a Benefit Corporation (with 6 million members in 100,000 cities). 
CouchSurfing was followed by successful more commercial initiatives such Airbnb (short-term 
rental) and Home Away (vacation rental). Also renting of storage and office space could be 
included here. Sharemystorage, for instance, is a social marketplace that brings together those 
who have spare space and those who need it for storage. Wework, on the other hand, is the 
community of creators where buildings are provided as collaborative workspaces. ShareDesk 
connect mobile professionals with productive work and meeting spaces. There are, however, also 
new platforms that could arguably be considered a way to leverage underutilised assets: a) 
Cohealo is an asset mobilisation and analytics platform for the healthcare industry. It allows 
hospitals to use their non-emergency medical equipment more efficiently and save money on their 
future equipment purchases; b) Cargomatic connects shippers with qualified carriers who have 
unutilised capacity on their trucks; c) MuniRent, targets local governments with a platform that 
facilitate the sharing of heavy duty equipment (directors of Public Works or Fleet Managers can 
access an online catalogue of equipment owned by neighbouring jurisdictions). Money is by 
definition an asset, which would justify including under this category different types of initiative in 
the financial sector (personal loans, business loans, and crowdfunding). Lending Club, for instance, 
is a credit marketplace platform facilitating personal loans, business loans, and financing. 
Borrowers access lower interest rate loans and investors provide the capital to enable many of the 
loans in exchange for earning interest. Funding Circle allows savers to lend money directly to small 
and medium-sized businesses. Indiegogo and Kickstarter are well-known crowdfunding platforms.  
There are new platforms leveraging assets such as Internet connections and solar energy. Open 
Garden, for instance, is dedicated to connecting the next 5 billion mobile devices with peer-to-peer 
connections by leveraging the density of mobile devices. Open Garden is a platform for the 
crowdsourcing of connectivity across 3G, 4G, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. It enables users to create their 
own ad hoc mesh networks with other Open Garden-enabled devices including smartphones, 
tablets and PCs. Yeloha is a platform that allows the sharing of solar energy between ‘sun hosts’ 
and ‘sun partners’. It provides access to purchase solar energy generated by neighbours.  
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Evidence Box 8 Services/ labour exchanges: examples 
Monetised services and labour exchanges with sizeable market values such as TaskRabbit and 
Freelancers are the commercialised version of ‘time banks’ (Shor 2014; Shor & Fitzmaurice 2015). 
The digital services and labour exchange platforms that have emerged more recently have, 
however, nothing to do with the spirit of the time banks. They have more recently become the 
object of the controversy over labour security and rights. At TaskRabbit ‘taskers’ sign in (30,000 
currently signed in) to be available to run errands, assemble furniture, and perform other skilled 
task to people in their community. When contacted they set their own rates. According to data 
reported by TaskRabbit roughly 10% to 15% of taskers can earn $6,000 to $7,000 a month. 
Freelancer is a platform facilitating freelance work offered by individuals to businesses that boasts 
over 14 million registered members that have so far posted over 6.9 million projects and contests 
to date in over 700 areas as diverse as website development, logo design, marketing, copywriting, 
astrophysics, aerospace engineering and manufacturing. In conceptual terms it can be noticed that 
labour when idle can be considered as ‘dead capital’; its harnessing through digital platforms to 
provide services could thus also be characterised as a case of increased asset utilisation. 
Furthermore, one could also observe that Uber drivers (with Uber being placed under increased 
asset utilisation) if considered from the perspective of labour rights are no different from the small 
tasks contractors delivering errands on TaskRabbit. 
Evidence Box 9 Building of social connections: examples 
This is a variant between recirculation of goods and service exchange and is best represented by 
exchange and/or co-preparation of home-produced and prepared food. These initiatives have also 
the stated objective of favouring and building social connections and social experiences. 
Shareyourmeal.com, for instance, is a start-up based in Utrecht which helps people share food. 
Shareyourmeal.net makes it possible to share one’s cooking with people in the neighbourhood. 
Similar sites include Soup Sharing, and EatWithMe. 
Evidence Box 10 Other platforms: examples 
Finally, there are a number of new emerging cases that can hardly be re-compacted with the four 
categories above. The ride sharing and ride service boom is creating both satellite activities and 
vertically specialised emulation. SherpaShare, for instance, helps drivers of ride sharing and ride 
services platforms track their earnings, expenses, taxes and working opportunities in one single 
online repository. SherpaShare's information systems are integrated with Uber, Lyft, and on 
demand services. Hence, in practice, this is a service organisation that caters for Uber drivers. On 
the other hand, SAP launched TwoGo, which is basically a sort of Uber for corporate employees; it 
provides mobile and cloud-delivered service for enterprises to support ride sharing among 
employees for their daily commute and business travel. On the other hand, in the accommodation 
sector there is an equivalent of what has just been mentioned for ride sharing and ride services. 
Smart Host, for instance, provide recommendations for pricing short-term rental analysing listings 
in the surrounding marketplace to determine an optimal price, promising more bookings, more 
profit with less work. There is a wider range of platforms self-defining themselves as ‘sharing’. 
ClassPass is a monthly fitness membership programme allowing members to go to gyms in 
different cities. The platform Musketeer is among the activities included under ‘Municipal/Security’.  
Musketeer is a social safety network modelled on initiatives such as Guardian Angels in New York 
City, Mothers against Drunk Driving, and Neighbourhood Watch but powered by digital 
technologies working with smart cities, providing a real time control system that empowers the 
city to better protect its citizens. Chegg (with a market value of US $ 733 million) is a student hub 
which emerged from what was originally a textbook rental company (this could be seen as part of 
service exchanges). It connects millions of students with each other and with people and tools 
needed to succeed in college. Google Helpouts is an online platform that allows users to share 
their expertise through live video and provide real-time help from their computers or mobile 
devices.  
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6.2.3 Sector-based categorisations 
An alternative approach is to break down the ‘sharing economy’ into sectors and 
segments defined to some extent with respect to their traditional counterparts, as done 
by industry analyst Owyang and illustrated by the next two figures. 
Figure 8 Sectors Classification: Categories and Examples 
 
Source: (Owyang, et al., 2014) 
Figure 9 Collaborative Economy Honeycomb, version 2.0  
 
Source: Owyang (2014)xlvii and (VB Profiles & Crowd Companies, 2015) 
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The second and more recent categorisation by Owyang (figure above) includes 12 
sectors and a total of 31 segments reported below in alphabetic order; for the segments 
examples used by Owyang are reported in parentheses. The majority of these examples 
are already briefly described in the previous evidence boxes or reviewed in Table 6, the 
others are briefly described in notes. The sectors and segments in Owyang’s 
classification are: (1) Corporate: Private label (i.e. Near Me xlviii , customised digital 
platforms); Supply chain (i.e. Cargomatic, optimisation of use of trucks); Employee 
services (i.e. TwoGo, SAP version of Uber for its employees); (2) Goods: Pre-owned 
goods (i.e. eBay, Craigslist); Bespoke goods xlix (i.e. Etsy); Loaner Products (i.e. Bag 
Borrow or Steal, platforms to rent luxury and fashion items); (3) Food: Food sharing (i.e. 
Leftoverswap); Shared food preparation (i.e. Kitchen Surfingl); (4) Health and Wellness: 
Healthcare (i.e. Cohealo, hospital exchanging idle medical equipment); Wellness (i.e. 
ClassPass, sharing of passes to gyms); (5) Learning: Instructor led (i.e. Google 
Helpouts); Peer to peer (i.e. Chegg); (6) Logistics: Local delivery (i.e. Instacart, delivery 
of grocery); Storage (i.e. Sharemystorage, renting of storage space); Shipping (i.e. 
Friendshippr li ); (7) Money: Lending (i.e. Lending Club); Crowdfunding (i.e. Funding 
Cycle);Transfer (i.e. TranferWise); Crypto currencies (i.e. Bitcoin lii ); (8) Municipal: 
Equipment (i.e. MuniRent: local governments exchanging idle big equipment used for 
construction work); Safety (i.e. Musketeers, a sort of digitally enabled city angels 
activity); (9) Services: Personal (i.e. TaskRabbit, market for personal generic services); 
Business (i.e. Freelancers, oDesk, markets for professionalised services); (10) Space: 
Personal space (i.e. Airbnb); Work space (i.e. Wework); Rental optimisation (i.e. smart 
host); (11) Transportation: Ride sharing (i.e. BlaBlaCar); Car sharing (i.e. Getaround); 
Ride Services (i.e. Uber); Driver Optimisation (i.e. SherpaShare); (12) Utilities: Energy 
(i.e. Mosaic liii, Yeloha, sharing of solar energy installations); Telecommunications (i.e. 
Open Garden, sharing of WiFi connections).  
A different sector and segment-based categorisation has been proposed in a report on 
the French ‘Collaborative Consumption’ (see next two figures) and is based on the 
consumers’ needs 
Figure 10 Sectors Categorisation (France) 
 
Source: (PIPAME, 2015), p.20 
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Figure 11 Sectors and segments Categorisation (France) 
 
Source: (PIPAME, 2015), p.20 
 
 
6.3 Synthetic and analytical accounts of sources 
6.3.1 Summary overview of scoping review findings 
In the next three tables summary statistics are reported only for the 140 items formally 
included in the review. 
Table 2 Summary statistics: type of source and type of contribution 
 
Empirical 
studies 
Conceptualliv  
Essays on 
regulation 
Policy 
analysis 
and 
similar 
Total 
Academic 
contributionslv  
58 38 19 0 115 
Reports 5 5 6 9 25 
Total 63 43 25 9 140 
Table 3 Summary statistics: empirical contribution by topic* 
 
Policy 
Reports 
Social 
capital 
& 
related  
Inequa-
lity 
Ratings/ 
matching/ 
network 
growth 
Motiva-
tions  
Impact Other Total 
Qualitative 5 11 2 1 8 0 4 31 
Quantitative 0 1 1 8 8 10 0 28 
Mixed 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 4 
Modelling 0 0 1 2 0 5 0 8 
Total 5 13 4 11 19 15 4 71 
(*) Several items could be placed in two or more categories; hence there is a double counting 
which explains why the total of empirical and modelling studies is 71 in this table and only 63 in 
the previous one. 
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Table 2 shows that 115 broadly defined scholarly work (journal articles, academic papers 
in the pre-publication stage, and academic book chapters) and 25 reports were included 
in the analysis. Out of 140 items, 43 were essays of a different nature (conceptual, 
conceptual-theoretical, theoretical, critical, prescriptive, reviews). 25 essays focussed on 
either regulation or legislation and 9 on broadly-defined policy-oriented analyses. The 
remaining 63 items are empirical studies or modelling simulations using some empirical 
data. When studies are imputed to more than one category the total number of empirical 
and/or modelling contributions increases to 71. In terms of topics the majority of 
empirical or modelling contributions are around the following distinct but closely related 
topics: social capital and related issues such as reciprocity and network structure (13), 
inequality (4), reputational ratings (11), motivations to participate (19), and broadly 
defined impacts (15). Though this is not shown in the two tables above, only 24 of the 
140 reviewed items focussed on a European context.  
Table 4 overleaf provides an even more granular account for the above 140 sources, 
although the total shown this time is 152, because in this case not only the empirical 
studies but also the other items have been imputed to more than one cell when 
appropriate. This table presents the discipline of origin and/or the approach across the 
various domains/sectors of application. The data in the table can be aggregated in 
various interesting ways, some of which are briefly presented below. A total of 65 entries 
focussed on the sharing economy in general and/or on several types of domains/sectors, 
whereas the remaining 87 focus on a specific domain of application. As could be 
expected, all of the contributions originating from economics deal with commercial 
platforms, whereas NFP platforms are dealt with by contributions from other social 
sciences disciplines; the latter also include all qualitative study on social capital and 
motivations, although they have also produced some quantitative studies on these two 
topics. From economics most contributions, both theoretical and empirical, are on the 
dynamic of peer-to-peer markets and only a few focus on impacts. Airbnb, CouchSurfing, 
and Uber are the most studied platforms, followed by broadly defined platforms for the 
recirculation of goods, and by labour markets such as TaskRabbit and oDesk. A fairly 
large number of studies, including four modelling simulations, focus on car-sharing, and 
this can be explained by the fact that these platforms have emerged earlier and seem to 
be less reluctant to provide their data compared to Airbnb and Uber; in this respect it 
should be mentioned that for almost all of the contributions on matching and or rating at 
least one of the co-authors is a researchers formally affiliated with the platform 
providing data (Cullen & Farronato, 2015; Farronato & Fradkin, 2015; Fradkin, 2014; 
Fradkin, et al., 2015; Horton & Golden, 2015); the same applies to the earlier cited and 
only contribution studying ‘sharing economy’ contractors (Hall & Krueger, 2015). As 
anticipated, the normative positive and optimistic narratives outnumber the critical and 
pessimist ones. Amongst the regulatory essays 8 are radically against any regulation and 
in favour of self-regulation through reputational ratings, while 11 are more moderate 
and show a balanced approach considering various forms of co-regulation and smart 
regulation; the three specialist legal essays lean to some extent more towards more 
traditional and strict forms of regulation. 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics by disciplines and domain 
Discipline/type of contribution 
Domain/sector 
Space rental Labour markets/ services Transportation Other 
General Total Couch 
Surfing Airbnb 
Time-
banking Commercial 
Car  
sharing Uber NFP FP 
Economics: theoretical/conceptual P2P markets 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 10 
Economics: empirical/impacts 0 4 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 10 
Economics empirical/ ratings 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Economics empirical/ P2P markets 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Economics: labour issues 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Modelling: inequality issues 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Modelling car sharing impacts 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 
Other social sciences: Social capital (qualitative) 3 1 1 0 1 1 5 0 2 14 
Other social sciences: Social capital 
(quantitative) 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Other social sciences: Motives (qualitative) 2 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 8 
Other social sciences: Motives (quantitative) 1 3 0 0 5 3 1 1 4 18 
Other social sciences: inequality issues 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 
Normative optimistic visions  0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 9 
Normative critical visions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Narrative Review essay 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 
Theoretical-conceptual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 
Business models / Strategic Management 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 5 
Regulatory essay:  Laissez-faire 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 9 
Regulatory essay: co-regulation/ smart 
regulation 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 9 11 
 Specialist legal essays 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 9 
Policy analysis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 9 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
Total 10 22 3 4 17 17 8 6 65 152 
 
 6.3.2 Analytical tabulation of scoping review findings 
Table 5: Formally reviewed sources: analytical accounts 
Source Source type/Domain/ topic 
Contribution type / method & 
source 
Main points/findings 
1. (Agrawal et al., 2013) 
 Paper 
 oDesk (Online Labour 
Market, OLM) 
 Matching and impact 
 Review of empirical evidence 
 Other empirical study 
The authors review the evidence on the market 
functioning and impacts of online labour 
markets such as oDesk. The evidence is not 
conclusive, although it suggests that such 
markets tear down geographical barriers and 
seem to increase female participation. On 
distributional and aggregate welfare effects the 
evidence is ambiguous and does not warrant 
any preliminary conclusions 
2. (Agyeman, et al., 2013) 
 Report 
 Sharing economy & cities 
(general) 
 Regulation to maximise 
benefits 
 Prescriptive essay 
 Secondary sources plus short 
examples 
If well steered and regulated at city level the 
‘sharing economy’ can produce economic, 
social, and environmental benefits to cities as 
reinvigorated polis, through increased social 
participation and sense of community 
3. (Albinsson & Yasanthi 
Perera, 2012) 
 Journal Article 
 NFP (free reuse sharing of 
goods) 
  Social capital, participation 
 Empirical study 
 Participant observations and 
interviews (N=36) 
A sense of community is both a driver of 
participation and an outcome of these NFP 
platforms. According to the authors the findings 
challenge the entrenched notions of exchange 
and reciprocity.  
4. (Allen & Berg, 2014) 
 Report 
 Sharing economy in general  
 Critique of regulation  
 Regulatory essay; 
 Secondary sources 
The authors propose a new approach to bottom-
up self-regulation. Various forms of licensing 
should be reduced to allow private certification 
schemes and reputation mechanisms to evolve; 
avoid regulations making it difficult for start-ups 
to compete for labour (contractors should not 
be turned into employees) 
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Source Source type/Domain/ topic 
Contribution type / method & 
source 
Main points/findings 
5. (Arsel & Dobsha, 2011) 
 Journal Article 
  NFP (Freecycle, platform for 
reuse of goods) 
 Social capital, community 
cohesion 
 Empirical study 
 Case study based on blog 
mining, archival search, and 
interviews with 22 regular 
participants of Freecycle. 
 
The authors find tensions between the goals of 
the institution (the owners of the Freecycle 
brand) and its community members 
(participants in local chapters). The findings 
contrast with other studies reporting improved 
community cohesion as a result of such kind of 
pro-social communitarian activities and sharing. 
6. (Balck & Cracau, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Various platforms (space 
rental, car sharing, 
recirculation of goods) 
 Motivations 
 Empirical study 
 Survey based on a convenience 
simple (Pilot N=15; main survey 
N=105) of German users of 
different types of platforms  
The most important motivation are lower prices. 
Other motives include sustainability, preference 
for access over ownership 
7. (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012) 
 Journal Article 
 Car sharing (Zipcar) 
 Social capital/ altruistic vs. 
utilitarian values 
 Empirically informed conceptual 
essay 
 40 semi-structured interviews 
with a purposive sample of 
Zipcar users located in Boston 
Four key findings are reported: consumers do 
not experience perceived ownership and avoid 
identification with the accessed object of 
consumption; the predominant object-self 
relationship is that of use value, which do not 
match altruistic or hedonic values attributed to 
sharing; consumers engage in opportunistic 
behaviours toward the company and one 
another (negative reciprocity); no sense of 
brand community 
8. (Barnes & Mattsson, 2015) 
 Journal article 
 Sharing economy in general 
 Future driver of growth 
 Empirical study 
 Four stage Delphi with 25 
experts 
The driver most cited by experts is the 
economic one (need to economise in view of 
crisis), followed by technology and socio-
cultural changes. The environmental drivers did 
not emerge as very important. Socio-cultural 
attitudes are also cited as inhibitors, together 
with ongoing political and regulatory 
controversies. 
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Source Source type/Domain/ topic 
Contribution type / method & 
source 
Main points/findings 
9. (Barry & Caron, 2014) 
 Paper 
 Car & ride sharing 
 Regulating innovation 
 Regulatory essay 
 Legislative and regulatory 
sources 
The essays used the ‘sharing economy’ to 
illustrate the challenges that existing laws and 
regulations pose for new industries.  
10. (Baumeister & 
Wangenheim, 2014) 
 Paper 
 Various platforms (bike and 
car sharing, books, bags) 
 Motivations / consumers’ 
preferences 
 Empirical study 
 Online experiment (N=2098, 
Germany 
 Respondents were randomly 
assigned to one of four 
conditions, which differed in the 
product category (cars, bicycles, 
books and handbags). They were 
instructed about different 
scenarios with respect to which 
they had to express their 
perceptions on access and 
ownership. 
The main finding is that the attitude towards 
access is found to be consistently worse than 
the attitude towards ownership across all 
product categories. In other and simpler words 
the respondents expressed preference for 
ownership across all the four product 
categories. 
11. (Belk, 2010) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Sharing 
 Theoretical essay on the concept 
of sharing 
 Secondary sources 
It distinguishes between ‘sharing in’ and 
‘sharing out’ and suggests that sharing in 
dissolves interpersonal boundaries posed by 
materialism and possession attachment through 
expanding the aggregate extended self. 
However, growing market commoditisation 
challenges such sharing. 
12. (Belk, 2014a) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Sharing 
 Critical distinction between 
sharing and pseudo-sharing; 
 Secondary source 
 
As in the previous case of the wars on music 
and file sharing, the ‘sharing economy’ is 
characterised by conflicting rhetoric and 
semantic confusion. Money, egoistic motives, 
expectations of reciprocity, and lack of a sense 
of community are major criteria by which 
sharing and pseudo-sharing may be 
distinguished 
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Source Source type/Domain/ topic 
Contribution type / method & 
source 
Main points/findings 
13. (Belk, 2014b) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general  
 Definitions / typology 
 Conceptual and theoretical 
review; 
 Secondary sources; 
Sharing and collaborative consumption as 
alternative ways of consuming and as new 
business paradigms should not be overlooked 
and few industries will be exempted from 
potential disruptive change these practices 
introduce. Sharing makes a great deal of 
practical and economic sense for the consumer, 
the environment, and the community 
14. (Bellotti et al., 2014) 
 Paper 
 NFP (exchange of services/ 
Time banks) 
 Motivation 
 Empirical study 
 50 semi-structured interviews 
with time bank coordinators, 
users, and other community 
members  
These NFP platforms lag very much behind 
commercial platforms in terms of users’ base. 
The focus on tracking credits and debts earned 
by giving and receiving personal services is 
seen as hampering scaling up. The authors 
propose to emphasise the personal and social 
benefits of participation, and avoid such 
unappealing concepts as debt and neediness. 
15. (Benjaafar et al., 2015) 
 Paper 
 Owning and renting 
 Equilibrium outcomes 
(ownership, usage levels, 
consumer surplus, and social 
welfare) 
 Theoretical economic modelling 
 No empirical sources used, 
based on key hypotheses from 
standard economics  
According to this theoretical modelling exercise 
and its underlying assumptions, consumers 
always benefit from collaborative consumption. 
Under the model assumptions a platform is least 
profitable when the cost of ownership is either 
very high or very low. The authors also claim 
that a platform may not have an incentive to 
completely eliminate moral hazard. This is 
because the platform can leverage moral hazard 
to induce desirable ownership levels without 
resorting to extreme pricing, which can be 
detrimental to its revenue. 
16. (Birdsall, 2014) 
 Journal article 
 Car sharing 
 Business models 
 Conceptual discussion of 
business model 
 Secondary sources ; 
The articles identifies three models: a) round 
trip (i.e. Zipcar); b) point-to-point (Car2Go); 
and c) peer-to-peer (Getaround and Relay 
Rides) 
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Contribution type / method & 
source 
Main points/findings 
17. (Bond, 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Uber 
 Impact on taxi industry 
 Empirical study 
 Descriptive statistics use to 
quantify impact of Uber on taxi 
industry in San Francisco, 
District of Columbia and New 
York. 
The descriptive data suggests a clear negative 
impact of Uber both on the revenue of the taxi 
industry and on the values of the medallions.  
18. (Botsman & Rogers, 
2010a) 
 Journal article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Business models 
 Conceptual essay 
 Secondary sources 
The article states that collaborative 
consumption is a system of organised sharing, 
renting, and trading of merchandise reducing 
personal costs and decreased environmental 
impact. It describes three forms of collaborative 
consumption: goods as a rented service, 
redistribution markets of pre-owned or used 
goods, and collaborative lifestyles. 
19. (Brinkø et al., 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Conceptual essay; 
 Space rental  
 Typology of access over 
ownership models 
 Conceptual essay 
 Secondary source 
 
Typology proposed with the following types: a) 
sharing a specific facility – a desk or a 
workspace in a semi-closed community; b) 
sharing several facilities in an open or semi-
closed community; c) sharing physical space in 
a building or a building in itself in a closed 
community; d) sharing facilities between users 
in a network of buildings/organisations in an 
open, semi-closed or closed community 
20. (Buksh & Mouat, 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing of productive assets 
(work hubs) 
 Urban work 
 Conceptual essay; 
 Secondary sources; 
The paper re-orientates attention to the 
networked interplay of agglomeration, 
collaborative consumption and co-working 
towards urban revitalisation as part of suburban 
and regional development policies to strengthen 
local communities. 
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21. (Caldararo, 2014) 
 Paper 
 Sharing economy in general 
 Negative social impact 
 Critique 
 Secondary sources and statistics 
According to the author the socio-economic 
status of American families has steadily 
degraded as wealth shifted to a small 
percentage of the population in the past 40. The 
sharing economy represents one more 
mechanism for continuing and deepening this 
degradation trend. 
22. (Cannon & Chung, 2015) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Co-regulation approach 
 Regulatory essay  
 Secondary sources  
Sharing platforms do not fit traditional-
regulatory approaches and it is in the public 
interest not to curb such forms of innovation; 
neither is laissez-faire appropriate because of 
possible negative externalities on local level 
public goods. The author propose a framework 
for co-regulatory scheme that can effectively 
complement the inherent attributes of the 
sharing economies to improve effectiveness and 
the optimal level of protection of public interests 
over interest groups 
23. (Cannon & Summers, 
2014) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Regulation and platforms’ 
strategy 
 Prescriptive essay 
 Secondary sources 
The authors advise ‘sharing economy’ players 
to: 1) be offensive with regulators making their 
case evident and supported; 2) respond to 
regulators’ concerns; 3) use best practices in 
influencing public policy (form coalitions, seek 
external validators); 4) share their data so that 
it is public and usable and may reduce 
regulators’ concerns 
24. (Cohen & Muñoz, 2015) 
 Journal article 
 Sharing economy and cities 
 Sustainable consumption 
and production  
 Empirically informed conceptual 
essay 
 Mesh database of 9400 sharing 
initiatives around the globe 
The authors develop an empirically grounded 
typological mapping of sharing activities with 
respect to the topic of Sustainable Consumption 
and Production (SCP) in the context of cities. 
They identify five groups 18 sharing activities to 
create a Sharing Cities-SCP  
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25. (Cohen & Kietzmann, 
2014) 
 Journal Article 
 Car & ride sharing 
 Business models taxonomy 
 Conceptual and theoretical essay 
 Secondary sources   
Using four business model building blocks ( a 
value proposition, supply chain, customer 
interface, and financial model) the authors 
identify and describe 8 different business 
models distinguishing car sharing from ride 
sharing and sub-types internal t each of the two 
types 
26. (Cohen & Sundararajan, 
2015) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general  
 Innovation and Self-
regulation 
 Regulatory essay 
 Secondary sources 
Self-regulatory approach preferred to 
regulation. Platforms as actors that are a key 
part of the regulatory process. 
27. (Cohen & Zehngebot, 
2014) 
 Article 
 Sharing Economy in general  
 List of legal issues 
 Legal essay 
 Secondary sources 
The sharing economy raises (US context) issues 
concerning: a) ownership (can you share what 
you do not own); b) consumer protection 
(quality, information); c) taxation; d) 
insurance; e) liability ; f) zoning; g) 
licensing/permitting 
28. (Corciolani & Dalli, 2014) 
 Journal Article 
 NFP (Bookcrossing.com, 
reuse of goods) 
 Social capital, reciprocity 
 Empirical study 
 Bookcrossing.com is analysed 
with qualitative tools, such as 
ethnography, personal 
interviews and participant 
observation 
The main result is that gift giving is not the only 
process responsible for value creation and 
distribution in consumption communities: 
sharing and commodity exchange also play a 
role. Evidence about collective reciprocity and 
anonymous sharing is provided. 
29. (Costain et al., 2012) 
 Journal article 
 Car sharing 
 Motivations  & behaviour 
 Empirical study 
 Quantitative descriptive and 
econometric analysis (using 
administrative data) of 
motivations and behaviour of the 
users of a car sharing platform 
in Toronto 
Members are motivated also by environmental 
concerns, yet having the option for CO2 
reduction car sharing would increase the 
amount of driving per month, which would 
cancel out any potential benefit in terms 
reduced emissions. 
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30. (Cullen & Farronato, 2015) 
 Paper 
 TaskRabbit (MLM / generic 
services) 
 Matching  
 Quantitative study 
 Econometric analysis (including 
difference in difference 
identification strategy) of 
TaskRabbit internal data 
Three main findings are reported: 1) supply is 
highly elastic and prices hardly increase: when 
demand doubles the providers work twice as 
hard; 2) the average gain from each trade is 
$37; 3) platform success varies greatly across 
cities as a result of geographic density (buyers 
and sellers living close together), and of level of 
task standardisation (buyers requesting 
homogeneous tasks). 
31. (Daus & Russo, 2015) 
 Report 
 Ride sharing 
 Drivers vetting and criminal 
checks 
 Legal essay 
 Secondary sources 
The authors argue that safety requirements 
concerning for-hire vehicles should be applied to 
all players, including platforms such as Lyft and 
Uber. 
32. (Demailly & Novel, 2014) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
(French context) 
 Sustainability 
 Policy analysis 
 Secondary sources and official 
statistics for the discussion of 
sustainability and social impacts 
The authors argue that if sharing models could 
be operated under the most favourable 
conditions, savings of up to 7% in the 
household budget and 20% in terms of waste 
could be achieved. 
33. (Dervojeda, et al., 2013a) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
(Europe) 
 Trends, impacts, drivers and 
barriers 
 Policy Report commissioned by 
European Commission 
 Based on a four case studies and 
interviews focusing on peer-to-
peer ‘sharing economy’ 
examples in Europe 
 
 
Trust is a main driver or bottleneck and 
measures to boost confidence include peer-to-
peer rating systems and ID checks. Policy 
makers could provide valuable contributions in 
the form of minimum quality and safety 
requirements.  
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34. (Dervojeda et al., 2013b) 
 Report 
 Sharing of productive assets 
 Trends, impacts, drivers and 
barriers 
 Policy Report commissioned by 
European Commission Report  
 Based on a few case studies and 
interviews focusing on sharing 
productive facilities examples in 
Europe 
The obstacles include: the resistance to change 
by organisations considering the 
implementation of mobility measures; the lack 
of skills of middle management to manage more 
flexible employees; and the (perceived) cost 
associated with implementing more mobility 
into work processes. In contrast, the drivers are 
employee’s perceptions of flexibility, 
productivity and reduced commuting and the 
reduction of operational costs for businesses. 
35. (Dillahunt & Malone, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Disadvantaged groups  
 Empirical study 
 A participatory-design based 
workshop with unemployed 
individuals to investigate the 
perception and feasibility of 
finding some work / income 
opportunity within sharing 
platform  
According to the authors the findings indicate 
that individuals seeking employment could 
positively leverage ‘sharing economy’ solutions. 
All participants believed that the ‘sharing 
economy’ applications could help with 
employment and/or saving money. Yet, the lack 
of skills, of awareness of opportunities, and of 
trust in the sharing-economy platform are a 
clear barrier for less advantaged individuals. 
36. (Dredge & Gyimóthy, 
2015) 
 Journal article 
 Sharing economy in general 
 Discourses on effects on 
tourism 
 Critical review essay 
 Secondary sources 
Critical exploration and assessment of the 
sharing economy and its implication for the 
tourist industry. Five claims made by the 
supporters of the sharing economy are critically 
appraised. 
37. (Dubois, et al., 2014) 
 Book chapter 
 NFP (Exchange of services, 
Time Bank) 
 Motivation to participate 
 Empirical study 
 In depth qualitative case study 
of one Time Bank 
Anti-capitalist sentiments, discontent with 
consumption, and an ideology of sustainability 
emerged as strong motivations for participation. 
On the other hand, the authors also find that 
high cultural capital and distinction (in the 
sense specified by Bourdieu) matter and create 
contradictions forms of social differentiation 
between members with high and low cultural 
capital. 
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38.(Edelman & Geradin, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Sharing economy in general 
 Platforms efficiencies and 
scope for intervention 
 Regulatory essay 
 Secondary sources 
After reviewing the potential efficiency gains 
that sharing platforms can produce, the authros 
discuss the issue of regulation and propose 
that: a) regulatory restrictions should be 
avoided; but b) certain evident market failures 
should be corrected with smart regulatory 
interventions 
39. (Edelman & Luca, 2014) 
 Paper 
 Airbnb (space rental) 
 Racial discrimination 
 Empirical study 
 Descriptive statistical analysis of 
data web scraped from Airbnb 
(dataset combine pictures of all 
New York City landlords, prices 
of their listings,  and information 
about quality of the listed 
rentals) 
The main finding is that that non-black hosts 
charge approximately 12% more than black 
hosts for the equivalent rental. These effects 
are robust when controlling for all information 
visible in the Airbnb marketplace. These 
findings highlight the existence of discrimination 
in online marketplaces as an important 
unintended consequence of a seemingly-routine 
mechanism for building trust. 
40. (Einav, et al., 2015) 
 Paper 
  Uber, Airbnb, TaskRabbit 
(peer-to-peer markets) 
 Two-sided market 
functioning and implication 
for regulation 
 Conceptual and theoretical essay 
 Formalised economic theory 
informed by data from empirical 
economic studies  
According to the authors matching algorithms, 
pricing, and reputation systems are the main 
features making such platforms successful or 
not. A simple model of how these markets 
enable entry by small or flexible suppliers, and 
the resulting impact on existing firms is 
developed and used to consider when and how 
such platforms should be regulated. The 
economic arguments for different approaches to 
licensing and certification, data, and 
employment regulation are discussed. 
41. (Fang et al., 2015) 
 Journal article 
 Airbnb (space rental) 
 Spill-over effects on tourism 
industry employment 
 Empirical study 
 Panel data analysis and 
extrapolation at macro-economic 
level of the impact of Airbnb 
tourism industry employment 
The findings are ambivalent and identify both 
positive and negative effects without concluding 
on the net results. Airbnb has positive overspill 
on tourism but may reduce employment in the 
low end of the hotel industry as its penetration 
increases 
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42. (Farronato & Fradkin, 
2015) 
 Paper 
 Airbnb (space rental) 
 Impacts 
 Quantitative study  
 Econometric analysis of data on 
Airbnb and the hotel industry  
The authors show that Airbnb has two effects: 
a) market expansion (meeting demands of 
previously under-served consumers); and b) 
business stealing (attracting consumers away 
from conventional suppliers). Hotels and peer-
to-peer suppliers differ in their fixed (higher for 
hotels) and marginal costs (higher for peer-to-
peer suppliers). The authors conclude that 
efficient market structure depends on the level 
and variability of demand, and quantify the 
welfare gains from peer-to-peer entry in the 
accommodation industry. 
43. (Fassi et al., 2012) 
 Journal article 
 Car sharing 
 Network growth 
 Modelling simulation; 
 Data from one platform 
calibrated into a discrete event 
simulation model  
The model provides decision makers with a tool 
for selecting best network growth strategies to 
implement for meeting adequately the demand 
growth while maximizing the members’ 
satisfaction level and minimizing the number of 
vehicles used. 
 
44. (Fellander et al., 2015) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
(global considerations and 
analysis of situation in 
Sweden) 
 Trends, policy and 
regulatory implications 
 Policy report for Swedish 
government 
 Secondary sources and statistics  
The reports review the benefits and the 
potential risks of the sharing economy and 
propose a flexible trial and error approach to 
regulation that would also support innovation 
and entrepreneurship  
45. (Firnkorn, 2012) 
 
 Journal article 
 Car2go (car sharing) 
 Impact on other 
transportation forms 
 Quantitative study 
 Survey of Car2Go users in 
Germany (N=1881) to assess 
the impact of using such mean 
over other means of 
transportation.  
The study using  two methods based on 
different questions of the survey produce 
contrasting estimates of the impact of car 
sharing on other means of transportation.  
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46. (Foden, 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general  
 Sharing, inclusion/exclusion 
 Theoretical essay  
 Practice theories and secondary 
sources 
Findings suggest that technologically mediated 
reuse ‘communities’ connect some people but 
exclude others. Eliminating money from the 
exchange process gives participants access to 
goods they would otherwise struggle to afford, 
but at the same time raises questions as to how 
goods are allocated, potentially privileging other 
unequally distributed material and cultural 
resources.  
47. (Forno & Garibaldi, 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 NFP (Home swapping) 
 Motivations 
 Empirical study 
 Qualitative analysis (i.e. in depth 
interviews) of  Italian home-
swappers. 
The authors analyse and discuss the socio-
economic profiles, motivations, and lifestyles of 
Italian home-swappers. This alternative form of 
tourism requires trust, open-mindedness, 
inventiveness, enthusiasm, and flexibility. While 
the economic aspect is arguably one of the key 
driving factors when opting for this type of 
travelling accommodation, it cannot account 
alone for the current popularity of the social 
phenomenon. 
48. (Fradkin, 2014) 
 Paper 
 Airbnb (space rental) 
 Matching  
 Quantitative study 
 Econometric analysis and 
modelling of Airbnb internal data 
The efficiency of this market and the effects of 
ranking algorithms are analysed. Airbnb uses 
novel data generated by users’ activities on the 
website to design algorithms and products that 
influence the search and matching process. The 
more descriptive finding is that potential guests 
engage in limited search, are frequently 
rejected by hosts, and match at lower rates 
(compared to a normative potential) as a result. 
Using a micro model of search and matches the 
paper shows that there are major matching 
frictions and that, if such frictions were 
removed, matches woud increase by 102%. 
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49. (Fradkin, et al., 2015) 
 Paper 
 Airbnb (space rental) 
 Reputation rating  
 Quantitative study 
 Two field experiments conducted 
inside Airbnb 
The experiments aimed at studying the 
determinants of reviewing behaviour, the extent 
to which reviews are biased, and whether 
changes in the design of reputation systems can 
reduce bias. Descriptively the main finding is 
that reviews on Airbnb are generally positive 
and informative: 97% of guests privately and 
anonymously report having positive experiences 
and 74% of guests submit a five out of five star 
overall rating. The results of the field 
experiments show that that non-reviewers tend 
to have worse experiences than reviewers and 
that strategic reviewing behaviour occurred on 
the site, although the aggregate effect of the 
strategic behaviour was relatively small. The 
authors model the three mechanisms causing 
bias and show that the experimental 
manipulations tested reduce the reviewing 
biases. 
50. (Fraiberger & 
Sundararajan, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Getaround (Car sharing) 
 Welfare impacts  (with focus 
on lower income groups) 
 Modelling simulation  
 Data from one platform 
(Getaround) and from the 
traditional US car market place 
calibrated into a model used as a 
stripped-down ”laboratory”  
The simulation shows that peer-to-peer rental 
markets change the allocation of goods 
significantly, substituting rental for ownership 
and lowering used-good prices while increasing 
consumer surplus. Consumption shifts are 
significantly more pronounced for below-median 
income users, who also provide a majority of 
rental supply. The results suggest that these 
below-median income consumers will enjoy a 
disproportionate fraction of eventual welfare 
gains from this kind of ’’sharing economy’’ 
through broader inclusion, higher quality rental-
based consumption, and new ownership 
facilitated by rental supply revenues. 
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51. (Furuhata, et al., 2013) 
 Journal article 
 Car sharing 
 Literature review 
 Literature review 
 Secondary sources 
A taxonomy and classification of current 
ridesharing systems. Is presented. From the 
reviewed sources it emerges that ridesharing 
can reduce travel costs, congestion, and 
pollution, but still faces challenges and 
bottleneck. 
52. (Geradin, 2015) 
 Report 
 Uber (ride services) 
 Regulating Uber in Europe 
 Regulatory essay 
 Secondary sources and mere 
speculation. 
The author argues that, since Uber business 
model is so superior in terms of efficiency and 
consumer welfare, it will prevail and should not 
be stopped by European regulators, else they 
would users of attractive services and trigger 
many years of litigation. The other option is to 
embrace technological change and allow Uber to 
compete on a level playing field with taxi 
companies. The regulatory changes that will be 
needed raise complex questions, but these 
questions are unavoidable and it is important to 
tackle them early. Taxi companies can also 
embrace technologies and rely on the 
competing online-enabled car transportation 
services that are already available to them. 
53. (Greenwood & Wattal, 
2015) 
 Paper 
 Uber (ride services) 
 Impact (reduction in 
accidents) 
 Quantitative study 
 Quasi-experimental difference-
in-difference identification 
strategy  
The study exploits natural experiments settings 
produced by the time diversified entry of Uber 
in different local markets. According to the 
counterfactual analysis carried out Uber 
contributed to a significant drop in the rate of 
DUI homicides during 2009-2013 in California.  
54. (Gobble, 2015) 
 Journal article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
(but focus also on Airbnb, 
Uber, and TaskRabbit) 
 General review of regulatory 
issues and controversies 
 Regulatory review essay 
 Secondary sources on legal 
controversies between 2013 and 
2014 regarding especially Uber 
and Airbnb, but also task rabbit 
The main issues of controversy include: 
insurances, liability, consumer protection, but 
also labour regulations. 
  
91 
Source Source type/Domain/ topic 
Contribution type / method & 
source 
Main points/findings 
55. (Guttentag, 2013) 
 Journal Article 
 Airbnb (space rental) 
 Sharing as disruptive 
innovation  
 Conceptual essay with discussion 
of regulation 
 Secondary sources and exploring  
Disruptive innovation theory describes how 
products that lack in traditionally favoured 
attributes but offer alternative benefits can, 
over time, transform a market and capture 
mainstream consumers. Airbnb distinct appeal 
centres on cost-savings, household amenities, 
and the potential for more authentic local 
experiences. The legality issues and their 
corresponding tax concerns are discussed, with 
an overview of the current state of regulatory 
flux and a possible path for resolution. 
56. (Habib et al., 2012) 
 Journal Article 
 Car sharing 
 Network growth 
 Quantitative study 
 Data obtained from a Canadian 
platform are used in the 
application of an econometric 
model to the behaviour of car 
sharing users  
 
Main empirical findings: a) males and French-
speaking people tend to be shorter-duration 
members but high-frequency users; b) initially 
members have the intention of staying for a 
short duration, but with increasing membership-
duration the tendency to remain a member 
increases; c) increasing the number of cars in 
the car sharing stations does not influence 
membership duration but increase frequency of 
usage; d) in zones where car ownership is 
higher car sharing membership duration is 
shorter 
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57. (Hall & Krueger, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Uber (ride services) 
 Labour issues 
 Quantitative study 
 Comprehensive statistical 
analysis of Uber provided data 
on the drivers 
According to the analysis of the authors, drivers 
appear to be attracted to the platform in large 
part because of the flexibility it offers, the level 
of compensation, and the fact that earnings per 
hour do not vary much with hours worked, Uber 
drivers are more similar in terms of their age 
and education to the general workforce than to 
taxi drivers and chauffeurs. Most drivers had 
full- or part-time employment prior to joining 
Uber, and many continued in those positions 
after starting to drive with the Uber platform, 
which makes the flexibility to set their own 
hours all the more valuable.  
58. (Hamari, et al., 2015) 
 Paper 
 Sharing economy in general 
plus empirical study of one 
Finnish platform 
 Motivations to participate  
 Quantitative study; 
 Survey (N=168) of members of 
www.sharetribe.com  
Participation is motivated by many factors such 
as its sustainability, enjoyment of the activity as 
well as economic gains. It includes also a 
conceptual discussion of what the sharing 
economy means. 
59. (Harvey et al., 2014) 
 Journal Article 
 NFP (CouchSurfing, 
Freecycle, Landshare) 
 Social capital, social 
exchanges 
 Empirical study 
 Ethnography and in depth 
interviews with members of 
three platforms that facilitate 
offline gift giving and sharing.  
Findings reveal how technology is used to enact 
and influence the management of identity, 
partner selection, ritual normalisation, and 
negotiation of property rights. The findings have 
significant implications for the design and 
management of systems that encourage non-
monetary forms of collaborative consumption. 
60. (Heimans & Timms, 2014) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 New power vs. Old power 
 Normative/prescriptive essay 
(optimistic) 
 Secondary sources, speculative 
reasoning, and typical business 
rhetoric.  
It presents a typology of players with respect to 
the dimension of New/Old forms of power and 
values. New power values represented by the 
‘sharing economy’ champions are based on 
informal, opt-in decision making; self-
organisation; networked governance; radical 
transparency; open source and collaboration. 
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61. (Heinrichs, 2013) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Sustainability 
 Normative/prescriptive essay 
(optimistic) 
 Analysis of the ‘sharing 
economy’ as a new path for 
sustainability beyond the hype 
The ‘sharing economy’ has the potential to 
serve as an umbrella concept that may bring 
together and re-frame older and recent 
alternative forms of economic activity and their 
academic conceptualisation. The significant 
(public) attention, evoked by the ‘sharing 
economy’ over the past two years, indicates the 
attractiveness of the phenomenon for broader 
parts of society. The ‘sharing economy’ 
approach might bring together the fragmented 
landscape of diverse academic perspectives and 
practices in specific milieu and niches. 
62. (Hirshon et al., 2015) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
in cities 
 Trends, benefits, drafting 
regulation 
 Policy analysis (stakeholders’ 
consultation) 
 Interviews with city leaders 
around the US who were looking 
for guidance on how to modify or 
develop new regulations for the 
sharing economy 
There is no one size fits all approach to 
regulating the sharing economy. It emerges 
from interviews with all stakeholders the need 
to balance issues of innovation, economic 
development, tourism, equity, access, and 
safety. 
63. (Horton, 2014) 
 Paper 
 oDesk (OLM) 
 Matching of two market 
sides 
 Empirical study 
 Econometric analysis of oDesk 
data  
The author documents the problem of 
congestion when buyers inefficiently pursue 
oversubscribed sellers the data show that such 
misdirected search effort are consequential: 
recruited seller rejecting a buyer's recruiting 
inquiry reduces the probability of match 
formation by as much as 67%.  
64. (Horton & Golden, 2015) 
 Paper 
 oDesk (OLM) 
 Reputation ratings  
 Quantitative study 
 Field experiment implemented 
inside oDesk to analyse 
reputation ratings 
Reputation ratings tend to be inflated by two: 
(1) it costs more to give bad feedback than 
good feedback and (2) this cost to raters is 
increasing in the cost to sellers from bad 
feedback. Together, (1) and (2) can lead to an 
equilibrium where feedback is always positive, 
regardless of performance.  
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65. (Horton & Zeckhauser, 
2016) 
 Paper 
 Owning and renting 
 Modelling of renting and 
owning  
 Theoretical economic model 
backed by consumer survey 
 Own survey conducted with 
convenience sample using 
Amazon Mechanical Turks 
The authors present a model of short-run and 
long-run equilibrium for P2P rental markets 
partially tested with the results of a surveys of 
consumers. Ownership and consumptions, 
rental rates, quantities, bring to market costs 
and surplus generated are modelled. According 
to the model surplus increases in both the 
short- and long-run P2P rental market equilibria 
relative to the pre-sharing status quo. Yet, 
these results are based on assumptions that 
simplify the possible variability concerning 
different type of goods for what concerns 
owning or renting decisions, as well as bring to 
market costs. 
66.  (Huiskamp, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Airbnb vs Uber model 
 Two-sided markets 
 Conceptual essay 
 Secondary sources 
The author concludes that both platforms are 
two sided markets but that they differ widely in 
the extent of standardisation and flexibility. In 
particular Airbnb is much more flexible than 
Uber with respect to the supplier (host and 
drivers) freedom in setting the prices 
67. (Ikkala & Lampinen, 2014) 
 Paper 
 Airbnb in Helsinki (rental 
space) 
 Social capital, social 
exchange, reputation 
 Empirical study 
 In depth interviews with Airbnb 
hosts in Helsinki  
The study examines how money mediates and 
structures social Exchange. Monetary 
transactions set to exchange relationships 
contributes to the hosts’ sense of control and 
ease in the exchange. Two behavioural patterns 
that highlight the importance of reputation and 
trust were identified: a) hosts divert their 
accumulated reputational capital into the rental 
price and b) they may price their property 
below “the market price”, so that they can 
choose their exchange partners form a wider 
pool of candidates 
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68. (Jefferson-Jones, 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Airbnb & others (in space 
rental) 
 Local government 
restrictions and 
constitutional rights 
 Legal essay 
 Secondary sources 
Legal discussion on the extent to which local 
rulings limiting Airbnb short-term rentals 
represent an unconstitutional taking (in the 
US). It particularly focuses on the New York city 
controversy with Airbnb. Guidelines should be 
adopted in the short-term housing regulation 
context. 
69. (Jenk, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Uber (ride services) 
 Coase Theorem & Uber 
 Theoretical essay 
 Application of the Coase theorem 
to the emergence of Uber  
The author argues that Uber has transformed 
the city regulated oligopolistic taxi markets with 
value–added effects. Uber and similar platforms 
are reducing transaction costs, increasing social 
utility and disaggregating the structure of firms  
70. (John, 2013a) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Rhetoric of sharing 
 Critical review essay  
 Secondary sources and analyses 
of the 44 largest, most visited 
and historically significant SNSs 
(Social Networking Sites). 
The paper argues that a new meaning of 
sharing has emerged in the context of Web 2.0 
with three main features: fuzzy objects of 
sharing; the use of the word ‘share’ with no 
object at all; and presenting in terms of sharing 
functions of social network sites that used not 
to be so described. 
71. (John, 2013b) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Rhetoric of sharing 
 Review essay 
 Secondary sources 
This article explores the concept of sharing in 
three distinct spheres: Web 2.0; “sharing 
economies” of production and consumption; 
intimate interpersonal. It is argued that a range 
of distributive and communicative practices—
not all of which are entirely new—are 
converging under the metaphor of sharing. 
Thus, practices in one sphere are 
conceptualised in terms of practices from other 
spheres.  
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72. (King, 2015) 
 Journal article 
 Sharing economy in general 
 Implications for competition 
law 
 Legal essay 
 Secondary sources 
According to this review of the possible 
implications of the sharing economy from the 
perspective of competition law there are three 
main concerns: a) anti-trust implications when 
platforms activate network effects leading to 
dominance; b) lock in of third parties on one 
side of the transaction; and c) power to 
reference rivals (i.e. leading to collusion or 
alternatively to discriminatory behaviour). 
73. (Koopman, et al., 2015) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Self-regulation as the 
solution 
 Regulatory essay (developed in 
response to public consultation 
launched by the US Federal 
Trade Commission prior to a 
workshop held in June 2015 on 
the sharing economy) 
 Secondary sources  
The authors call for the FTC to intervene to stop 
the local level anti-competitive regulation that 
are hindering innovation in the sharing economy 
74. (Koopman, et al., 2014) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Self-regulation as the 
solution and critique to 
regulation 
 Regulatory essay 
 Secondary sources and 
application of orthodox economic 
theory critique of regulation. 
The ‘sharing economy’ has overcome market 
imperfections without recourse to traditional 
forms of regulation. Continued application of 
these outmoded regulatory regimes is likely to 
harm consumers. The Internet, and the rapid 
growth of the ‘sharing economy’, alleviates the 
need for much of this top-down regulation, with 
these recent innovations likely doing a much 
better job of serving consumer needs. 
75. (Kuttner, 2013) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Labour issues / inequality 
 Radical critique 
 Secondary sources  
The author illustrates claims that the ‘sharing 
economy’ cause labour insecurity and the 
weakening of the broadly defined labour 
contract. The ‘sharing economy’ represents the 
latest manifestation in the precarisation of 
work. 
  
97 
Source Source type/Domain/ topic 
Contribution type / method & 
source 
Main points/findings 
76. (Lamberton & Rose, 2012) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Commercial sharing 
systems/motivations 
 Theoretical essay with empirical 
components  
 The authors develop a 
conceptual and theoretical 
framework of commercial 
sharing systems using two 
empirical studies (Study 1: 
Sample of 369 licensed US 
drivers using the online panel 
provided by Amazon Mechanical 
Turk; Study 2: sample of 129 
respondents; Study 3: 3*2 
experimental design). 
The authors specify the various forms of utility 
that a good may provide in order to be 
sharable. It should favourable transaction utility 
similar to that of ownership, storage utility from 
not taking up our space, anti-industry utility by 
acting against the power of large corporations 
through sharing rather than buying their goods, 
environmental utility by doing less harm to the 
environment and creating less waste, and social 
utility in gaining approval from our reference 
groups. 
77. (Lauterbach, et al., 2009) 
 Paper 
 NFP (CouchSurfing) 
 Reciprocity and reputation 
ratings 
 Empirical study 
 Quantitative network analysis of 
reciprocity and reputation 
ratings using CouchSurfing data 
(666,541 users with 1,541,398 
connections amongst them) 
The global CouchSurfing network displays a 
high degree of reciprocal interaction and a large 
strongly connected component of individuals 
surfing the globe. This high degree of 
interaction and reciprocity among participants is 
enabled by a reputation system that allows 
individuals to vouch for one another. The 
authors find that the strength of a friendship tie 
is most predictive of whether an individual will 
vouch for another. However, vouches based on 
weak ties outnumber those between close 
friends. We discuss these and other factors that 
could inform a more robust reputation system. 
78. (Lee, 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Sharing as marketing 
instrument 
 Normative/prescriptive (critical) 
essay 
 Secondary sources  
According to the author, the ‘sharing economy’ 
is just the latest example of insurgent sentiment 
being used to sell the bona fides of profit-
making corporations. In today’s post-crash 
reality, ‘sharing economy’ giants like Uber and 
Airbnb compete to be seen as leading the 
charge against “Big Taxi” and “Big Hotel.” 
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79. (Lougher & Kalmanowicz, 
2016) 
 Journal article 
 Sharing economy in general 
 Implications for EU 
competition law 
 Legal essay 
 Secondary sources 
According to this review Sharing economy 
intermediation markets are likely to become 
concentrated and possibly dominated by a 
single market player. The activities of powerful 
sharing economy platforms, for which data use 
is key, are likely to be scrutinised in merger 
control proceedings and in the long term 
potentially also in the area of market abuse. 
80. (Malhotra & Van Alstyne, 
2014) 
 Journal Article 
 Narrative Review  
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Dark side of the sharing 
economy 
 Review essay 
 Secondary sources  
The authors review various controversies that 
surround the sharing economy; according to 
them a crucial aspect is the quality of review 
systems, for authenticating the validity of 
reviews is critical to prevent abuse. They 
suggest that an independent agency might help 
prevent glowing “sock puppet” reviews or unfair 
criticisms.  
81. (Martin, 2016) 
 Journal article 
 Sharing economy in general 
 Discourse analysis 
 Empirically based discourse 
analysis 
 Secondary sources and online 
ethnography 
Through his discourse analysis the author 
observe that the sharing economy is framed in 
contrasting ways from being seen as a pathway 
to sustainability to being considered a 
nightmarish form of neoliberalism. The author 
identifies six different ways in which current 
discourses frame the sharing economy as: 
economic opportunity; sustainable 
consumption; decentralised and more equitable 
economy; unregulated marketplaces; 
reinforcing the neoliberal paradigm; incoherent 
field of innovation. 
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82. (Martin et al., 2015) 
 Journal article 
 NFP (Freegle) 
 Grass-root initiatives and 
scaling 
 Empirical study with 
development of a conceptual 
model 
 Case study of one grass-root 
platform (Freegle), becoming 
more commercially-oriented 
Focussing on a NFP platform, the authors 
identify the causes, processes and outcomes of 
the attempt to become more commercial. They 
argue that grassroots organisation may be 
forced to undergo such transition and point out 
the ambiguities of such development. They 
conclude calling for further research on whether 
is desirable and feasible to protect grassroots 
organisations from such pressures. 
83. (Martin & Shaheen, 2010) 
 Report 
 Car sharing 
 GHG (greenhouse gas) 
emission 
 Empirical study  
 Survey of car sharing users in 
the US to extract estimate of 
GHG emission impacts 
The authors conclude that, while car sharing 
does facilitate lower emissions, the reduction is 
not generalizable across all households. Rather, 
car sharing as a system facilitates large 
reductions in the annual emissions of some 
households, which compensate for the collective 
emission increases of other households.  
84. (Martin & Upham, 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 NFP (Freecycle and Freegle) 
 Values and motivations 
 Empirical study 
 Large-scale survey of free reuse 
groups (e.g. Freecycle and 
Freegle) engaged in 
collaborative forms of 
consumption 
The authors show that while the majority of free 
reuse group participants do hold significantly 
stronger self-transcendence (i.e. pro-social) 
values than the wider UK population, they also 
hold other values in common with that 
population and a minority actually place less 
emphasis on self-transcendence values. We 
conclude that diffusion of this particular 
grassroots innovation is unlikely to be simply 
value limited and that structural features may 
be more significant. 
85. (Matzler & Kathan, 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Strategies and business 
models 
 Prescriptive strategic 
management essay 
 Secondary sources  
According to the authors, while the shift toward 
more sustainable modes of consumption 
represents a major threat to established 
business models and revenue streams, it also 
offers several potentially profitable paths by 
which also established companies can benefit. 
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86. (McArthur, 2014) 
 Journal Article 
 NFP (Land sharing) 
 Motivation 
 Empirical study 
 Ethnographic study of the 
motivations to participate in 
Landshare,  
Landshare is a non-profit scheme operating in 
the UK, Canada, and Australia, which connects 
growers to people with land to share The study 
finds that there are significant social belonging 
and other benefits stemming from collaborative 
consumption. 
87. (McLean, 2015) 
 Journal article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Regulatory and legal  
challenges 
 Legal essay 
 Secondary sources  
Key legal issues include: consumer protection, 
data protection, discrimination, taxation, 
employment, safety and security, liability, 
payments and frauds, insurance 
88. (McNeill, 2016) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in S. 
Francisco 
 Politics, lobbying, and urban 
tensions 
 Empirical study 
 Reconstruction of city level 
developments using statistics 
and secondary sources 
The author reconstructs the political processes 
and tensions surrounding the rise of S. 
Francisco as a city of unicorns. He underlines 
the important role played by technology and 
venture capital in the political economy of urban 
development. The paper describes the urban 
policy tensions associated with the evolution of 
new “sharing economy” firms such as Uber and 
Airbnb that, according to the author, have 
aggressively challenged municipal regulations in 
the taxi and property rental fields.  
89. (Miller, 2014) 
 Paper 
 Assets (space rental) 
 Transferrable sharing rights 
as a way to regulate Airbnb 
and similar 
 Legal-theoretical essay 
 Secondary sources 
The mechanism proposed is that of 
“transferable sharing right” (TSR), which is 
modelled on existing transferable development 
rights regimes. The proposed TSR regime would 
provide cities a means of regulating short-term 
rentals while also charging a fee equal to 
externalities and lost city revenue resulting 
from short-term rentals. Further, TSRs could be 
used to re-invest in neighbourhoods where 
short-term rentals occur or to drive economic 
development to neighbourhoods. 
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90. (Miller, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Sharing Economy in general  
 Ad hoc policy regime 
 Regulatory essay 
 Secondary sources 
The paper presents a normative and 
prescriptive analysis proposing 10 principles to 
regulated the ‘sharing economy’. The ten 
principles proposed include among others the 
following: ‘sharing economy’ requires 
differentiated regulatory regime; need to 
daylight activities; information based 
regulation; traditional regulation not 
appropriate 
91. (Möhlmann, 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Airbnb and Car2go (space 
rental and car sharing) 
 Motivations 
 Empirical study 
 Regression analysis of data from 
surveys of car2go (N = 236), 
Airbnb (N = 187) users 
Utility, trust, cost savings, and familiarity were 
found to be essential in both studies, while 
service quality and community belonging were 
identified solely for the car sharing users.  
92. (Molz, 2013) 
 Journal Article 
 NFP (CouchSurfing) 
 Social networking / Moral 
economy 
 Empirical study 
 37 in depth interviews with 
CouchSurfers 
Using the concept of ‘moral affordances’, the 
analysis outlines the way CouchSurfing technical 
systems, software design, and search 
algorithms enable participants to engage in a 
moral economy based on the non-commodified 
provision of accommodation to strangers and 
personal relations of trust and intimacy. 
Findings suggest that these affordances are not 
isolated effects of the technologies themselves, 
but rather reflect a broader moral landscape in 
which alternative tourism is performed.  
93. (Morgan & Kuch, 2015) 
 Journal article 
 NFP Sharing economy in 
general 
 Discourses and the law 
 Theoretical and critical essay 
 Secondary sources 
By combining the analysis of legal 
consciousness, the law, and diverse forms of 
economic activities the authors conceive non-
commercial platforms as the locus of radical 
transactionalism, where legal building blocks of 
property and capital can be reimagined and 
reconfigured, helping to construct a shared 
infrastructure for the exercise of collective 
agency in response to disadvantage sustained 
by law. 
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94. (Neeser, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Airbnb (Rental Space) 
 Effects on hotel business in 
Nordic countries 
 Empirical study 
 Quasi-experimental 
counterfactual analysis of the 
impact of Airbnb on the hotel 
industry in Nordic countries 
The paper measures the impact of Airbnb on 
hotel revenues in Norway, Finland, and Sweden 
using a difference-in-differences strategy with 
many time periods and different level of 
treatment. The data are used to differentiate 
among Airbnb listings and to identify which type 
of hotel costumers Airbnb is more likely to 
attract. The main findings are that: a) Airbnb 
does not significantly affect hotel’s revenue per 
available room in average; b) it contributes to a 
reduction in the average price of a room where 
Airbnb entered the most; c) it is relatively more 
attractive for foreigners than locals. 
 
95. (O’Regan, 2009) 
 Book chapter 
 NFP (CouchSurfing) 
 Social capital and trust 
 Review essay 
 Secondary sources and 
theoretical/conceptual analysis 
The author argues that social networking has 
been wrongly criticized for the decline of social 
trust, social capital, privacy, autonomy and 
even community; he contends that individuals 
working with one another via social networks 
are a growing force in our economy and society, 
as they create and manage ties once bounded 
and maintained by door-to-door and place-to-
place relationships. 
96. (OECD, 2015) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Labour issues 
 Conceptual essay as background 
paper prepared for the workshop 
held in June 2015 on new forms 
of work in the sharing economy 
 Secondary sources 
It distinguishes three types: P2P selling, P2P 
sharing, and Crowdsourcing. The effects of 
these activities on working arrangements and 
their implications for workers are still poorly 
understood. Firms can increasingly source 
inputs of different types all along the value 
chain. 
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97. (Oei & Ring, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Essay on Regulation 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Taxation 
 Legal essay 
 Secondary sources 
The authors argue that, the application of 
substantive tax law to sharing is clear, because 
current law generally contains the concepts and 
categories necessary to tax sharing. However, 
tax enforcement and compliance may present 
challenges, as a result of two distinctive 
features of sharing. First, some sharing 
businesses opportunistically pick the more 
favourable regulatory interpretation if there is 
ambiguity regarding which rule applies or 
whether a rule applies. Second, the 
“microbusiness” nature of sharing raises unique 
compliance and enforcement concerns.  
98. (Ozanne & Ozanne, 2011) 
 Journal Article 
 NFP (ecovillage, online 
exchange, time bank) 
 Social capital, reciprocity 
 Empirical study 
 Qualitative case studies of a 
community time bank, an online 
goods exchange community, and 
one ecovillage 
While traditionally relational and reciprocal 
exchange is highly valued, the weak ties of non-
reciprocal exchange allow the communities to 
tap into the significant distributed expertise. 
 
99. (Ozanne & Ballantine, 
2010) 
 Journal Article 
 NFP (Toy sharing off and 
online) 
 Motivation to participate 
 Empirical study 
 Survey of 397 toy library 
members 
The study reveals four groups - Socialites, 
Market Avoiders, Quiet Anti-Consumers and 
Passive Members. The Socialites enjoy the 
social benefits of active participation in their 
library. The Market Avoiders also perceived 
social and community benefits, are interested in 
sharing and are the least materialistic of the 
groups. The Quiet Anti-Consumers feel a sense 
of belonging to their toy library and hold strong 
anti-consumption, frugality and sharing values. 
The Passive Members are not socially involved, 
nor did they hold strong anti-consumption 
values. 
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100. (Parigi & State, 2014) 
 Book chapter 
 NFP (CouchSurfing) 
 Social capital, strength of 
ties 
 Empirical study 
 Quantitative network analysis of 
2 millions ties among 
CouchSurfing members between 
2003 and 2010 complemented 
with qualitative ethnographic 
work  
The accumulation of ratings about users 
(whether guests or hosts) had a double-edged 
effect on the emergence of trust and 
relationships: it made relationships easier to 
establish initially but it also weakened them 
after a certain threshold. That is, technology 
facilitated the emergence of interpersonal trust 
among CouchSurfers, but it also made 
establishing strong ties harder as users acquired 
more and more reviews. This case illustrates a 
process of disenchantment created by 
technology, where technology increases the 
ease with which friendships are formed and, at 
the same time, diminishes the bonding power of 
these experiences. 
101. (Parigi, et al., 2013) 
 Journal Article 
 NFP (CouchSurfing) 
 Social capital, friendship 
impact on participation 
 Empirical study 
 Quantitative network analysis of 
CouchSurfing data from 2003 till 
2010 (random sample of 10,000 
American users was created and 
analysed)  
The study tests two alternative hypothesis 
about individuals’ participation in associations: 
a) participation as by-product of existing 
friendship; b) participation driven by the 
association’s capacity to form new identities. 
The authors report significant impact of new 
friendship ties on participation, compared to a 
negligible impact of pre-existing friends, defined 
here as ties to other members formed outside 
of the organisation’s context. 
102. (Piscicelli et al., 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Recirculation of goods 
 Motivation, values, 
acceptance 
 Empirical study 
 Mixed qualitative and 
quantitative study (in depth 
interviews and survey among 
users of Ecomodo, a UK-based 
online marketplace where people 
can lend and borrow each 
other's objects, spaces and 
skills)  
This paper investigates how consumers' values 
can influence the acceptance, adoption, and 
diffusion of collaborative consumption. It 
concludes with a discussion of the role of values 
in relation to the introduction and scaling up of 
Product Service Systems (PSSs) that enable 
collaborative consumption 
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103. (Pfeffer-Gillett, 2016) 
 Journal article 
 Uber and Lyft (ride sharing) 
 Liability issues (US cases 
 Legal essay 
 Secondary sources 
This essay focuses on the grey area of ride 
sharing concerning for consumers whether 
injured parties can recover from the platforms 
operators rather than their drivers alone. The 
author argues that platforms operators such as 
Uber and Lyft should be liable for acts of their 
drivers, and based this claim on the the non-
delegable duty rule. This is a new approach yet 
to be used by plaintiffs in existing cases.  
 
104. (Probst, et al., 2015a) 
 Report 
 Collaborative production 
business models 
 Trends, impacts, drivers and 
barriers 
 Policy Report commissioned by 
European Commission 
 Secondary sources and 
interviews  
The report defines the collaborative production 
business model, analyses trends, and identifies 
drivers and obstacles, and presents policy 
recommendations The key recommendations 
are to: support the provision of common 
physical infrastructures; promote the platforms 
marketplace; introduce regulatory frameworks 
to democratising and scaling up the makers 
collaboration and also to create flexible labour 
contracts; Assure quality of products and 
services through government, community and 
industry standards 
 
105. (Probst, et al., 2015b) 
 Report 
 Crowdsolving business 
models 
 Trends, impacts, drivers and 
barriers 
 Policy Report commissioned by 
European Commission 
 Secondary sources and 
interviews 
The report defines the crowdsolving business 
model, analyses trends, and identifies drivers 
and obstacles, and presents policy 
recommendations. The key recommendations 
are to: support marketing efforts; have 
governments as first buyer and door opener; 
raise awareness and educate on Intellectual 
Property and Taxation issues 
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106. (Probst, et al., 2015c) 
 Report 
 Freemium business models 
 Trends, impacts, drivers and 
barriers 
 Policy Report commissioned by 
European Commission 
 Secondary sources and 
interviews 
The key recommendations are to: support in 
early stages to help companies grow their user 
base; create community for Freemium 
companies; devise proper safeguard to protect 
consumers’ from in app purchase abuse. 
107. (Ranchordas, 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Regulation of Innovation 
 Regulatory essay 
 Secondary sources 
Regulation and policy review of challenges faced 
by regulators in dealing with the emergent 
disputes on ‘sharing economy’, frames as 
regulating innovation. Challenging questions 
included: should the regulation of these 
platforms be designed to pursue same goals as 
the regulatory regime of established 
businesses? How can regulation be technology 
neutral as to avoid steady need of catching up 
with innovations. The solution to these 
problems requires analysing two fields of study, 
both of which seem to be at an embryonic stage 
in legal literature: the study of ‘sharing 
economy’ practices and the relationship 
between innovation and law in this area. 
108. (Rauch & Schleicher, 
2015) 
 Paper 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Local government 
 Regulatory essay 
 Secondary sources  
Regulation and policy review considering in 
particular local government options in dealing 
with the ‘sharing economy’. The authors argue 
that the local governments will adopt some 
combination of the following policies in addition 
to insisting on consumer/incumbent protections: 
(1) subsidize sharing firms to encourage 
expansion of services that produce public 
goods, generate substantial consumer surplus 
and/or minimize the need for excessive 
regulation of the property market; (2) harness 
sharing firms as a tool for redistribution; and/or 
(3) contract with sharing firms to provide 
traditional local government services.  
  
107 
Source Source type/Domain/ topic Contribution type / method & 
source 
Main points/findings 
109. (Richardson, 2015) 
 Journal article 
 Sharing economy in general 
 Rhetoric and discourse 
 Empirical analysis  
 Participant observation at 
sharing economy festival and 
discourse analysis of online 
platform material 
According to the author the discourses and 
actual practices of the sharing economy have 
the potential to both shake up and further 
entrench ‘business-as-usual’. The sharing 
economy does simultaneously two contrasting 
things: a) it presents a narrative of more 
socially connect and less isolated activities; but 
b) it also masks new forms of inequality and 
polarisations The author, however, concludes 
that the sharing economy should be used as an 
opportunity to use the ‘digital’ transformations 
of economy as a source of change 
110. (Rogers, 2015) 
 Journal article 
 Uber (ride services) 
 Social cost 
 Regulatory and economic 
analysis 
 Secondary sources and statistics  
The essay argues that Uber is not simply the 
result of regulatory arbitrage but originates in 
its creation of more efficient market. On the 
other hand, it also contends that Uber success 
is both a source of optimism and pessimism: a) 
compilation of data on passenger and driver 
behaviour can enable Uber and regulators to 
ensure safety and root out discrimination 
against passengers with relative ease; but b) 
longer-term impact on labour standards is quite 
unclear and may cause the worsening of future 
of low-wage work more generally. 
111. (Sablik, 2014) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Benefits and costs 
 Critical review essay 
 Secondary sources  
Critical review essay that contrasts potential 
economic benefits against risks for consumer 
safety and potential for consumers’ detriments 
The author concludes by observing that even 
the most enthusiast supporters of the sharing 
economy do not claim that it should be 
unaccountable. Rather they urge regulators to 
allow firms to experiment and seek solutions to 
problems after they arise. 
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112. (Santi, et al., 2014) 
 Journal Article 
 Car pooling 
 Shareability network 
(impacts) 
 Modelling simulation 
 Dataset of millions of taxi trips 
taken in New York City 
calibrated into a modelling 
simulation 
A modelling simulation is developed to estimate 
collective benefits of sharing as a function of 
passenger inconvenience, and to efficiently 
compute optimal sharing strategies using a 
massive dataset. The simulation shows that 
carpooling can cut cumulative trip length by 
40% or more. This benefit could come  with 
reductions in service cost, emissions, and with 
split fares 
113. (Schaefers, 2013) 
 Journal Article 
 Car sharing 
 Motivation 
 Empirical study 
 Laddering interviews with 14 
users of a US car sharing service 
The underlying hierarchical motive structure is 
uncovered and four motivational patterns are 
identified: value-seeking, convenience, lifestyle, 
and environmental motives. 
114. (Schneiderman, 2014) 
 Report 
 Airbnb in NYC (space rental) 
 Legal essay 
 Official report of NYC State 
Attorney 
 Based on very extensive 
statistics, including data from 
the platform 
The main findings reported are the following: a) 
revenues for Airbnb New York City exceeded 
$282 mn; b) 72% of units used as private 
short- term rentals on Airbnb violated city laws; 
c) 94% of Airbnb hosts offered at most two 
unique units during the Review Period. But the 
remaining 6% of hosts dominated the platform 
offering hundreds of unique units, accepting 
36% of private short-term bookings, and 
receiving $168 million, 37% of all host revenue. 
The report refers to these hosts as “Commercial 
Users; d) Private short-term rentals displaced 
Long-Term Housing in thousands of 
apartments; e) Numerous short-term rental 
units appeared to serve as illegal hostels;  
115. (Schor, 2014) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Various topics (typology, 
impacts, conflicts) 
 Review essay  
 Secondary sources 
The review shows a polarisation of opinions and 
analyses. As an alternative the author envisages 
the possibility that sharing entities become part 
of a larger movement that seeks to redistribute 
wealth and foster participation, ecological 
protection, and social connection.  
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116. (Schor & Fitzmaurice, 
2015) 
 Book chapter 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Various topics (typology, 
motivation,  impacts, 
conflicts) 
 Review essay  
 Secondary sources 
The authors suggest that participation in the 
‘sharing economy’ is motivated by economic 
and ecological concerns, as well as a desire to 
increase social connections. But they question 
how effective the ‘sharing economy’ has been in 
meeting these goals. They underscore the 
importance of digital technologies, facilitating 
the emergence of “circuits of commerce,” in 
overcoming the trust and reputational barriers 
that once restricted sharing to kin and 
community.  
117. (Schor, et al., 2014) 
 Paper 
 NFP Sharing  
 Class and other forms of 
inequality 
 Empirical study  
 Qualitative empirical fieldwork 
conducted at four NFP sharing 
platforms  
The authors find considerable evidence of 
distinguishing practices and the deployment of 
cultural capital. This exercise of class power in 
turn undermines the ability to forge relations of 
exchange and the volume of trades. This results 
in an inconsistency between actual practice and 
the ‘sharing economy’ widely articulated goals 
of openness and even equality, which they call 
the “paradox of openness and distinction.” 
118. (Seyedabrishami, et al., 
2012) 
 Journal Article 
 Car pooling 
 Fuel consumption reduction 
 Modelling simulation 
 Data from stated preferences 
survey used in  a simulation 
model 
The results show that; under certain 
assumptions, carpooling would increase by 30% 
and this increase will reduce annual fuel 
consumption about 240 million litres.  
 
119. (Shaheen & Bansal, 
2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Car Sharing (S. Francisco) 
 Perception by users 
 Empirical study 
 Verbal intercept survey with 300 
respondents 
The authors find that there was generally low 
awareness about P2P carsharing, even in the 
San Francisco Bay Area where many shared-use 
services exist. It also shows that people who 
drive more are less likely to be drawn to P2P 
carsharing, while people who use public transit 
more are more likely to consider using it. 
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120. (Shaheen, et al., 2012) 
 Journal Article 
 Car sharing 
 Motivations, drivers, 
barriers, trends 
 Empirical study 
 34 expert interviews 
Personal vehicle sharing could impact the 
transportation sector by increasing availability 
and interconnectivity among modes and 
providing greater alternatives to vehicle 
ownership in more geographic locations. 
121. (Shaughnessy, 2014) 
 Paper 
 Airbnb and Uber 
 Two-sided markets 
 Conceptual essay; 
 Secondary sources 
The essay discusses different platforms business 
models (focusing on Uber and Airbnb) and their 
degree of two-sidedness and the importance for 
them of network effects. The author contends 
that not all platforms are two-sided markets 
and network effects are not a necessary 
condition in all platforms. Uber and Airbnb 
qualify as two-sided markets but their network 
effects are of medium importance and much 
less important than for credit cards and 
operating systems.  
122. (Stokes et al., 2014) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Miscellaneous 
 Policy analysis by NESTA  
 Secondary sources 
According to this report the most obvious 
question for policymakers is how to manage any 
direct collaborative economy risks. Providing 
effective oversight that encourages positive 
innovation, whilst managing public concerns and 
potential risks, can be remarkably difficult. 
123. (Sundararajan, 2014) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Benefits/regulation 
 Written testimony for the 
hearing titled, The Power of 
Connection: Peer-to-Peer 
Businesses, held by the 
Committee on Small Business of 
the United States House of 
Representatives, January 15th, 
2014 
The author affirms that peer-to-peer business 
enabled by digital platforms will constitute a 
significant segment of the economy in the 
future with likely positive impact on economic 
growth and welfare, by stimulating new 
consumption, raising productivity, and 
catalysing individual innovation and 
entrepreneurship. The current regulatory 
infrastructure can impede the growth of these 
businesses, because of misalignment between 
new business models/roles and older guidelines 
developed to mitigate safety concerns and 
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economic externalities for the existing ways of 
providing the same or similar services.  
124. (Sunil & Noah, 2015) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Regulation of innovation 
 Regulatory essay 
 Secondary sources  
The report explores why the ‘sharing economy’ 
is such a puzzle for governments. It assesses 
what’s new and what’s not about these 
marketplaces. Specific recommendations for 
policymakers grappling with the challenges and 
opportunities posed by the ‘sharing economy’ 
are proposed, including establishing a strategic 
operating framework, re-aligning political and 
cultural incentives, modernizing government 
structures and adopting smarter regulatory 
responses 
125. (Thierer, et al., 2015) 
 Paper 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Reputation systems as self-
regulation 
 Regulatory essay 
 Secondary sources and classical 
economics hypotheses 
The authors argue that the Internet, the 
‘sharing economy’, and reputational Feedback 
Mechanisms solve the classical “Lemons 
Problem”. They also discuss how these new 
realities affect public policy and conclude that 
asymmetric information is not a legitimate 
rationale for policy intervention in light of 
technological changes 
126. (van de Glind, 2013) 
 Master Thesis 
 Sharing Economy in general 
in Amsterdam 
 Motivations 
 Empirical study 
 Mixed methods by first 
conducting 27 in depth 
interviews with users of three 
Dutch platforms and then a 
quantitative survey with 1330 
citizens of Amsterdam 
The findings show that users started 
participating in platforms for the extrinsic 
motives of practical need, financial gains and 
receiving praise. The main intrinsic motives are 
social, for example ‘meeting people’ or ‘helping 
out,’ or have an environmental character, for 
example contributing to a healthy environment. 
Besides motivational factors, networks, (social) 
media and recommendation prove to be 
explanatory factors for the willingness to take 
part. 
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127. (Wallsten, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Uber (ride services) 
 Impacts (competitive 
pressure on taxi industry) 
 Empirical study  
 Quantitative analysis of: a) 
Google trends of Uber popularity 
in NYC and Chicago (proxy 
measures of market 
penetration); and b) official 
statistics about consumers’ 
complaints on taxy in NYC and 
Chicago (proxy measure of taxi 
service quality) 
Controlling for underlying trends and weather 
conditions that might affect taxi service, the 
author concludes that Uber increasing 
popularity is associated with a decline in 
consumer complaints per trip about taxis. The 
author concludes that competitive pressure 
from Uber is forcing taci drivers to provide 
better services 
128. (Walker, 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing economy in general 
 Rhetoric to cover 
exploitative practices 
 Normative/prescriptive essay 
(critical) 
 Secondary sources  
The author argues that the rhetoric of sharing is 
a smoke-screen hiding exploitative practices. 
Highly profitable companies like Airbnb and 
Uber are grouped alongside voluntary gift-giving 
exchanges like Freecycle or CouchSurfing. 
129. (Weber, 2014) 
 Journal Article 
 Theoretical essay 
 Space rental 
 Insurance 
 Theoretical essay 
 Agency theory 
The paper argues that an intermediary can 
eliminate the moral hazard problem by 
providing optimal insurance to the lender and 
first-best incentives to the renter to exert care.  
 
130. (WEF, 2013) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Contribution to circular 
economy 
 Prescriptive/foresight essay  
 Secondary sources and statistics 
According to this report, the adoption of sharing 
economy principles, systems and drivers has 
the potential to reshape business models and 
create valuable opportunities for companies – 
large and small, start-up and established – who 
can understand and harness the advantages 
available.  
 
131. (WEF, 2014) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Contribution to circular 
economy 
 Prescriptive/foresight essay  
 Secondary sources and statistics 
According to this report, accelerating the scale-
up of the circular economy ( of which the 
sharing economy is a component) promises to 
deliver substantial macro-economic benefits.  
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132. (Widener, 2015) 
 Paper 
 Space rental 
 Regulating shared spaces 
 Regulatory essay 
 Secondary sources  
According to the author, as the sharing 
economy grows it will increase traffic trips, 
overtaxed curb side parking spaces, additional 
ambient noise, and stress upon electric and 
other utility grids tapped by sharing enterprises. 
Since these neighbourhood burdens are not 
addressed in the form of sales taxes or license 
fees directly returned to host enclaves, many of 
these burdens are borne largely by dwellers. 
Hence, the paper proposes a form of spatial 
zoning regulation of district with heavy sharing 
activities. 
133. (Willer et al., 2012) 
 Journal Article 
 NFP (reuse of goods) 
 Social exchange, solidarity 
 Theoretical essay 
 Secondary sources 
The authors argue that benefits received 
through exchange foster group identification 
and solidarity but that this effect is stronger in 
generalised exchange systems —in which giving 
and receiving of resources occurs unilaterally 
among three or more individuals—than direct 
exchange systems—which feature reciprocal 
transfers of resources between two people.  
 
134. (Wittel, 2011) 
 Journal Article 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Social capital 
 Theoretical essay  
 Secondary sources  
The hypothesis developed by the author is that 
different forms of sharing have different 
qualities with respect to social capital. Whereas 
sharing in the pre-digital age was meant to 
produce social exchange, sharing in the digital 
age is about social exchange on the one hand 
and about distribution and dissemination on the 
other hand. What makes sharing with digital 
media so hard to understand is exactly this 
blurring of two rather different purposes.  
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135. (Wosskow, 2014) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general  
 UK policy approach 
 Advocacy report 
 Secondary sources and 
anecdotal evidence  
The report affirms that there has been 
tremendous growth in the ‘sharing economy’ in 
recent years, and that this is set to continue. 
The author argues that this is a huge 
opportunity for the UK where ambition should 
be to be the world’s leading ‘sharing economy’.  
136. (Yannopoulou, 2013) 
 Journal Article 
 Airbnb, CouchSurfing 
 Brand and Identity 
construction, indirectly 
motivation 
 Empirical study 
 Discourse analysis of the 
material available in the two 
platforms. 
The paper examines the brand identity 
construction of user-generated brands (UGBs), 
using discursive and visual analysis of UGBs’ 
social media material in an attempt to 
contribute to a better understanding of this 
relatively new branding phenomenon. The 
findings are that the main themes include: the 
access to the private sphere, the human 
dimension and meaningful inter-personal 
discourses, and authenticity. 
137. (Zekanovic-Korona & 
Grzunov, 2014) 
 Paper 
 Airbnb in Croatia (space 
rental) 
 Adoption/motivation 
 Empirical study 
 A convenience online survey 
posted on the Facebook page of 
Airbnb in Croatia to explore the 
drivers of adoption and main 
motivations 
The main findings are the users were mostly in 
the middle range income and with high level of 
technological readiness, and motivated mostly 
by practical needs and benefits 
138. (Zervas, et al., 2014) 
 Paper 
 Airbnb (space rental) 
 Impact on hotel industry in 
Austin, Texas 
 Empirical study 
 Quasi-experimental 
counterfactual analysis of the 
impact of Airbnb on the hotel 
industry in Texas  
Using data both from Airbnb and from the hotel 
industry in Austin the authors adopt a 
Difference in Difference identification strategy 
exploiting hat exploits the significant 
spatiotemporal variation in the patterns of 
Airbnb adoption across city-level markets. The 
authors find that that in Austin, where Airbnb 
supply is highest, the impact on hotel revenue 
is roughly 8-10%. They find that Airbnb impact 
is non-uniformly distributed, with lower-priced 
hotels, and hotels not catering to business 
travel being the most affected segments.  
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139. (Zervas, et al., 2015) 
 Journal Article 
 Airbnb (space rental) 
 Reputational ratings 
 Empirical study  
 Quantitative analysis of 600.000 
rating collected from Airbnb 
contrasted with the ratings of 
approximately half a million 
hotels worldwide collected on 
TripAdvisor. 
The authors find that nearly 95% of Airbnb 
properties boast an average user-generated 
rating of either 4.5 or 5 stars (the maximum); 
virtually none have less than a 3.5 star rating. 
This is much higher of the 3.8 average rating 
found for hotels in TripAdvisor. This is to be 
considered as a first step is a first step towards 
understanding and interpreting nuances of user-
generated ratings in the context of the ‘sharing 
economy’ 
140. (Zrenner, 2015) 
 Report 
 Sharing Economy in general 
 Ethical aspects of sharing 
economy regulation 
 Regulatory essay 
 Secondary sources 
Main issues discussed include: competition, 
consumer protection, taxes, and legality of 
practices. 
 6.3.3 Selective review of ‘sharing’ platforms 
A short illustration on how the platforms reviewed were identified and on what 
information was retrieved is in order, for it may shape the design of future 
research activities.  
The platforms were selected following dimensional (i.e. platforms with larger 
users base) and convenience criteria (visibility and availability of information 
during the first round of analysis of media accounts), which led to include in the 
first round almost only platforms that were launched in the USA (many of which, 
however, already have a global or at least international reach); in a subsequent 
update a few more European platforms were included (in this case relaxing the 
dimensional criterion, for very few European platforms have reached the scale of 
those launched in the U.S.A.), but obviously a more extended and systematic 
search will be needed in the future to have a better picture (even if not 
representative) of the situation in the EU28 Member States.  
Platforms' websites and blogs were analysed in depth to gain information on key 
metrics (number of users, volume of transactions, self-reported impacts), on the 
key features of the business model (i.e., revenue streams, pricing strategy, 
ratings, vetting, liability, insurance, etc.), as well as to consider the terminology 
and rhetoric in their self-description. In addition, information on platforms was 
obtained from the various newspaper and magazine articles reviewed, from some 
of the reports and journal articles, and from specific industry sources such as for 
instance: a) the blog of a key industry analyst quoted in countless newspapers 
articles (Owyang, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d); b) a market report on the 17 
most valued ‘sharing economy’ companies (VB Profiles & Crowd Companies, 
2015); and c) the repository of information, company data, and market trends 
available at http://www.vbprofiles.com (accessible for free upon registration) lvi. 
As anticipated, the empirical analysis of platforms has informed various parts of 
this essay and in the following table only schematic and synthetic information is 
presented. The following acronyms (reported in alphabetic order) are used in the 
table: 
B2C= business-to-consumer 
B2B= business-to-business 
G2G= government-to-government 
OLM= online labour markets 
MLM= mobile labour markets 
NFP= Not For Profit 
P2P= peer-to-peer 
P2B= peer-to-business 
Please note that, except for those indicated with the acronym NFP, all other 
platforms are for profit.  
 
 Table 6: Reviewed platforms  
Name/ url Type Origin/coverage 
Main revenue 
stream 
Description plus metrics (where available) 
Adtriboo 
(http://www.adtriboo.com/en/)  
P2B OLM/ 
micro-tasking 
Spain/ Spain and 
Latin America 
Transaction fee 
Online labour market for micro-tasking (objects 
classification, tagging, transcriptions, marketing spam, data 
entry, content review, editing, website feedback, and many 
more) matching employers and on demand workers; about 
135,000 registered ‘contractors’. 
Airbnb 
www.airbnb.com  
P2P space 
sharing 
(home/room 
rental) 
US/ Global Transaction fee 
Residential space renting platform matching hosts and 
guests; as of February 2016 the platform reports: presence 
in 34,000 cities (covering more than 190 countries, 2 million 
listings, and more than 60 million guests ‘hosted’. Private 
Company valued at between $ 10 billion and employees 
category: 2.500-5000 (Source: VB Profiles). 
Amazon Mechanical Turk 
https://www.mturk.com/mturk
/welcome  
P2B OLM/ 
micro-tasking 
US/ International Transaction fee 
Online labour market for micro-tasking (objects 
classification, tagging, transcriptions, marketing spam, data 
entry, content review, editing, website feedback, and many 
more) matching employers and on demand workers; about 
500,000 registered ‘contractors’. 
Bag Borrow or Steal 
www.bagborrowsteal.com  
P2P Loaner 
goods 
US/Global Subscription 
Platform for borrowing, buying, and selling of fashion items. 
Employees category: 25-50 (Source: VB Profiles). 
BlaBlaCar  
www.blablacar.com  
P2P Ride 
sharing 
France/ Growing 
in Europe & 
worldwide (22 
countries) 
Transaction fee 
BlaBlaCar is a ride-sharing platform enabling drivers with 
empty seats and paying passengers to share distance travel 
costs; as of February the platform reports: 25 million 
members and 10 million travellers per quarter; In April 2015 
it acquired the German platform Carpooling.com. Private 
Company valued at: $ 1.6 billion; employees category: 250-
500 (Source: VB Profiles). 
Care.com 
www.care.com  
Mobile 
unskilled 
home & 
personal 
services 
US/ International Transaction fee 
Platform matching families and care givers. As of end of 
2015 the platform reports: 17.6 million members (10 million 
families and 7.6 million care givers) in 16 countries (half a 
million employees of corporate clients use the services). 
Public company traded at NYSE with market cap of $ 160 
million (in 2014 it was valued at $ 500 million); about 600 
employees. 
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Car2Go 
www.car2go.com  
B2P Car sharing 
(rental) 
Germany/ 
Growing in 
Europe & 
North 
American 
Traditional 
rental 
business 
car2go offers transportation on demand using “by-the-minute” 
rates. Present in 29 European and North American cities. It 
reports having 1,000,000 members. Employees category: 100-
250 (Source: VB Profiles). 
Carpooling 
 www.carpooling.com  
P2P Ride sharing  
Germany/ 
Global 
Transaction 
fee 
Ride sharing network present in 40 countries used by 1.4 million 
people every month. Acquired BlaBlaCar in April 2015. Employees 
category: 25-50 (Source: VB Profiles). 
Cargomatic 
www.cargomatic.com 
B2B Truck sharing 
(delivery) 
US/US 
Transaction 
fee 
Platform matching shippers with carriers having unutilised 
capacity on their trucks. Raised $ 10.6 million in venture capital; 
Employees category: 25-50 (Source: VB Profiles). 
ClassPass 
www.classpass.com 
B2B gym sharing  
(subscription) 
2012 
US/US 
Subscription 
fee 
ClassPass matches users with gyms around the country, so that 
one can access a workout also when travelling. Raised $ 54 
million in venture capital; employees category: 100-250 (Source: 
VB Profiles). 
Clickworker 
https://www.clickworker.co
m/  
P2B OLM/ micro-
tasking 
Germany / 
International 
Transaction 
fee 
Online labour market for micro-tasking (objects classification, 
tagging, transcriptions, marketing spam, data entry, content 
review, editing, website feedback, and many more) matching 
employers and on demand workers; about 700,000 registered 
‘contractors’. 
Cohealo 
www.cohealo.com  
B2B Equipment 
sharing (rental) 
US/US  
 
Service Fee 
Platforms match hospitals with other hospitals or different 
departments within a single hospital to share underused 
equipment. Raised $ 13.3 million in venture capital; employees 
category: 25-50 (Source: VB Profiles). 
CouchSurfing 
www.couchsurfing.org 
NFP P2P space 
sharing 
US/Global 
Advertising 
and charges 
for its 
verification 
system 
CouchSurfing has 10 million members in more than 200,000 
cities. It was totally not for profit until 2010; since 2010 it 
became a for profit business in the form of a Benefit Corporation 
(i.e. having a special focus in producing benefits for the 
communities). Raised $ 22.6 million in venture capital; 
employees category: 25-50 (Source: VB Profiles). 
Crowdflower 
http://www.crowdflower.co
m/  
P2B OLM/ micro-
tasking 
US / 
International 
Transaction 
fee 
Online labour market for micro-tasking (objects classification, 
tagging, transcriptions, marketing spam, data entry, content 
review, editing, website feedback, and many more) matching 
employers and on demand workers; about 5, million registered 
‘contractors’. 
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Crowdgure.de 
http://www.crowdguru.de/e
n/start/  
P2B OLM/ micro-
tasking 
Germany / 
Germany 
Transaction 
fee 
Online labour market for micro-tasking (objects classification, 
tagging, transcriptions, marketing spam, data entry, content 
review, editing, website feedback, and many more) matching 
employers and on demand workers; about 30,000 registered 
‘contractors’. 
Crowdsource 
http://www.crowdsource.co
m/  
P2B OLM/ micro-
tasking 
US / 
International 
Transaction 
fee 
Online labour market for micro-tasking (objects classification, 
tagging, transcriptions, marketing spam, data entry, content 
review, editing, website feedback, and many more) matching 
employers and on demand workers; about 8 million registered 
‘contractors’. 
EasyCar Club 
https://carclub.easycar.com
/  
P2P Car sharing 
(rental) 
UK/UK 
(National 
mkt.) 
administration 
charge (only 
charged to car 
owners) 
Platform whereby individuals can let their car and/or van. Car 
owners currently earn about £3,500 per year for each car listed. 
EatWith 
www.eatwith.com  
P2P Food sharing  
2012 
US/US plus 
Spain, Israel 
(Localised: S. 
Francisco, 
Barcelona, 
Tel-Aviv) 
Transaction 
Fee 
Platform matching hosts who share their home and cooking skills 
with guests willing to have ‘authentic’ homecooked meals; hosts 
may or may not charge guests for the meals; Raised $ 8 million 
in venture capital; employees category: 25-50 (Source: VB 
Profiles). 
Etsy 
www.etsy.com/  
P2P and P2B 
Bespoke goods 
US/Global 
A fee of 3.5% 
of sale value; 
a listing fee of 
20 Cents per 
item 
Etsy, Inc. is a benefit corporation operating a platform for buying 
and selling handmade and/or vintage products and supplies. The 
platform self-reports: 32 million items for sale, 1.4 million active 
sellers and 20.8 million active buyers. Public Company (NYSE) 
valued $ 708 million; Employees category: 1000-2500 (Source: 
VB Profiles). 
9Flats 
http://www.9flats.com/  
P2P space sharing 
(home/room 
rental) 
Germany/Inte
rnational 
Transaction 
fee  
Residential space renting platform matching hosts and guests. 
Allegedly the leader in Europe after Airbnb  with 100,000 listings 
globally (Employees category: 25-50 (Source: VB Profiles). 
Favour 
https://favordelivery.com/  
P2P Mobile 
unskilled home and 
personal services 
US and 
Canada (18 
cities) 
Transaction 
Fee 
Platform for delivery of anything within one hour by a fleet of 
3,500 part-time ‘runners’; it has 80 employees 
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Fieldagent 
https://fieldagent.net/  
P2B unskilled 
business services 
US/ 
International 
Transaction 
Fee 
Platform connecting 800,000 ‘agents’ with retailers in need of market 
research and audit services. 
Freecycle 
www.freecycle.org 
P2P NFP goods 
exchange 
US/Global Not applicable 
Platform connecting 9 million members lending or borrowing (giving or 
receiving) stuff as to reuse and reduce waste. 
Freelancer 
www.freelancer.com/ 
P2B OLM / macro-
tasking 
Australia/Global 
Transaction 
fee 
Online labour market for macro-tasking (website development, logo 
design, marketing, copywriting, astrophysics, aerospace engineering) 
matching employers and on demand workers; about 18 million 
registered ‘contractors’. Public company (ASX) valued at AUD 700 
million; about 500 employees 
Funding Circle  
www.fundingcircle.com  
P2P money lending UK/ UK &US  
Success and 
servicing  fees  
Platform connecting SMEs with potential lenders/investors. Private 
Company valued at $ 1 billion; Employees category: 100-250 (Source: 
VB Profiles). 
Gigwalk 
http://www.gigwalk.com/  
P2B mobile 
unskilled business 
services 
US/US 
Transaction 
fee 
Platform matching leading brand and retailer to about 400,000 
‘Gigwalkers’ who since 2011 have performed 4 million ‘gigs’ (mystery 
shopping, store audits, field data collection, including photographic 
work and interviews) across US cities.  Private Company raised $ 18 
million in venture capital funds; Employees category: 25-50 (Source: 
VB Profiles). 
GoMore 
www.gomore.dk  
P2P car pooling 
Denmark/Denm
ark, Norway, 
Sweden, Spain 
Transaction 
fee 
Peer-to-peer carpooling platform with 170,000 members 
Grownies 
www.grownies.com 
P2P marketplace  
2010 
Spain/Spain 
Subscription  
Peer-to-peer marketplace for goods and clothes for children aged 0 to 
8. Spanish only platform (available only in Castellan and Catalan). 
Handy (US) 
www.handy.com  
P2P mobile 
unskilled home and 
personal services 
US/US (28 
cities) 
Transaction 
Fee  
Handy is a platform matching individuals looking for household 
services (house cleaning, but also handyman services) with 5,000 
‘contractors’. According to platform self-report data the wage is 
between $15 and $22 per hour, averaging around $18 per hour; it has 
reached presence. Private company raised $ 62.5 million in venture 
capital; Employees category: 100-250 (Source: VB Profiles). 
HomeAway  
www.homeaway.com  
P2P space sharing 
(vacation home 
rental) 
US/Global 
Transaction 
fee and/or 
subscription  
Residential space renting platform matching hosts and guests with 
coverage of 190 countries Public Company (Nasdaq) valued at $ 3.4 
billion with about 1600 employees. 
Home Exchange 
www.homeexchange.com  
P2P NFP good 
exchanges 
Spain/Global Subscription Platform for home swapping boasting 65,000 homes in 150 countries. 
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HourlyNerd 
https://hourlynerd.com/  
P2B OLM/macro-
tasking 
US/ International 
Transaction 
fee 
Marketplace that connects MBAs (both current students and alumni; 
currently 17,000 registered) with businesses seeking help on projects 
in Marketing, Finance, Strategy, Operations, Business Planning, 
Presentation Creation and more. Private company raised $ 13 million 
in venture capital (Source: VB Profiles) 
Hub Culture  
https://hubculture.com 
P2P collaborative 
production 
2002 
UK/Global 
Subscription 
and services 
fee 
Collaborative production platform connecting 25,000 Urban 
professionals through Pavilions (common work spaces), Knowledge 
brokerage (exchange of services), and VEN (global digital currency).  
Jepti 
www.jepti.dk 
P2P goods 
sharing (rental) 
Denmark/Denma
rk 
Transaction 
Fee  
Platform for renting of underused durable goods. It has 10 employees. 
IndieGogo 
www.indiegogo.com  
P2P crowdfunding US/Global 
Transaction 
fee  
Platform matching individuals with projects (creative, entrepreneurial, 
or related to a cause) with all sorts of funders. Private company raised 
$ 56.5 million in venture capital; employees category: 100-250 
(Source: VB Profiles). 
Instacart 
www.instacart.com/ 
 
P2P mobile 
unskilled home 
and personal 
services 
US/ US  
Delivery fee; 
Subscription 
for Instacart 
express 
Platform for same-day delivery of food local grocery stores done with 
7,000 independent contractors. Private Company valued at $ 2 billion; 
employees category: 250-500 (Source: VB Profiles). 
Lending Club 
http://lendingclub.com  
P2P money 
lending 
US/US 
Success and 
servicing fee 
Platform connecting borrowers (individual and/or SMEs) with potential 
lenders. Public Company valued at $ 2.5 billion (NYSE). 1,000 
employees. 
Leftoverswap (US) 
http://leftoverswap.com/ 
P2P NFP food 
sharing 
US/ US  
(Localised in a 
few cities) 
Not applicable 
Leftoverswap is a mobile app that enables its users to offer their 
leftovers to locals in their community, allegedly reducing waste, 
enabling local eating, and building relationships within the community.  
Lingjob 
P2B OLM/micro-
tasking 
Lithuania/Lithuan
ia 
Transaction 
fee 
Online labour market for micro-tasking (objects classification, tagging, 
transcriptions, marketing spam, data entry, content review, editing, 
website feedback, and many more) matching employers and on 
demand workers; about 3,000 registered ‘contractors’. 
Luxe Valet 
http://www.luxevalet.co
m/  
P2P mobile 
unskilled home 
and personal 
service 
US / Only present 
9 cities 
$ 5 per hour  
Platform matching ‘valets’ (independent contractors) with individuals 
in need to drop their car and having it returned anywhere in a city. 
Platform rents its own parking space. Average Luxe hourly pay is 
approximately $15.92 per hour  
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Lyft (US) 
 www.lyft.com/  
P2P ride services 
US/ US  
(Localised in 65 
US cities) 
Transaction 
Fee  
  
Platforms matching individual needing a ride services with drivers; 
60,000 registered drivers (independent contractors). Private Company 
valued at $ 2.5 billion; Employees category: 1000-2500 (Source: VB 
Profiles). 
Kickstarter 
 www.kickstarter.com  
 
P2P crowdfunding US/Global  
Transaction 
Fee 
Platform matching individuals with projects (creative, entrepreneurial, 
or related to a cause) with all sorts of funders. Raised $ 10 million in 
venture capital (Source: VB Profiles) 
MinbilDinbi 
https://minbildinbil.dk 
P2P car sharing 
(rental) 
Denmark/Denma
rk  
Transaction 
Fee 
Peer-to-peer car-sharing platform 
Mi Trastero 
www.mitrastero.org 
P2P  market 
place 
Spain/Spain 
Transaction 
fee 
Platform for sale of second-hand goods 
MuniRent (US) 
 www.munirent.co/ 
 
G2G equipment 
sharing (rental) 
US/US 
Transaction 
fee 
The platform allows municipalities to share under-utilised heavy-duty 
equipment (excavators, vector trucks, street sweepers, bucket trucks 
and aerial lifts)  
Neighborgoods  
neighborgoods.net/ 
P2P NFP goods 
exchange 
US/US Not applicable 
Community platform where people can save money and resources by 
sharing stuff with their neighbours. Tools, toys, bicycles, etc. can be 
shared.  
Oltretata 
www.oltretata.it 
P2P mobile 
unskilled home 
and personal 
services 
Italy/Italy Subscription Platforms connecting families with nannies and baby-sitters 
Parkinghood 
www.parkinghood.com 
P2P space 
sharing (parking 
space rental) 
Spain/ Spain 
Transaction 
fee 
Platform for the renting of private parking space. 
Postmates 
P2P mobile 
unskilled home 
and personal 
services 
US/US Service fee 
Same day delivery (anything delivery) platform with 400,000 
contractors working as couriers. Private company raised $ 138 million 
in venture capital; employee category: 250-500 (Source: VB Profiles) 
Prosper 
www.prosper.com/  
FP/asset 
utilisation/ 
money (lending)/ 
P2P 
US/US 
Transaction 
and service 
fee 
Consumer credit platform connecting borrowers and lenders 
Over the past six years, more than $2.5 billion in personal loans have 
originated through the Prosper platform. Private Company valued at $ 
1.7 billion (Source: VB Profiles) 
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Name/ url Type Origin/coverage 
Main revenue 
stream 
Description plus metrics (where available) 
Peerby 
 www.peerby.com  
NFP P2P goods 
sharing 
(borrowing) 
NL/NL Not applicable 
Peerby is a small Dutch company supporting people to borrow from 
each other avoiding unnecessary consumption  
Relay Rides  
www.relayrides.com/ 
P2P Car sharing 
(rental) 
US/US 
Transaction 
fee 
Platform of car sharing (rental) available in 2100+ cities and 300+ 
airports throughout the United States.  
 
Sailsquare 
www.sailsquare.com 
P2P sail  sharing 
Italy/Internationa
l 
Transaction 
fee 
Sailsquare connects people who have a sailboat with people who want 
to have an experience at the sea. Through a "peer-to-peer" platform, 
users can join boating trips that are directly offered by private boat 
owners 
Sfinz 
http://www.sfinz.com/  
P2P MLM/ generic 
services 
Italy / Italy 
Transaction 
fee 
Labour market for generic services connecting contractors to 
consumers in need of most disparate type of services (Italian version 
of TaskRabbit, see infra). 
Shared Desk  
www.sharedesk.net/  
P2P space sharing 
(office space 
rental) 
US/International Service fee 
Platform connecting mobile professionals with productive work and 
meeting spaces enabling collaborative work and production; 4,500 
venues in 440 cities across 70 countries. 
Sharemystorage 
www.sharemystorage.c
om/  
 
P2P space sharing 
(storage space 
rental) 
US/international 
Transaction 
fee 
Platform connecting those who have spare space and those who need 
spare space for storage.  
Shareyourmeal  
 
www.shareyourmeal.ne
t/  
NFP P2P food 
sharing 
NL/NL Not applicable 
Shareyourmeal.net makes possible to someone to share his/her 
cooking with people in the neighbourhood. It has already shared more 
than 120,000 meals  
Sidecar 
www.sidecar.com 
P2P ride services US/US 
Transaction 
Fee 
Platforms matching individual needing a ride services with drivers; 
6,000 registered drivers (independent contractors) 
Smart Host 
 www.smarthost.me/ 
B2P home rental 
optimisation 
services 
US/US Service fee 
Platform targeting hosts (i.e., of Airbnb and similar) with services to 
optimise property rentals. Intelligent algorithm analyses one’s listing 
and the surrounding marketplace to determine an optimal price.  
SherpaShare 
www.sherpashare.com/  
 
B2P home rental 
drivers 
optimisation 
services 
US/US Service fee 
Platform targeting independent contractors track their earnings, 
expenses, taxes and working opportunities in one single 
cloud. SherpaShare is integrated with Uber, Lyft, Sidecar, Postmates, 
and other popular on demand services.  
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stream 
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Shyp 
https://www.shyp.com
/  
P2P mobile 
unskilled home and 
personal services 
US/US Service fee 
Same day package delivery platform with contractors  that since 2015 
have been reclassified as employees. 
Swapstyle.com 
 www.swapstyle.com/ 
P2P NFP goods 
exchange 
US/International Not applicable 
SwapStyle is the world’s longest standing FREE online fashion swap 
marketplace. Women from all around the world use SwapStyle to 
swap clothes online and save $$$ in the process; 55,000 participants 
and more than 4 million completed trades  
TaskRabbit 
www.taskrabbit.com 
 
P2P MLM / generic 
services 
US/ International 
Transaction 
Fee 
Labour market for generic services with 30,000 registered ‘taskers’ 
(i.e. contractors) providing any kind of services consumers (posters). 
The five largest categories between 2009 and mid 2014 were shopping 
and delivery (24%), moving help (12%), cleaning (9%), home repairs 
(6%), and furniture assembly (4%). 
Time Bank 
 ww.timebanks.org/  
P2P NFP service 
exchanges 
US/International Not applicable 
Platform for giving and receiving services networks and strong 
communities exchanging time on equal basis. One hour helping 
another earns one Time Bank Hour (also called time credits). The 
platform works with Time Banks leaders across the US and 
internationally to strengthen and rebuild community, and use Time 
Banks to achieve wide-ranging goals such as social justice, bridges 
between diverse communities, and local ecological sustainability. 
Trademe  
 www.trademe.co.nz/  
 
P2P marketplace  
New Zealand / 
International 
Transaction 
fee plus 
advertising  
Online marketplace and classified advertising platform spanning 
auctions and fixed price sales for new and used goods. Private 
Company currently valued at $ 1.4 billion (Source: VB Profiles) 
Topdesigner.cz 
P2B OLM/micro-
tasking 
Czech/Czech 
Transaction 
fee 
Online labour market for micro-tasking (objects classification, tagging, 
transcriptions, marketing spam, data entry, content review, editing, 
website feedback, and many more) matching employers and on 
demand workers; about 3,900 registered ‘contractors’. 
TransferWise (UK) 
www.transferwise.com 
  
P2P money 
transfer 
UK/ Global 
Transaction 
fee 
Money transfer platform whose pricing and operating model are a 
substantial departure from standard practice in the money transfer 
sector; it provides customers with a lower-cost alternative to 
traditional means of moving money internationally. Private Company 
currently valued at $ 1 billion (Source: VB Profiles) 
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Uber 
www.uber.com/ 
P2P ride services US/International 
Transaction 
fee 
Platforms matching individuals needing a ride services with drivers; 
160,000 registered drivers (independent contractors). Coverage: 230 
Cities in 58 countries. Estimates of revenues in 2014 between 1.5 and 
2 billion $. Private Company currently valued at $ 41.2 billion (Austin 
et al 2015) 
Upwork 
(www.upwork.com) 
OLM/macro-
tasking 
US/ Global 
Transaction 
fee 
Online labour market for macro-tasking (software development, 
engineering and data science, creative services such as graphic design 
and writing, business and administrative activities such as clerical and 
secretarial work) matching employers and on demand workers; about 
10 million registered ‘contractors’. Private company currently valued 
at about $ 500 ; about 300 employees 
Wegolook 
(Wegolook) 
P2P mobile 
unskilled business 
services 
US / US, 
Australia, 
Canada, UK 
Transaction 
fee 
Platform connecting 20,000 ‘inspectors’ with businesses in various 
sectors (i.e. onsite verifications and inspection services for buyers of 
online and distant items such as automobiles, real estate, and high 
value goods in need field inspections). 
 
 
 
 
 Notes 
                                           
i  Time banks are initiatives that emerged in the 1980s and involved community-based 
trading of services on the basis of the time spent and following the principle that every 
member’s time is valued equally(Cahn & Gray, 2015; Cahn & Rowe, 1992; Collom et 
al., 2012). 
ii  Additional indications of this type include, for instance, the fact that Zipcar, one of the 
‘sharing economy’ first movers, was bought already in 2013 by Avis for the astronomic 
amount of $ 500 million (Geron, 2013). As reported by Belk (2014b, pp. 1597-1598), 
the popularity of car sharing has triggered action also by automobile manufacturers 
which now offer their own programmes (i.e. Daimler Benz's: Car2Go; BMW's 
DriveNow; Volkswagon's Quicar; and Peugeot's Mu) or acquire start-ups like in the 
case of General Motors the acquisition of Relay Rides. Etsy, a marketplace facilitating 
contact to make and/or sell/buy bespoke goods, has 1.4 million active sellers and 20.8 
million Active buyer (Etsy, 2013) and is currently valued at 2.7 $ billion (Owyang, 
2015c; VB Profiles & Crowd Companies, 2015). Allegedly, users of service exchange 
platform TaskRabbit can make up to 7,000 $ per month by running errands, 
assembling Ikea furniture, and performing many other kinds of activities (Brown, 
2015; Zimmermann, 2015). 
iii  See workshop agenda at: 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/636241/sharing-
economy-agenda.pdf ; see also the opening speech by Commissioner Maureen K. 
Ohlhausen at: 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/671141/150609shari
ngeconomy.pdf 
iv  Reported, for instance, in the overview on competition law and the sharing economy 
published by the blog ‘Out-Law.com’  
(http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/april/the-role-of-competition-law-in-
innovation-markets-/ .Retrieved 15-05-2016). 
v  See, for instance, the speech “The Digital Single Market, consumers and EU 
competition policy”, delivered on September 21 2015 during the Competition and 
Consumer Day, Luxembourg Presidency event. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2016_01_en.pdf, retrieved 10-05-
2016)  
vi  The reference is to the following text “Those who have handled sciences have been 
either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant, 
they only collect and use, the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of 
their own substance. But the bee takes a middle course: it gathers its material from 
the flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms and digests it by a power of 
its own.” Bacon, First Book of Aphorisms (1620). 
vii  A-critical empiricism is vulnerable to the idea that truth is never prior to all 
interpretation. This is exactly the corrosive critique that pragmatism has mounted on 
logical positivism as best presented in Quine’s famous essay ‘Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism’ (Quine, 1951). To describe what we experience we must apply concepts 
and concepts are never merely dictated by phenomena, since they are involved in 
classifying the phenomena themselves. The pragmatist critique departs from the self-
evident observation that the mind is always active in deciding what counts as 
knowledge. 
viii  The expression ‘empirical idealism’ is a variation on the ‘practical idealism’ that has 
been deemed as the approach inspiring the entire work of Albert Hirschman (Adelman, 
2013). Idealism should be intended only as to convey the fact that ideas are given an 
autonomous and essential explanatory role. Because humans behave essentially as 
the bees in Bacon’s quotation, this means that they do not filter experience through 
concepts and values but they also can be distinguished from other living beings 
(according to the hermeneutic tradition) because their actions have meaning (in the 
double sense that actions have meaning both from inside and from outside); they are 
informed by ideas and ‘theories’ that humans hold about the nature of things. The 
meaning and objectives of many actions depends on the model of the social world that 
is in the actors’ heads. More often than not the ideas and theory used in everyday 
practices are filtrated and informed by the social sciences themselves. Or better there 
is an interaction between common sense, media accounts, and the social science. 
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ix  In the past five years criticisms in the media have shattered the scientific enterprise 
(Glenn Begley, 2013); Nature published a piece containing 20 tips for politicians to 
interpret scientific claim where the key message is that uncertainty and measurement 
errors are always present in any scientific work (Sutherland et al., 2013). There are 
doubts that science can inform policy as in the classical linear model of the relations 
between evidence and policy (Pielke, 2007, pp. 12-14); accordingly, the idea of 
‘speaking truth to power’ (Wildavsky, 1979) by way of scientific advice to politicians 
and policy makers is under serious reconsideration. 
x  Situations when facts are uncertain, values disputed, stakes high, and decisions 
urgent would require, according to the epistemology developed within the field of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) a quarter of a century ago, a ‘post-normal 
science’ approach. It has been introduced and further developed in various works of 
Functowicz and Ravetz (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990, 1991, 1993, 2008; Ravetz, 1990). 
Useful systematic reviews of the application of this and of other critical approaches to 
the relation between science and policy can be found in Carrozza (2015) and in 
Hessels & van Lente (2008). 
xi  Often there are attempts to turn all policy-making into technical exercises that obviate 
the need for political debate in what has been called technocracy or scientisation 
(Jasanoff, 1990; Ravetz, 1990; Sarewitz, 2000, 2004). Under conditions of 
uncertainty, a detached ‘pure science’ approach is nothing more than ‘stealth issue 
advocacy’ (Pielke, 2007, chapter 5). 
xii  A partial modelling simulation has been disseminated and trumpeted in the press 
under the headline ‘Sharing Economy benefits lower income groups’ (Bradshaw, 2015). 
xiii For instance: Peers (US based, funded by big commercial platforms); OuiShare (based 
in Paris, mostly a European network of advocates); Sharable (US based, advocacy 
and knowledge sharing NGO); Collaborative Consumption (Australia, advocacy group 
chaired by Rachel Botsman). 
xiv  For instance, the paper by Hall & Krueger (2015) was included because it is the only 
source based on internal administrative data from Uber; although it was obviously not 
conducted by a disinterested third party given that one of the author is an employee 
of the platform. Other exceptions include a number of reports from free-market think 
tanks that were included to illustrate one particular view on the issue of regulation 
and self-regulation. 
xv  The ‘sharing economy’ is preferred to the expression ‘collaborative economy’, 
currently prevailing in the European Commission vocabulary, since it is used in most 
of the reviewed source. 
xvi  In written comment sent to a public consultation launched in the US by the Federal 
Trade Commission Relay Rides makes a clear case for distinguishing its business 
model – defined as a person-to-person car-sharing platform, connecting car owners 
who rent out their idle vehicles to travellers – from ride services business models such 
as Uber or Lyft.  On this basis, the platform asked policy makers not to take a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach to regulation. The comment can be retrieved at: 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/07/02031-
96671.pdf. The various differences in business models in the broadly defined 
transportation sector are summarised in Evidence Box 5.  
xvii  In a written evidence Airbnb presented to the UK House of Lords inquiry into the 
Commission DSM strategy it explicitly stated that given the diversity of business 
models ‘An effective single regulatory framework suited for such varied models would 
be impossible to conceive .... there are significant differences that require bespoke 
approaches’ (House of Lords, 2016, p. 25). This aspect was reiterated in public oral 
auditions by Patrick Robinson, Head of Public Policy Europe and Canada, Airbnb, and 
Mark McGann, Head of Public Policy EMEA, Uber (House of Lords, 2016, pp. 37-50). 
xviii  Typologies are conceptual and mainly used in the social sciences, whereas taxonomies 
are empirically grounded, hierarchical, and most commonly used in the natural 
sciences. In reality, however, the two can be re-compacted (a typology can be applied 
to empirical reality or can be derived inductively from data via cluster analysis) and 
the two terms are often used interchangeably. Moreover, though only conceptually 
and ex ante, typologies can also include within each type a hierarchical order of super 
and sub-types. Probably the most distinguishing element between typologies and 
taxonomies is in that the former uses monothetic classes derived from 
discrete/nominal dimensions/variables and the latter instead uses polythetic classes 
derived from continuous dimensions/variables. Monothetic classes contain cases that 
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must be identical on all the dimensions used for the classification. Polythetic classes 
contain groups of cases aggregated by the overall greatest similarity. To put it 
differently monothetic classes must include cases to have a set of properties that are 
both necessary and sufficient. A polythetic class A instead is one where cases share as 
much as possible although they are not entirely identical: a) in a given class defined 
by X properties each case possesses a large number of such properties; b) each 
properties in the class is possessed by a large number of cases; but c) none of the 
properties defining A is possessed by all cases in aggregate (that is in all the other 
classes of the classification), otherwise such property would no longer be defining. On 
the process of classifying in the social sciences and on the difference between 
typologies and taxonomies see for instance Bailey (1994). 
xix  Classifying together similar cases allows to focus the analysis on them and not lose 
time on very different cases of no interest, or alternatively to differentiate between 
different cases so as to treat them separately in the analysis instead of leaving them 
mixed together 
xx  Intensional definitions are clear-cut in that they establish the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a ‘thing’ being a member of a specific set. The advantage of intensional 
definitions is that they automatically produce mono-dimensional classifications. The 
disadvantage is that empirical reality is always more complex and nuanced than an 
intensional definition could capture; using the intensional approach may entail 
excluding items from a specific set of ‘things’ in ways that may appear artificial or 
arbitrary, especially when this contrasts with how players self-define themselves or 
are defined by others in practice. Ostensive definitions more pragmatically denote just 
a few key features and complement them with exemplifications. The advantages are 
that they are more inclusive (reducing hard clear-cut choices and exclusions) and 
fairly easy to be produced. The clear disadvantage is that, if they are too loose and 
encompassing, they become trivial with limited descriptive power and do not reduce 
complexity as they group together entities that are similar with regard to very few 
characteristics (possible not the most relevant ones) and very dissimilar with regard to 
a much larger number of relevant ones. 
xxi  There are some more intensional definitions, but they either exclude many platforms 
counterintuitively with respect to common practices or are used inconsistently. Belk’s 
definition of ‘true sharing’ (2014b) is admittedly more precise but excludes all 
commercial platforms. Definitions focussing on access exclude many commercial 
platforms where there is a definitive transfer of ownership (i.e. Etsy, eBay, etc.). 
Definitions focussing on the peer-to-peer (P2P) or consumer-to-consumer (C2C) 
connotation also have some inconsistencies and difficulties. First, they are used to 
indicate platforms such as oDesk or Freelancers where single individuals offer their 
work to firms and obviously these relations are not peer-to-peer (possibly they can be 
described as P2B). Second, C2C definitions exclude well-known platforms that are 
Business-to-Consumers (B2C). Third C2C and P2P are not necessarily the same thing: 
in many cases, one side is a consumer and the other a provider (i.e. TaskRabbit). 
Obviously, there are other more encompassing definitions that capture all the 
platforms. However, these greatly expand the boundaries of the definition, almost to 
the point where it becomes difficult to argue why other well-known digital platforms 
are not included under the label of the ‘sharing economy’. The object-based 
categorisations (see Section 6.2.2 in the Technical Annex) group together very 
different platforms that only have a minimum common denominator and differ in 
many important respects. One example will suffice here. Exchanging under-utilised 
medical equipment (i.e. Cohealo) and under-utilised living space (i.e. Airbnb) are 
similar activities with respect to the criteria of ‘increased asset utilisation’ but are very 
dissimilar in very crucial respects. They differ with regard to the type of players 
involved, the regulatory and policy implications and the relevant jurisdiction, the 
extent to which incumbent industries are disrupted or damaged, the risks and 
liabilities involved, and much more. The same reasoning applies to other sector-based 
categorisations (see Section 6.2.3 in the Technical Annex). In all definitions and 
categorisations, radically different activities can be found in terms of both the 
modality (P2P, P2B, C2C, B2C, B2B, G2G) and the substantive kind of economic 
function addressed. The broad categorisations are obfuscated by, for instance, the 
narrative of ‘underutilised assets.’ They make no effort to clearly distinguish what 
these assets are (i.e. there is an evident difference between real estate or money and 
free time as assets). In the same way, the original idea of true sharing leads to talk of 
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‘exchange of services’ when in many cases the platforms included in this category are 
simply for profit markets where skilled or unskilled work is sold and bought. 
xxii  Lamberton & Rose (2012), using the principle of public economics, propose an 
interesting typology with rivalry (rival and non-rival goods) and exclusivity (high and 
low level of exclusivity) as dimensions. Yet, within each of four quadrants identified 
platforms are grouped together that have very different regulatory and policy 
implications. The typology presented by Cohen & Muñoz (2015) is interesting but too 
specific to distinguish the contribution of different activities to sustainable production 
and consumption within cities. Schor (2014) typology used two dimensions – profit 
orientation (NFP versus commercial platforms) and type of interaction (P2P vs B2P) –
and identify four types used as a good starting point in the process followed in this 
essay to arrive at the proposed typology; it fails, however, to consider other 
interaction modalities (i.e. P2B as in digital labour platforms). 
xxiii  Local level exchange of services for money (i.e. TaskRabbit) and similar but not-for-
profit activities (i.e. Time Banking) have little in common in terms of policy 
implications (the former has pressing implications for labour regulation, the latter may 
be of interest for social innovation and inclusion policies). 
xxiv  Some have a users’ base of a few hundreds or thousands of individuals and others of 
millions of people. In terms of dimensional relevance, for instance, makers’ spaces 
and collaborative production platforms are currently much smaller than transactional 
(i.e. Airbnb) and labour (i.e. Upwork or Freelancers) platforms; the latter are a more 
immediate sources of regulatory concerns, whereas innovation policy support 
measures may enable the former to scale up. 
xxv  The modalities of the exchange are different as some of the largest platforms (i.e. 
Airbnb) are pure P2P (where peer stands for a physical person as opposed to juridical 
persons), others are P2P (i.e. where individuals provide work to businesses as in 
Upwork or Freelancers), still others are B2C (i.e. Zipcar), G2G (i.e., MuniRent) or B2B 
(i.e., Cohealo). B2C platforms, no matter how innovative their business model (i.e. 
Zipcar), are fully regulated by existing legislation; the modality of exchanges and the 
players involved have different implications with respect to taxation concerns, which 
are obviously more important both in terms of what rules to apply and how to enforce 
them when platforms enable monetary exchanges between peers (i.e. taxation is an 
issue for Airbnb but a non-issue for Zipcar). 
xxvi  Hospitals renting under-utilised medical equipment from each other (i.e. Cohealo) or 
municipalities renting under-utilised heavy duty equipment from each other (i.e. 
MuniRent), as compared to renting under-utilised living space (i.e. Airbnb), have in 
common again a trivial characteristic but differ widely with respect to the kind of 
players involved, the regulatory and policy implications, the relevant jurisdiction, the 
extent to which incumbent industries are disrupted or damaged, the risks and 
liabilities involved, etc. The former types are small and have a great prospective 
potential from the perspective of policies in support of healthcare and public sector 
innovation, whereas the latter is big and raises short term regulatory concerns (i.e. 
taxation, consumer protection and liability). 
xxvii  For instance, ride services (i.e., Uber), as compared to ride sharing (i.e., BlaBlaCar) 
and car sharing (i.e., RelayRides), differ in several ways: a) ride services are labour 
intensive, car and ride sharing are not; b) ride services raise issue of market access 
(i.e. licensing) and provoked strong protests from incumbents, car and ride sharing 
don’t; c) car and ride sharing create much less problems for what concerns liability 
and insurance. All of these transportation-centred services have obviously different 
implications compared to space rental, or re-sale of goods. Digital labour platforms in 
turn present their own peculiarities. 
xxviii  In Quadrant (2) rental of spaces and cars or ride sharing correspond to the provision 
of services entailing mobility and encounters that are not contemplated in the 
exchange of goods (i.e. safety is not a concern for goods exchange). In Quadrant (3), 
TaskRabbit is a mobile labour market that matches individuals with free time to run 
errands and all kinds of generic services that consumers request, whereas Uber or 
Lyft provide only ride services, and other platforms send contractors to do home 
services or make deliveries. In Quadrant (3), there is a clear difference between 
platforms sending contractors into the field to do inspections and other activities that 
require mobility and other platforms working as labour markets for the remote 
delivery of digitalised and routinised micro-task. Furthermore, regardless of the 
difference between skilled and unskilled work placing them in (4) or (1), platforms 
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such as Mechanical Turks or Upwork are both online labour markets where the entire 
process (job posting, bidding, matching, and delivery) is accomplished digitally with 
no requirement for mobility or face-to-face interaction. They differ from mobile labour 
markets such as TaskRabbit where the process is also almost entirely digitalised 
except the fact that the final delivery of work requires mobility and face-to-face 
interaction. As a matter of fact, the typology entails a third dimension distinguishing 
online from mobile labour markets and service delivery. 
xxix  This estimate by PwC has been spun around in the last two years and reified as a true 
‘quantification’. Few of those citing this estimate bothered, as the authors of this 
essay did, to dig into how these figures were constructed to discover they are based 
on a shaky methodology and a controversial inclusion of sectors and players, such as 
for instance Netflix and Spotify. Netflix and Spotify are resellers and have nothing in 
common with platforms such as Airbnb or Uber classically typifying the ‘collaborative’ 
or ‘sharing economy’. 
xxx  Among the sources reviewed formally only one article, based on a Delphi study 
involving 25 experts, was entirely focussed on drivers (Barnes & Mattsson, 2015); the 
most cited driver for the sharing economy was the need to save in the context of the 
crisis (followed by technology, and socio-cultural changes), whereas environmental 
drivers did not emerge as very important. It is worth noting that also critical observers 
argue that the fact that the crisis started in 2007 and continued for the next eight 
years is among the key drivers for the current sharing economy boom ( see for 
instance an academic (Schor, 2014) and a media (Roose, 2014) discussion of this kind 
of explanation). On the other hand, references to drivers were found in various other 
sources. Cohen & Muñoz (2015), for instance, stressed the combination of increased 
urbanisation and the need for new forms of Sustainable Production and Consumption 
(SCP). Indeed, in 2008 for the first time in history more people were living in cities 
than in rural areas and by 2030  5 billion people will live in urban areas (Dobbs et al., 
2012; Dobbs et al., 2011; UNDESA, 2014); this puts great pressure on mobility and 
logistics (i.e. with clear implications for ride sharing, space sharing, etc.) and creates a 
further push to increase access to shareable assets and to go toward circular and 
shared modes of both consumption and production (WEF, 2014). The importance of 
technology is found in most sources, and two in particular stress the advances made 
in the capacity to create digital matching markets and harness trust among strangers 
(Edelman & Geradin, 2015;Horton & Zeckhauser, 2016). Technological innovation and 
adoption has several economic, social, and cultural impacts. Access to technology 
increases the possibility and empowerment for both access-based consumption and for 
collaborative production; it also allegedly has a further impact on social capital and 
trust. For instance, whereas digital natives seem to trust people less (Pew, 2014), 
when they have used social networking sites they become three times more likely to 
think that most people are trustworthy and this also applies to other population 
groups (Hampton et al., 2011). It is further argued that connected consumers are 
much more likely to trust strangers online and, as they will become the overwhelming 
majority of the population, this ensures that the sharing economy would further 
develop and consolidate (Vaughan & Hawksworth, 2014). At the socio-cultural level, 
various consumption theorists see the irreversible advent of the switching from 
ownership to access as consumers are becoming more comfortable with this practice 
and with sourcing trust through peer-review systems (Baumeister & Wangenheim 
2014); this trend is allegedly reinforced by surveys cited in various policy reports 
(Barbezieux & Herody, 2016; EESC, 2014; Observatorio Cetelem, 2013; PIPAME, 
2015) conducted in various European countries suggesting that consumers are 
increasingly in favour of access over ownership. In addition, according to the more 
optimist and utopian analysts there is an increasing desire for community (Gansky, 
2010: p. 50) and for richer small world experiences (Owyang, 2013, p. 5). These 
socio-cultural changes apparently interact with other behavioural and economic 
aspects. In France, for instance, it has been estimated that potentially shareable 
goods account for about 25% of expenditure and for about one third of household 
waste (Demailly & Novel, 2014); alternatively it has been calculated that on average 
each French family holds 70 unused object and this makes a potential recirculation 
market worth € 12 billion (PIPAME, 2015, p. 27). Imbalances among different parts of 
the global economy have created and will continue to create accumulation of cheap 
imports in wealthy nations, that is seen as one of the drivers for the uptake of 
platforms enabling the recirculation of goods (Schor 2004; Shor & Fitzmaurice 2015). 
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Developments at socio-cultural and socio-economic level are in clear relation with the 
environmental pressures that allegedly will make the transition from consumption to 
access irreversible (Vaughan & Hawksworth, 2014; WEF, 2014). 
xxxi  The roots of social utopianism for the ‘sharing economy’ are to be found in the 
narratives about crowdsourcing and the ‘commons’ that chronologically preceded the 
‘sharing’ boom. The optimism on crowdsourcing originated with the popularisation by 
Howe (2006, 2008) of the ‘wisdom of crowds’ narrative (Surowiecki, 2004). A well-
known narrative on creativity of the commons concerns collaboration among large 
number of individuals effectively cooperating and coordinating for the provision of 
information, knowledge, and cultural goods without having to rely on market 
mechanisms or managerial hierarchies (Benkler, 2004, 2006). In this optimistic vein 
one can also find the democratising effect of the ‘long tail’ (Anderson, 2006), the 
generosity stemming from ‘cognitive surplus’ (Shirky, 2010), the celebration of 
crowdsourcing as a model for problem solving (Brabham, 2013; Brabham, 2008; Gehl, 
2011), the philosophical praise of its virtues (Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006), and the 
promise of increased efficiency (Chandler & Kapelner, 2013; Djelassi & Decoopman, 
2013; Satzger et al., 2013). Moving to narratives more directly related to the sharing 
movement, they can be summarised as promising triple benefits including greener 
commerce, greater profits, and rich social experiences (community revival and 
strengthening of social capital). It was predicted, for instance, that the ‘hyper-
consuming’ 20th century would be followed by a new 21st century where community, 
reputation, sharing, collaborative and access-based consumption would rise in 
prominence (Leadbeater, 2009). The interest in sharing was interpreted as a new 
positive socially oriented reaction neoliberal blind faith in the power of economic self-
interest (Grassmuck, 2012). The emerging sharing platforms led to affirm that social 
networking, which was criticised as causing the decline of social capital and 
community, was instead the source of new forms of socially oriented collaboration 
bridging digital boundaries once considered as sealed (O’Regan, 2009). Digital sharing 
was seen as producing both social exchanges and distribution and dissemination 
(Wittel, 2011). Anthropological and neuroscience contributions are cited in several of 
the reviewed contributions to argue that sharing is an evolutionary and cultural traits 
of human beings (Agyeman, et al., 2013). Two cited sources are based on 
experiments supposedly showing that sharing, fairness expectations, and altruistic 
behaviours are embedded in human nature (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Tomasello 
& Warneken, 2008). The increasing attention given to the sharing economy was also 
see as a potential for bringing together social and academic practices interested in 
reframing economic activities toward transformative social innovations (Heinrichs, 
2013). Even among essays focussing on regulation one can find optimistic views on 
how to enlist the ‘sharing economy’ for the provision of local public services (Rauch & 
Schleicher, 2015). These authors envisage that, as sharing economy firms move from 
being start-ups to become important and permanent players in key urban industries 
(transportation, hospitality and dining), local and state governments can adopt a 
strategy to make platforms contribute to the provision of local public services by: (1) 
subsidising sharing firms to encourage expansion of services that produce public 
goods, generate substantial consumer surplus and/or minimise the need for excessive 
regulation of the property market; (2) harnessing sharing firms as a tool for 
redistribution; and/or (3) contracting with sharing firms to provide traditional 
government services. Morgan & Kuch, (2015) combining the analysis of legal 
consciousness, the law, and diverse forms of economic activities conceive non-
commercial platforms as the locus of radical transactionalism, where legal building 
blocks of property and capital can be reimagined and reconfigured, helping to 
construct a shared infrastructure for the exercise of collective agency in response to 
disadvantage sustained by law. 
xxxii  A number of sources present a sort of business-driven optimism (Guttentag, 2013; 
Heimans & Timms, 2014; Matzler & Kathan, 2015; WEF, 2013, 2014; Wosskow, 2014). 
Management gurus (Heimans & Timms, 2014), for instance, propose a normative 
loaded and speculative distinction between ‘new power’ (sharing economy, but also 
grass-roots political movements) and ‘old power’ (big corporations, but also 
established political parties) where: a) New power is about radical transparency, 
openness and collaboration, wisdom of crowds, do-it-yourself; and b) old power is 
about bureaucracy, institutionalisation, managerialism, professionalism, etc. According 
to a WEF report on the circular economy ‘The sharing economy is driven by three 
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primary benefits: economic—more efficient and resilient use of financial resources; 
environmental—more efficient and sustainable use of resources; and communal—
deeper social connections among people. All of these are enabled and scaled by 
technology platforms. All of these systems are enabled by four key principles: trust 
between strangers, belief in the effective management of common resources, the 
existence of idle capacity and the build-up of a critical mass of users, customers, 
consumers, producers and/or members’ (2014, p. 24). 
xxxiii  Neo-liberal and libertarian economists present the usual narrative on free market and 
no regulation (Allen & Berg, 2014; Cohen & Sundararajan, 2015; Koopman, et al., 
2014, 2015; Sundararajan, 2014; Thierer, et al., 2015). They expect the ‘sharing’ 
platforms to: a) increase economic activities and productivity through better use of 
underutilised assets or ‘dead capital’, and through lowering transaction costs that 
expand of trade; b) increase social utility and consumer welfare as a result of more 
competition; c) create new jobs; d) reduce information asymmetry between 
consumers and producers thanks to reputational ratings; e) create new markets 
through disruptive innovations and spur in turn further innovation among incumbent 
industries; f) produce a new cohort of entrepreneurs if the micro-entrepreneurs who 
provide services in the platforms acquire the experience and skills to progress and 
launch their own ventures. Importantly, they argue that no regulation is needed and 
especially that legislation should not force platforms to hire independent contractors 
as employees. 
xxxiv  Very critical and pessimistic observers have defined crowd employment platforms as 
the new sweatshops (Uddin, 2012; Zittrain, 2009), and analysed them as new forms 
of encroachment and exploitation of labour (Carr, 2008; Deuze, 2007), underpaid free 
work (Kleemann et al., 2008; Scholz, 2013), and of new digitally enabled surveillance 
(Aneesh, 2009); the debate includes some contributions clearly inspired by the 
application of Marxian perspectives (Fuchs, 2014; Scholz, 2013). Others see the 
‘sharing economy’ as a source of social degradation and inequality, and as a rhetorical 
weapon harnessed for lobbying purpose to enlist the positive view of the sharing 
movement and mask exploitative activities (Caldararo, 2014; Kuttner, 2013; Lee, 
2015; Walker, 2015). Kuttner argued that practices such as those emerging in the 
sharing economy add to the erosion of the labour contract and to the increase of what 
economists call ‘contingent labour (2013). 
xxxv  A “B Corp is to business what Fair Trade certification is to coffee or USDA Organic 
certification is to milk; (https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps, accessed 8-
6-2015). 
xxxvi  In this respect it has been suggested that Silicon Valley is the new revolving door for 
Obama staffers with much emphasis placed on the fact that Uber appointed former 
Obama campaign manager David Plouffe as chief of policy and strategy (Kang & 
Eilperin, 2015) and provided its data to Alan Krueger — the former Chairman of 
President Barack Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers – to produce a paper 
concerning impacts on labour matters (see infra). 
xxxvii  Sperling uses objective administrative data from Airbnb on hosting of individuals own 
house such as average days hosted per year and average earning per host per year, 
but it is not clear how he attributes this income entirely to middle class since hosts do 
not provide socio-demographic information to Airbnb. 
xxxviii From this entry in the blog summarising the overall results one can then proceed to 
access the city specific reports (Airbnb, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2014a, 
2014b, 2015a, 2015b; Uber, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015f, 
2015g). 
xxxix  The concept of social capital commands an ever-expanding body of literature that 
cannot be discussed here. General approaches define social capital in slightly different 
ways depending on the theoretical perspective (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; 
Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 2000). At a very basic level it can be said that the 
concept entails both normative (norms and values) and instrumental dimensions 
(networks). At macro level social capital can be equated to civic sense entailing norms, 
social values, trust, and social network (especially participation in association). At a 
more micro level social capital can be defined as the ensemble of social networks that 
can enable individuals to gain access to desired resources and outcomes. Another 
classic distinction is that between weak and strong ties within the overall social capital 
of an individual, where the latter are typical of close-knit kin relationships whereas the 
former should actually be the bread and butter of the function of market economies 
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and democracy. It is, however, most important for the purposes of this essay to 
consider a bit further the concept of trust and relate it to social capital, as trust is 
fundamental for the uptake of any sharing economy platform. Trust is the social glue 
that enables collaborative consumption marketplaces and the sharing economy to 
function without friction. Scholars of trust distinguish between generalised and 
particularised trust (Couch & Jones, 1997; Delhey et al., 2011; Freitag & Traunmüller, 
2009; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Stolle, 2002; Yamagishi et al., 1998; Yamagishi & 
Yamagishi, 1994). Particularised trust, also referred to as ‘thick trust’ (Putnam 2000), 
concerns a close network of social proximity (i.e. family and friends). Generalised trust 
is a more abstract attitude toward other people and expectations about their 
behaviours. It entails some implicit consideration of risk and uncertainty leading to an 
‘estimate’ of the trustworthiness of others (Coleman 1990). In other words 
generalised trust can be defined as an attitude entailing reliance on the benevolence 
of human nature (Couch & Jones, 1997; Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994) or the attitude 
to give most people the benefit of the doubt (Putnam, 2000, p. 133). Generalised 
trust is, thus, a critical element of social capital and the foundation of civic behaviour 
(Stolle 2002), the basis of reciprocity and social connectedness (Delhey et al. 2011), 
and as a ‘bridging’ mechanism linking people to engage with others unlike themselves 
(Stolle & Hooghe, 2004). Obviously, since for sharing economy platforms to scale up 
transactions among strangers are crucial, generalised trust as a willingness to rely on 
‘abstract others’ is crucial. As shown later, however, also particularised trust can 
matter as a result of platforms enabling users to see what their ‘friends’ do and how 
they rate their experiences. On the other hand, the optimistic expectations about the 
sharing economy were that it would increase social capital, both in the forms of 
trusting others and of participating in ‘community’-based activities, and that it would 
create new meaningful friendships and social experiences. 
xl  Cultural capital and distinctions are used by the authors in the sense specified by 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986). 
xli  The practical relevance of the two-sided market literature has mostly to do with 
competition policy implications (see for instance Evans, 2003; Wright, 2004). Many 
traditional axioms of economic analysis that inspire competition policy do not hold 
with two-sided. For instance, pricing to one side below marginal cost is not a 
predatory behaviour but rather a common profit maximising strategy in two-sided 
markets. Defining the relevant market for antitrust purposes and looking at only one 
side can lead to a market definition that is too narrow. Furthermore, network effects 
can lead to tip toward a single dominant platform (Rysman, 2009). Under clear 
network externalities the presence of indirect network effects promotes larger and 
fewer competing platforms. The collection and use of users’ data can become a source 
of scaling up and a barrier to entry in two-sided digital platform markets. On the other 
hand, heterogeneity (of users and objects traded) and possible congestion and 
matching inefficiencies may reduce the potential for scaling up to dominant market 
power. Another important aspect of two-sided platforms is the extent to which both 
sides are ‘single-homing’ (using only one platforms) or ‘multi-homing’ (using more 
platforms). If one side of the platform would under perfect conditions opt for multi-
homing (i.e. drivers or other labour services providers to maximise income may want 
to provide services through several platforms) but the other side is single-homing 
(because of lock in with one platform), then the multi-homing side is vulnerable to 
market power exploitation especially if one platform scales to dominance, they may 
be forced to single-home (King, 2015, p. 735). As put by Armstrong ‘platforms have 
monopoly power over providing access to their single-homing customers for the multi-
homing side. This monopoly power naturally leads to high prices being charged to the 
multi-homing side’ (2004, 669-670). 
xlii  In a famous paper Akerlof (1970) describes how information asymmetries prevent 
certain mutually beneficial exchanges from taking place. Considering the used car 
market, he explains that used car buyers know that “lemons” (bad cars) exist but are 
unable to distinguish them from higher quality cars, and they are therefore less willing 
to pay. The buyers’ uncertainty, in turn, discourages sellers of higher-quality cars from 
offering their cars for sale, making both buyers and sellers worse off. 
xliii  See http://www.euro-freelancers.eu/european-sharing-economy-coalition/  
xliv  The reference here is the Max Weber’s distinction between ‘value-freedom’ 
(Wertfreiheit) and ‘value-relevance’ (Wertbeziehung) with respect to three phases of 
  
134 
                                                                                                                        
research: what we research, how we do it, and how results are interpreted (Weber, 
1904).  
xlv  If for various reasons the range of choices is fixed and not amenable to any 
controversy or debate and the policy maker presents the scientific adviser with three 
very technical policy options then one can still play the role of pure scientist or science 
arbiter. Under conditions of high uncertainty and low value consensus the ‘pure 
scientist’ and ‘science arbiter’ are pure fiction or end up being used to support a 
particular position but behind the facade of science (i.e. stealth issue advocacy). 
Apparently, the pure scientist and science arbiter do not seek to compel a particular 
decision outcome, but in practice they willingly or unwillingly slip into ‘stealth issue 
advocacy’. 
xlvi  The key distinguishing elements according to these authors are: a) the ability of 
facilitating exchange among strangers rather than among kin or within community; b) 
the strong reliance on technology that may also favour offline activities; and c) the 
participation of high cultural capital consumers rather than being limited to a survival 
mechanisms among the most disadvantaged (as was mostly the case for older forms 
of sharing and collaborative consumption, and is still the case for some current 
socially-oriented not-for-profit initiatives). 
xlvii  https://www.flickr.com/photos/jeremiah_owyang/15928658251/sizes/o/ 
xlviii  Near Me is a peer-to-peer commerce solution enabling anyone to build their own 
customisable sharing economy marketplace. 
xlix  It means the opposite of off-the-rack. Bespoke clothing is custom-made clothing. It is 
not made to measure, as featured by many good clothing vendors. A made-to-
measure item is a standard one customised at the factory in certain measurements 
and details. 
l  Kitchensurfing is an online marketplace where one can ask chefs to help (paying for 
the service) craft, for instance, a dinner menu and take care of everything from start 
to finish. 
li  Platform connecting friends and acquaintances so that things are shipped and 
delivered to those who need them by those who are travelling. 
lii  Bitcoin is a decentralised electronic cash system that uses peer-to-peer networking, 
digital signatures and cryptographic proof so as to enable users to conduct irreversible 
transactions. 
liii  Mosaic is platform connecting borrowers seeking to finance their solar energy projects 
with investors seeking steady returns. 
liv  All non-empirical contributions including purely conceptual analysis, conceptual-
theoretical ones, review essays, and various normative and prescriptive positive or 
negative essays; regulatory essay and policy analyses have been considered 
separately because for their very nature they could not be judged with the same 
presence/absence of empirical analysis. 
lv  Articles in peer-reviewed journals, book chapters, working and conference papers; two 
exceptions are included among the academic contribution, one thesis reporting 
interesting data on the Netherlands and one on Nordic countries respectively (van de 
Glind, 2013 and Neeser, 2015), whereas several Phd. and Master theses found on the 
relevant topics were not included in the review. 
lvi  VB Profiles, a partnership between the Spokeintel Network and VentureBeat, is a 
totally free source of up-to-date and comprehensive information on industries, 
industry trends, companies and people. It started with an initial database of over 
20,000 entities across multiple industries that has expanded widely through a robust 
crowd-sourced data gathering model, paired with automatically-updated enterprise-
specific news (https://www.vbprofiles.com/about ). VB profile database contains a 
vast amount of information about the ‘sharing economy’ and its segments, which has 
been used to integrate the review of platforms presented in Table 6 of the Annex. In 
particular, it produces and updates the ‘Collaborative Economy 2.0 Honeycomb’ 
representing a radar view on the various economic areas and sectors where broadly 
defined ‘sharing economy’ organisations are entering and expanding. 
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